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Abstract 
 
Basel II regulations have been implemented in Bahrain since 2007. I worked as the Head of 
Group Risk Management in a Bahraini multinational bank with 10 subsidiaries in 10 countries. 
While carrying out these roles, numerous examples of misalignment, irrelevance, and 
impracticality were found, and various gaps between cases in practice and what is stipulated and 
implemented by the regulator within the framework of Basel II were identified. I became 
interested in finding out why Basel II regulations failed to detect triggers of the 2007 crisis ahead 
of time and how successful was Basel II in ameliorating negative repercussions of the crisis. The 
foremost important question was “Was Basel II the right choice of regulations for banks and the 
banking system in the countries in which they were adopted?”  
There are numerous studies within the field of banking regulations and supervision on banking 
crises from regulators and standard setters’ perspective, but little has been written on the subject 
from bankers’ perspectives. More precisely, little has been written on what exactly constitutes 
efficient or inefficient regulations from bankers’ perspectives rather than from regulators, 
standard setters or academic perspectives.  
The above questions motivated us to study the structure, design, objectives and implementation 
of Basel II in Bahrain. An investigation carried out from the perspective of institutions being 
regulated via questionnaires, one-on-one interviews, and examination of banks’ annual reports.   
The purpose of this study is to assess whether the implementation of Basel II is an efficient or 
inefficient regulation. The study aims to provide the banking regulator in Bahrain with 
recommendations, solicited from within the banking system that would help the regulator to 
review its Basel II regulations and supervisions approach. An ethnographic account of the views, 
experience, and recommendations of the bankers are used to assess Basel II regulations and 
supervision in the country. 
The study found that the general perception of the interviewees and the survey’s respondents that 
Basel II regulations do not help banks withstand financial crises, improve risk management 
practices, reduce systemic risk, or improve international competitiveness. Furthermore, the study 
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found that the regulator ignored the idiosyncratic nature of the banking system and its 
constituents while implementing Basel II regulations.  
In light of the findings, the study offered several recommendations to the banking regulator in 
Bahrain. The regulator should, prior to adopting a regulatory tool and imposing it on banks, study 
the relevance and appropriateness of this tool with respect to the banks in the country. While 
designing its supervision program, the regulator should consider the idiosyncratic risks, financial 
performance, organizational structure, governance, and business model for each bank. In 
addition, the regulator should not rely on the implementation of Basel II to introduce risk 
management practices at a bank or prevent exposure to the financial crisis. The regulator should 
adopt tools such as stress testing for each bank and aggregate stress testing of the whole system 
in order to foresee and prepare for financial crises.  
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Chapter 1. Research Issues  
 
But what is the government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no 
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern them, neither external nor internal controls would be 
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in 
this: you must enable the government to control the governed, and in the next phase oblige it to control itself. 
James Madison, Federalist Papers, Number 51 
In many countries and in various eras since banks have existed in their current institutional 
form, the regulation of banks by governments has always existed (Barth et al., 2006). The 
rigidity of regulations has varied among countries and industries, some of which experienced 
extremely tight regulations while others enjoyed more relaxed rules. After the Great 
Depression of 1929, however, most countries have generally tended to tighten their grip 
through interventions on bank operations (Calomiris, 2003). Even in the era of so-called 
“free banking” in the United States in the mid-1800s and in Scotland between 1695 and 
1864, two archetypal examples of periods with minimal government intervention in banking, 
some cases of intervention have occurred (Kroszner, 1997). In the US in the mid-1800s, for 
instance, limits were imposed by the government on banks’ asset portfolio compositions 
(Haber, 2004; White, 1995; Bodenhorn, 2003). The stringency of banking regulations has 
increased over time; after each financial crisis, governments imposed additional rules or 
modified existing ones. Changes in banking regulations by governments have always taken 
place in the aftermath of banking crises (Calomiris and Gorton, 1991).    
 
With this in mind, and to understand the framework of banking regulations for the purpose of 
this study, we should start by answering some fundamental questions about banking 
regulations and the role of government in their design and implementation. Answering these 
questions is important at this stage to conceptualize the motivation of the study, the structure 
of each chapter and the research design. First, what are regulation and supervision? Second, 
why do we need banking regulations, i.e., what are government justifications for intervening 
in the banking industry? Third, how do governments intervene? Fourth, how can we evaluate 
whether the adopted regulations meet the set objectives? Finally, if the regulations do not 
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meet the objectives, how should regulations be redesigned and implemented?  In the 
following sections, we discuss these questions in their respective order. After discussing 
these fundamental questions, we move to address the motivations for and scope of the 
research followed by the research objectives we aim to achieve. After that, I highlight the 
contributions of the current research then move to address the research questions and 
hypothesis.  
 
1.1 What is regulation and supervision?  
 
Regulation is generally defined as “sustained and focused control exercised by a public 
agency over activities that are valued by a community” (Selznick, 1985). It involves 
“promulgation of a binding set of rules to be applied to a body devoted to this purpose” 
(Baldwin et al., 2012). BRTF (London ,2003) provides a more succinct definition of 
regulation: “government intervention that seeks to change the behavior of individuals or 
groups. It can both give people rights and restrict their behavior”.   
 
When we apply the above definitions of regulation to the banking industry, in particular, we 
can define banking regulations as a set of rules prescribed by a banking regulator related to 
all issues and areas related to banks’ technical operations and governance environments. 
These rules are combined and outlined in regulators’ rulebooks and from the banking 
regulatory policy in a given country.  Supervision, in contrast, refers to the way a banking 
regulator ensures that these rules have been observed. Supervision takes the form (inter alia) 
of on-site inspection visits, periodic meetings with the banks, periodic requests for reports, ad 
hoc financial information requests, off-site examination, and analysis.  After defining 
regulation, we should discuss, as in section 1.2, the justification that governments provide for 
bank regulation.   
 
1.2 Why do we need banking regulation? 
 
There are two competing camps that explain government intervention in the banking 
industry: a) public interest justification for regulation and b) private interest justification of 
regulation.  
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The public interest theories justify regulations on the ground that a government has to protect 
the public from banks’ actions, which might be detrimental to the public. The reasoning 
given is that the public lacks resources to monitor, and in some instances, an ability to 
understand actions of the banks. Furthermore, the public, if left without help from the 
government, will not have access to the necessary information they require to make informed 
decisions in dealing with banks.  
 
The private interest theories of banking regulations, on the other hand, explain regulations on 
the ground that a regulator designs and implements regulations and supervisions to protect 
interests of the regulator or the regulated entities. According to these theories, the public 
interest rank secondary to the priority of the regulator.  In Chapter Two, we examine the 
literature on these two polar extreme justifications of regulations — Public and Private — 
and we cite more examples.  
 
1.3 How do governments intervene in banking regulation?  
 
  Governments intervene in banking regulations using the following administrative powers: 
• Bank licensing  
• Restriction of activities  
• Capital requirements  
I discuss each one of these powers below.  
1.3.1 Bank Licensing 
 
Governments exercise their power when regulating banks by restricting the number of new 
entrants to the industry, particularly deposit-taking banks. Licenses for deposit-taking banks 
have always been regulated (Kohn, 1999). Restrictions on new entrants stemmed from the 
importance of banks to commerce. Worldwide, banks have acted as moneychangers; hence, 
they have acted as the driving force of the value of currency. Therefore, unregulated banks 
meant that a country was exposed to mismanagement of its currency, as moneychangers were 
“constantly under suspicion of undermining monetary policy by trading bullion at market 
prices and exporting it to foreign mints” (Kohn, 1999, p.22).   Bank licensing barriers are 
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viewed differently by the public and private interest theories of regulations. Public interest 
theory views the barrier as beneficial to the public because it promotes financial stability and 
prevents market failure. These two objectives are achieved because this barrier will ensure 
that only “fit and proper” entities are allowed to participate in the market; hence, the public is 
protected from rogue bankers and defrauders (Barth et al., 2006). Additionally, entrant 
barriers protect the public by restraining the negative impact of competition on financial 
stability; a large number of suppliers of funds and loans lead to excessive competition to 
attract a large number of borrowers. This increases pressure on rivals to further reduce 
interest on loans and to gain market share from other lenders. A reduction in interest rates on 
loans for this purpose creates a burden on the bank’s profitability (Hellmann, Muroch, and 
Stiglitz, 2000, 2002). Private interest theory views entrants as a regulation that benefits the 
regulator and those under regulation without helping the public. Existing banks will naturally 
not invite newcomers to share the “market pie” with them. Without new entrants, existing 
banks do not have to take into account the reactions of new rivals to the change in interest 
rates on lending and borrowing. To protect their interests, they now ask the regulator to 
approve newcomers. Governments support implementing this barrier because it will also be 
beneficial. With a low number of players in the “game” in a monopolistic environment, 
governments can guide banks’ credit and investment decisions (Barth et al., 2006).   
 
1.3.2 Restriction of activities  
 
Restriction of activities refers to the permissions granted to the banks regarding the markets 
in which they may operate, the types of products they can offer and the scope of work in the 
financial system that they can perform. In particular, this means that banks are restricted to 
focusing on banking, insurance, funds, investment companies, and so on; they are not 
allowed to mix these activities together. Even within the banking industry, banks must 
determine their niche and operate strictly within its mandates — being either a retail or 
deposit-taking bank or a wholesale bank focusing on large corporate clients. Justifications for 
a limitation on activities can be viewed from the public and private interest perspectives.  
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1.3.3 Capital requirements 
 
Capital requirements refer to the quantitative relationship between the size of capital1 and the 
risks assumed with a bank’s assets. Since their adoption by regulators, capital requirements 
have taken the form of a ratio with a minimum threshold. Although capital requirement 
existed prior to Basel I2 and II3, it gained worldwide acceptance, standardization and 
application with the pronouncement of Basel I. There are numerous studies in the literature 
on capital requirements as a tool of regulation, which are greater in number than studies on 
entry and activities restrictions. In Chapter Two, we discuss and examine the findings of 
these studies. However, we find it useful to discuss briefly governments’ justifications for 
imposing capital requirements at this stage. Banks assets are financed by deposits and 
shareholder investments. According to the public interest justification, bank shareholders are 
forced to share risks of ventured investments and loans with the depositors (Barth et al., 
2006). When shareholders share the risks of loss with the depositors, the bank’s management, 
as agents of the shareholders, will be conservative in terms of the size of risks assumed and 
targeted. Attributing the minimum regulatory capital requirement to the “loss sharing” of 
shareholders with depositors disregards the fact that shareholders share risks with depositors 
without adhering to the capital requirements limits. In the event of bankruptcies and the 
liquidation of bank assets, the bank’s shareholders rank after the depositors. Although banks 
are limited liability companies, shareholders risk the loss of their whole investments similar 
to the depositors, who may lose their deposits if they were not insured and if the bank’s 
assets became worthless. There is a dichotomy in the literature between researchers who 
found that a capital requirement is an effective tool of regulation versus those who found 
capital requirement less useful. In Chapter Two, we discuss these dichotomous views.  
 
                                                 
1 We provide the institutional details of how the capital requirement is calculated in Chapter 2. At this stage, we 
only seek to establish the concept that capital requirement is only one tool among several that regulators use in 
banking regulation. 
2 Basel I is set of banking regulation issued in 1988 by the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) of 
the Bank of International settlement in Basel City, Switzerland. The Basel I has also been dubbed Basel I 
Accord and Basel I concordat. It provides requirements for a calculation of how much of a bank’s capital should 
be allocated to the risk assumed in the credit portfolio. 
3 Basel II is an advancement of Basel I initially issued in 2004 but was modified further in 2006. Basel II scope 
is wider than Basel I as it includes market and operational risks, internal assessment of risk coverage and 
transparency measures.  
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1.4  How can we assess whether regulations meet their objectives? 
 
Regulations that meet the objectives set forth by regulators are considered efficient 
regulations; those that fail to fulfill their mandates are inefficient regulations. Chapter Four 
addresses the data and offers an analysis of our examination of this question in the case of 
Bahraini banks. It is, however, useful to distinguish between the concepts of efficient and 
inefficient regulations before we discuss the results as illustrated in Chapter Four as to 
whether the regulation objectives have been met from the perspective of the bankers.  
 
I used the criteria outlined by Baldwin et al. (2012) to distinguish between efficient and 
inefficient regulations. Baldwin et al. (2012) used, however, the term “good” and “bad” 
regulations. I did not follow their terms because the term “good” and “bad” might give an 
absolute conclusion that they refer to a set of regulations that is entirely good or bad. 
“Efficient” or “inefficient” regulations could refer to the same set of regulations to indicate 
that the regulations have positive features but with some shortcomings. According to 
Baldwin et al. (2012), regulations are considered good when they are characterized by the 
following principles (Baldwin et al., 2012):  
 
• Proportionality: The scope of regulation, its rigidity, and its complexity should be 
commensurate with the size of those under regulation, their capabilities and the 
nature of their business (e.g., commercial, investment, etc.) 
  
• Accountability: Regulators should be held accountable for the effects and 
implications of the adopted regulations. A regulator should be questioned about the 
cost of compliance and the benefits reaped from these regulations. 
 
• Consistency: Regulation should be congruent and integrated with other related 
regulations in the country.  
 
• Transparency: Regulation should be straightforward, accessible and communicated 
in a diplomatic manner with those under regulation and any other stakeholders.  
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• Targeting: Regulators should be focused on the ultimate objective of imposing the 
regulations. The enforcement of regulations should not be swayed by a focus on 
minute, immaterial or irrelevant issues.  
• Necessity: Regulation policy should only be implemented and enforced when there is 
substantiated evidence that the requirements in the policy are the best viable option 
or alternative for the regulator and for those under regulation. 
 
• Effectiveness: Regulation should periodically be reviewed to avoid irrelevance. 
Outdated or irrelevant regulations are costly for compliance. Regulation objectives 
should be communicated in a transparent manner in the guidance or regulatory policy 
documents to those under regulation.  
 
Chapter Four discusses the findings of our examination of these principles on banks in 
Bahrain in relation to Basel II regulations. The five questions about regulation and the role of 
government intervention I have discussed so far form the framework for examining Basel II 
regulations in Bahrain in this study. 
 
1.5  Motivation for the study 
 
I worked as the Head of Group Risk Management in a Bahraini multinational bank with 10 
subsidiaries in 10 countries. In addition to this role, we were also in charge of implementing 
Basel II and III requirements at the headquarters of the bank in Bahrain and all its foreign 
subsidiaries. While carrying out these roles, numerous examples of misalignment, 
irrelevance, and impracticality were found, and various gaps between cases in practice and 
what is stipulated and implemented by the regulator within the framework of Basel II or III 
were identified. The liquidity risk, for instance, is being supervised by the Central Bank of 
Bahrain (CBB) very lightly; from Bahrain’s adoption of Basel II in 2007 to the outbreak of 
the financial crisis and the formation of Basel III, no formal monitoring of banks regarding 
liquidity risk was performed by the CBB. Only reliance on the maturity mismatch in the 
Prudential Information Returns (PIR)4 occurred on a quarterly basis. This same procedure is 
applied to retail banks, conventional banks, Islamic banks and wholesale banks. This sole 
                                                 
4 Every bank in Bahrain is obliged to submit to the CBB a periodic report named “Prudential Information 
Returns”. This report includes the capital adequacy calculations and risk management information.  
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reliance on mismatch procedures is applied with a blanket approach, i.e., there is no 
distinction between a bank with a business model that requires short-term liquidity and a 
bank that does not require the availability of short-terms funds. An example of irrelevance is 
the regulation regarding a consolidated Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)5 for a bank located in 
Bahrain with subsidiaries outside Bahrain. The irrelevance is due to the fact that CAR, on a 
consolidated level, is interpreted as having an available amount of capital, which includes 
only the accounting equity of the parent bank to absorb any unexpected losses in 
consolidated assets. In theory, the ratio indicates how much the shareholders participate 
regarding the size of asset risks ventured in the bank’s balance sheet. In practice, because the 
ratio includes the parent bank’s capital in its numerator while the denominator includes the 
subsidiaries’ assets, a consolidated CAR does not indicate or assure regulators that the capital 
reported in the ratio is available to absorb subsidiaries’ asset losses. An example of 
impracticality is the regulatory and supervisory reporting: the existing periodic Basel II-
related reporting requirements to which we had to adhere are akin to ticking box exercises; 
there was the ambiguity of purpose and inflexibility of deadline and design. In addition to 
these on-the-job observations, the financial crisis of 2007 occurred. The 2007 financial crisis 
and its aftermath culminated in mass layoffs resulting from large failures of banks and other 
financial institutions. Practitioners and academics have been trying to find the root cause of 
this crisis and its casualties. 
 
In the midst of the crisis, we became interested in answering questions such as the following: 
How could a bank fail and shut down its operations as a result of assuming excessive risks 
without being detected by its regulator? Why did the regulatory framework (particularly 
Basel II accord) fail to detect triggers of the crisis ahead of time? How successful was Basel 
II in ameliorating negative repercussions of the crisis; i.e., would the crisis have resulted in 
far more losses had Basel II not been implemented? Was Basel II the right choice of 
regulation for banks and the banking system in the countries in which it was adopted? Did 
regulators study the suitability and the necessity of Basel II to their banking system prior to 
adopting and imposing this regulation? Why did countries adopt Basel II? If Basel II was a 
poorly-structured regulation, was it because of its requirements or its implementation? If it is 
                                                 
5 For more information about the definition of CAR and the methods of its calculation please refer to Chapter 3. 
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a bad regulation, as defined by Baldwin et al. (2012), what are the alternatives? Are the 
alternatives affordable economically, politically and socially?  
 
The above on-the-job observations and questions motivated me to study the structure, design, 
objectives and implementation of Basel II and III in Bahrain. This study is guided holistically 
by the above questions. I studied Basel II regulation in Bahrain because I want to investigate 
whether Basel II regulations and supervision in Bahrain is efficient or inefficient. The 
definition of “efficient” or “inefficient” is based holistically on the seven principles listed in 
section 1.5. An investigation will be carried out from the perspective of institutions being 
regulated. If our investigation leads to a conclusion that Basel II regulation in Bahrain is 
inefficient, the conclusion should help the CBB begin communicating with those under the 
regulation to examine the shortcomings and re-design its regulatory policy and supervisory 
conduct. If, however, the study leads to a conclusion that Basel II regulation in Bahrain is 
efficient, this conclusion should provide evidence and affirmation to the CBB that adopting 
and imposing Basel II was the right decision. 
 
Throughout this study, Basel II refers to the document published in June 2006 Basel 
Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) paper titled “International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards” (BCBS, 2006).  
 
This thesis uses the term “Basel-based regulation” to refer to regulations based on Basel II. 
The recommendations of these accords are indicated in various Modules of the Rulebooks, 
especially the Capital Adequacy, Prudential Deduction and Consolidation Modules 
(Cbb.gov.bh, 2015). 
 
1.6  Current Status of Banking Regulations Research  
 
In our review of the existing professional and academic literature, we found that studies on 
banking regulations, particularly those on Basel II, have examined whether Basel II 
regulations can engender a sound banking system. Researchers in these studies adopted a 
positivist stance by developing financial models and studying the impact of the minimum 
capital requirements, as measured by CAR as in Basel II or I, on portfolio compositions, by 
the risk-taking behavior of banks management for loans and investments, etc. Barth et al. 
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(2004), for instance, assessed the validity of banking supervision and its relationship to 
banking stability. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) assessed the relationship between 
banking supervision and achieving a “sound banking system.” They identified adherence to 
the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision as an indicator of a sound bank. 
Klomp and Haan (2012) used the database from Barth et al. (2004) to assess the relationship 
between banking regulations and a bank’s risk level. They developed a model of 25 risk 
indicators and found that large banks were affected. Avary and Berger (1991) studied the 
association between risk-based regulation and bank performance by analyzing US bank-level 
data and using a model developed by the researchers. Researchers who studied capital-based 
regulation have primarily focused on a quantitative analysis of the relationship between 
capital-based regulation and a myriad of variables such as asset composition, moral hazard, 
and portfolio risk. However, capital-based regulations from an ethnographic point of view 
have not been studied. In order for any regulatory policy and supervisory program to achieve, 
the objectives set forth by the regulator several factors have to be in place, chief amongst 
them is the buy-in from the regulated entities. Buy-in does not necessarily mean that the 
regulated entities must agree with the regulatory policy or the regulations will not be 
implemented. Instead, the regulated entities must understand clearly why they are 
implementing these regulations, whether these regulations are applicable and appropriate to 
their business model and environment, etc. When the regulator and the regulated both agree 
on the applicability and the merit of the regulatory policy and the supervisory program 
disputes, miscommunications, misunderstanding of the requirements and mistrust could be 
avoided. Thus, we sought to understand the bankers directly through taking accounts of their 
assessment and opinion and listening to their concerns, frustration, and disagreements with 
regard to Basel II regulations in order to be in a position to give informed recommendations 
to the local regulator. Examples of issues that, in our opinion, have not been sufficiently 
studied include a) bankers’ own assessment of the regulation and supervision program in 
place, b) what bankers perceive as practical and beneficial supervision programs and 
regulation policies for their businesses, c) whether bankers confirm the presence of benefits 
of capital-based regulations as claimed by the regulator.  
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1.7  Main objectives of the study  
 
This study’s aim is to identify whether Basel II regulations and supervision in Bahrain are 
efficient or inefficient. In particular, the study assesses whether Basel II regulations have 
achieved the CBB objectives of adopting Basel II, which include a) assisting banks in 
enhancing their risk management functions, b) assisting the stabilization of the banking 
system, and c) improving the financial and non-financial health of the banks (cbb.gov.bh, 
2015). 
If Basel II regulations and supervision do not achieve any of these objectives, what could be 
the reason for this? Could this be attributable to shortcomings on the part of the CBB or the 
banks? If not, could this be due to the applicability and practicality of Basel II to the nature 
of banking system in Bahrain in terms of bank operations and size? Regarding the Basel 
regulation, is communication between the CBB and banks optimal for both parties? The 
answers to these questions will be shared with the CBB to improve the relevance of Basel II 
for the Bahraini banking system.  
 
1.7.1 Contribution to the conceptual development 
 
The study aims to contribute to the body of knowledge regarding the implementation of 
Basel II in a developing country that has two different types of banks, conventional and 
Islamic banks6, which feature different business model and sizes. This study should also 
contribute to the body of knowledge via a case study on how regulators in a country adopting 
                                                 
6 Islamic banks are financial institutions that offer their banking services on Islamic Jurisprudence law that 
prohibits interest, derivatives, sale of debt or any transaction entails uncertainty of future outcome. Conventional 
banks, on the other hand refer to interest-based banks, i.e. the traditional definition of banking, as we know it in 
finance. In Bahrain, the regulator issues two separate sets of regulations for each type. In some chapters of these 
regulations, we can find significant differences while in other chapters there are holistically few differences. In 
the capital adequacy and credit management chapters of the rulebook, the differences are significant because the 
treatment of credit products of Islamic banks are structurally different from those at conventional banks. Other 
chapters, which delineate the requirements for internal control, corporate governance, business conduct, financial 
crime, etc., are almost identical. Islamic and conventional banks, although differ in business model, but they are 
both subject to the same governance and risk management requirements. Organizationally, both types of banks 
have almost the same departmental structure and reporting lines. Islamic banks, however, are required to have a 
BOARD of scholar, called Sharia Board, comprises of Sharia scholars who should give a report, similar to the 
External Audit Report, in which they give their statement that the products and transactions carried out are within 
the Sharia principles. In terms of human resources, both types attract qualified people; there are no noticeable gap 
between them in terms of staff compensation and remuneration. Furthermore, Islamic banks in Bahrain attract 
and hire non-Muslim expatriate qualified staff in senior and executive posts.    
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Basel II could outline its regulation, create a supervision program and communicate its 
vision. 
 
1.7.2 Contribution to practice 
 
This study, the first study on banking regulations on banks in Bahrain, will assess the 
effectiveness of imposing Basel II on Bahraini banks. It should give the CBB the 
perspectives of the banks in Bahrain about how Basel II regulations and supervision are 
being coped with and used. These perspectives may alter how the CBB plans its regulatory 
scheme and conducts its supervisory program. The findings of the study should result in the 
CBB re-visiting its scope of Basel II adoption. The study should also give the CBB a basis 
for future consideration to augment Basel II with other regulatory tools.  
 
1.8  Research questions  
 
This thesis should answer the following key questions:  
1. How has Basel II implementation, in the context of the CBB Rulebooks, helped banks 
with risk management function and practice? 
 
2. How effective is the CBB in implementing Basel II in its banking system with the 
design of its regulation policy and supervisory program? 
 
3. Is the current CBB implementation of Basel II the optimal regulation for the Bahraini 
banking system? 
 
4. Has the CBB achieved its objectives of implementing Basel II, and did the banks 
approve of these objectives?  
 
In particular, we seek in this study seek answers the following specific questions:  
I. Do banks prefer to be supervised by principles-based approach than by rules-based 
approach? 
II. Do banks see the current supervisory program effective in addressing all the risks 
they are exposed to  
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III. Do banks see the existing supervisory program as effective in aligning the regulation 
to their risk profile and appetite  
IV. Do banks see the existing regulatory program as effective in advancing their risk 
management practices?  
V. Do banks see Basel II implementation and its capital adequacy requirements as 
reflective of their essential risks and performance? 
 
1.9  Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into Five Chapters. Chapter One discusses research issues that cover 
the motives, objectives, and scope of study followed by the research questions and 
limitations. Regulation and supervision are then defined, and the current status of research on 
banking regulation and supervision is highlighted.  
 
Literature is reviewed in Chapter Two. Texts on Basel II regulation and supervision fall into 
two groups. The first group includes writings which are in favor of Basel II regulation and 
focuses on the benefits of its implementation. The second group includes texts that address 
the pitfalls and weaknesses of Basel II regulation. The chapter then concludes with 
identifying deficiencies in the literature and the contribution of this thesis to the literature.    
 
Chapter Three is structured in two parts. The first part introduces the conceptual framework 
examined in the thesis and the philosophical underpinning of the research. In this part, the 
theories of regulation are outlined and assessed. Discussions of Basel II in the literature 
includes a heavy focus on the positive economics view of regulation. Researchers are either 
proponents or opponents of Basel II. They do not provide an alternative theory for how banks 
should be regulated if Basel II regulations cannot achieve their objectives. The second part of 
the Chapter addresses the research design and methodology and explains the reasons for 
selecting ethnography as the research method. This is followed by a description of the data 
collection tools and analysis.  
 
Chapter Four discusses and analyses the data. The findings and the discussions are grouped 
into four main categories: the role and the impact of Basel II, the appropriateness of Basel II 
requirements to the banks in Bahrain, the competence of the regulator to administer Basel II 
14 
 
regulations, and the banks’ management familiarity and awareness of Basel II requirements. I 
found that bankers do not find that Basel II implementation at their banks help them advance 
risk management function and practices, enhance their international competitiveness, help 
them survive a financial crisis or reduce systemic risk in the country. I also found that 
bankers find Basel II methods, as imposed by the local regulator, are not appropriate to their 
business model or the environment.  
 
The thesis concludes with Chapter Five which provides a summary of the conclusions drawn 
from the data presented and discussed in Chapter Four. The Chapter then provides the 
practical recommendations to the banking regulator in Bahrain in light of the findings and 
conclusions.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
This chapter examines the professional and academic literature on Basel II regulation and 
supervision. I organize the literature into five categories according to the five fundamental 
questions discussed in Chapter One. These questions are: first, what are regulations and 
supervisions? Second, why do we have government regulations, i.e., why do governments 
intervene in banking regulations? Third, how do governments intervene? Fourth, what are the 
objectives that government hopes to obtain by intervening? Fifth, did governments succeed 
in achieving their objectives?   
 
2.1 What Are Regulations and Supervisions?   
 
Regulation is generally defined as “sustained and focused control exercised by a public 
agency over activities that are valued by a community.” (Selznick, 1985) It involves 
“promulgation of a binding set of rules to be applied to a body devoted to this purpose.” 
(Baldwin et al., 2012). London (2003) provides a more succinct definition of regulation: 
“government intervention that seeks to change the behavior of individuals or groups. It can 
both give people rights and restrict their behavior.” The literature offers a narrower definition 
of regulations that relates only to the economy. Economic regulation refers to “...Government 
intervention in the market [to]... legislative and administrative controls over rates, entry, and 
other facets of economic activities.”(Posner, 1974) In light of Posner’s definition of 
economic regulation, banks regulations might be defined as an economic regulation because 
banking is a major economic activity. I, however, seek a specific definition of bank 
regulations that explains the existing Basel II as an international regulatory tool and provides 
a framework for any attempt by banks regulator to regulate beyond the realm of Basel II. I 
could not find in the literature a specific definition of bank regulations. There is a large 
volume of studies on the relationships of banking regulations to a plethora of banking and 
economic variables, but a succinct and comprehensive definition of banking regulation was 
not elaborated in these papers. For instance, Seater (2000) examined optimal bank 
regulations and monetary policy without defining what he meant by bank regulation; 
Bhattacharya et al. (1998) studied the economics of banking regulation but did not offer a 
definition of banking regulation; Freixas and Santomero (2002), in elaborating their “Overall 
Perspective on Banking Regulations,” cursorily referred to banking regulation as the 
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“rational response of the government to ….market failure,” Barth et al. (2004), in their study 
“Bank Regulations and Supervision: What Works Best,” surveyed the practices in 117 
countries to “assess the relationship between specific regulatory and supervisory practices 
and banking sector development and fragility.” Again, they do not illuminate what definition 
they have adopted for the purpose of their study. Even the Basel Committee’s papers did not 
give due attention to the definition.  
 
For the purpose of this study and in light of available highlights in the literature of banking 
regulations, we define banking regulations as: 
The set of policies and supervisory activities designed by government agencies in 
proportion to the objectives of the government and the banks, which are subject to the 
economic, political, social, and institutional constraints surrounding the sector, and 
which aim to manage risks at an individual and aggregate level.  
In summary, the literature offered a large number of studies on banking regulations, but these 
studies failed to offer a succinct definition of banking regulation that could explain current 
national practices. I offer a definition and discuss its concepts and components in this 
Chapter and Chapter 3.  
 
2.2 Why Do Governments Intervene in Banking Regulations? 
 
In this section, we discuss the literature on the economic justification for governments to 
intervene in the banking sector. There are two competing camps of arguments explaining the 
government’s intervention in the banking industry: a) public interest justification for 
regulation, and b) private interest justification of regulation.  
 
2.2.1 Public Interest Justification of Regulation  
 
Regulations triggered by the interest and welfare of civil society aim to protect the public 
from market inefficiencies and failures7.  A market fails when resources, good, and services 
are not efficiently allocated amongst market players. Efficiency in a market is associated with 
                                                 
7 There is no consensus on a unified definition of market failure. The dominant definition of market failure is 
associated with the efficiency of allocating resources and the size of risks (Santos, 2001). 
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the situation where a player’s pursuit of an outcome does not lead to the worsening of the 
conditions or situations of another player in the market. Generally, an efficient market in 
economics implies that resources are allocated in a manner that increases the production of 
goods and services, minimizes risks, and reduces information asymmetry. (Barth et al., 2006) 
 
Governments intervene when they apply public interest justifications to banking, in order to 
reduce inefficiencies that might impede a banking system.  The public interest view of 
banking regulation assumes that: a) there is a risk of market failure in the banking industry 
that benefits from government intervention to quell the potential failure, and b) the 
government is competent and able to ameliorate this failure to the benefit of society. I can 
summarize the justifications given by governments to regulate banks as follows:  
 
• Protect depositors in society from losing their deposits due to bank’s excessive risk-
taking. (Barth et al., 2006; Santos, 2001). Depositors who entrust their funds with 
banks should theoretically be able to monitor these banks periodically to ensure that 
their funds are utilized diligently. Direct monitoring requires access to information 
about where their deposits have been utilized and for what purpose, as well as the 
competency,  to conduct this monitoring. Some depositors will not be motivated to 
conduct such monitoring because the process of gathering the relevant information 
and having the competence to scrutinize this information might cost them more than 
the benefits yielded from the monitoring process. Thus, there are depositors who are 
not financially sophisticated enough to look after their interest at banks, and there are 
depositors who are not incentivized to do so because of the costs. Both types of 
depositors require the benevolent “helping hand” (Shliefer and Vishny, 1998) of a 
government regulator to carry out monitoring on their behalf.  Regulating banks to 
protect depositors’ money and interest, although it is a noble justification, has some 
flaws. First, a regulator, by acting as the benevolent helping hand to the depositors by 
looking after their interests and protecting them from the presumed greed and 
recklessness of the bankers, increases depositor’s reliance on the regulator; this 
reliance decreases the incentive for depositors to monitor the performance of banks 
they are transacting with themselves, which would eventually make them incognizant 
of the underlying risks of dealing with these banks (Santos, 2001). If depositors are 
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unable to assess the underlying risks, then they would not be able to accurately ask 
for the rate of interest on their deposits that is commensurate with the risks assumed. 
In this case, banks will optimally exploit this opportunity to embark upon risky 
projects or grow the loans in their portfolios beyond their limits because they are 
motivated by higher profits margins. So, the regulation may create another problem 
for the depositors because of the banks, in the above case, become riskier.  Second, 
there is some ambiguity about the term “protection of depositors’ interest.” If 
regulations are meant to create safe banks and having safe banks leads to the 
protection of depositors’ money and interest, then this claim fails to pass all of the 
tests in the history of banking regulations. Regulations were in place when the 
financial crises of 2007 erupted, to cite only one example, and not only were 
depositors’ money and interest not protected, thousands of people were sacked from 
their jobs.  
  
• Reduce information asymmetry (Santos, 2001). Information asymmetry is defined as 
the availability of relevant information to some but not to all involved parties in a 
transaction. Banks accept deposits, which are typically short term, and transform 
these deposits into loans and investments, which span both short and long term time 
horizons. This contractual gap between the assets and liabilities exposes banks to 
liquidity risks, should there be an excessive withdrawal of these deposits with little or 
no notice. To honor depositors’ requests for their deposits, banks would either 
liquidate some of their assets or seek liquidity funding from other financial 
institutions. Due to information asymmetry on the value of the bank’s assets, other 
financial institutions might refrain from extending funds to the liquidity-troubled 
bank, which could lead to “run on the bank”8 (Jacklin and Bhattacharya, 1988).  A 
run on financial institutions could cause banks to prematurely liquidate their assets in 
order to honor the withdrawal requests. Panic by depositors and debtors with the 
disturbed bank might spread to depositors of other banks, causing them withdraw 
their deposits and foreclose their investments.  The occurrence of such cases in a 
banking system leads to systemic risk and credit or liquidity crisis. The claim that 
banking regulations reduce information asymmetry is theoretical and not sufficiently 
                                                 
8 Excessive withdrawals of deposits with no or short notice  
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studied from a practical perspective. Santos (1999, 2001) highlighted the relationship 
between banking regulations and information asymmetry without specifically 
studying which part of the banking regulations reduces the asymmetry: is it the 
capital-based regulations, is it the corporate governance, is it the restrictions on 
executives’ remuneration and compensation, etc.  I did not find a dedicated study 
within the literature that asserted or denied the impact of banking regulations, 
specifically Basel II,  on information asymmetry. This does not mean, however, that 
we do not think there is a relationship between the two. In Basel II, for instance, there 
is a voluminous set of requirements under Pillar 3.9  Each bank is required to disclose 
full information about its loans portfolio composition, Basel II calculations, and its 
corporate governance framework (including the number of the board meeting, the 
presence of policies and procedures, etc.). Access to this information alleviates the 
risk of information asymmetry; shareholders have access to sufficient information to 
form their financing or investment decisions with the bank.  
 
• Reduce principal-agent problems (Santos, 2001). An agency relationship exists when 
an individual or an organization (referred to as the principal) hire(s) and/or delegates 
another individual or organization (referred to as an agent) to act on behalf of the 
principal. Agents are entrusted to act and take decisions to meet the objectives set 
forth by the principals in a manner that maximizes the value to the principals. Agents 
undertake these responsibilities in exchange for financial and non-financial 
compensation or  benefits. Specifically, shareholders’ investments are used to create 
an organization, and a board of directors is nominated and elected by these 
shareholders to manage the organization, which in turn delegates the management of 
the organization to a team of individuals. The management is thus the agent that 
should work to maximize the value of the shareholders’ investments. There are 
several reasons behind the separation between ownership and management: 
 
(a) Expertise: shareholders may have the financial investments necessary to 
establish an organization, but they might lack the know-how to run this 
organization. 
                                                 
9 We will discuss Pillar 3 when we discuss Basel II structure in section 2.3.1.1 
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(b) The opportunity cost incurred to run the newly established organization by 
forgoing the management of other existing investments. Agency problems 
arise when the management acts in a way that is detrimental to the interest of 
the shareholders (i.e., management acts in a way that maximizes its own value 
and interest at the expense of the shareholders).  
 
The problem is when the interests of the management deviate from the interests of the 
shareholders. Management is motivated to increase returns (e.g., to increase their bonus, 
prestige, and remuneration), which is typically accompanied by assuming excessive risks. 
Excessive risks might not align with shareholders’ risk appetite and capacity, or they might 
not even be sufficiently understood by the shareholders such that that they can approve these 
actions. Management might also be inclined to increase the size of the organization in an 
unsustainable manner and contrary to the objective of shareholders, in order to increase their 
prestige in the market. Public interest view holds that regulations restrain the deviations of 
management’s interests with shareholders’ interests, which will ultimately reduce both 
agency problems and information asymmetry (Santos, 1999).  
 
• Reduce externalities (Baldwin et al., 2012). Externalities are costs that a counterparty 
incurs in a transaction but that the counterparty does not choose to incur. There is 
both a nominal cost and a real cost of a social or economic transaction.  Nominal 
costs are what one counterparty explicitly pays to the other counterparty (i.e., the 
price tag). Real costs are the nominal costs plus what the counterparty does not pay in 
cash or in kind for the goods or services but subsequently pays them in the form of 
jeopardy or detriment to the financial, health, or economic conditions.  For instance, 
when consumers pay for the price tag of the car tyres, this excludes the costs of 
polluting the rivers and seas with the tyres manufacturing waste. Manufacturers of 
tyres externalize” the cost of their action by not paying for the environmental 
damages or public health problems. Regulations of tyres manufacturing aim to 
“internalize” the total costs of pollution by imposing restrictions on the manufacturer 
that limit the waste discharge or by imposing fees for the pollution caused. In the 
realm of banking, consumers seeking loans from banks, for instance, pay the interest 
rate and for administrative expenses but do not choose to pay for the negative 
repercussions that might result from lack of bank’s due diligence, relaxed credit 
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procedures for sub-prime customers, etc. A negative externality associated with a 
bank’s behavior is a bank’s failure, particularly if that failure spreads to other 
financial institutions, thereby causing disruptions to the whole financial systems akin 
to the damages of the financial crisis of 2007.  Thus, according to Baldwin et al., 
banking regulations internalize risks; in banking, this takes place in the CAR. By 
setting limits on the minimum CAR and continuously aiming to keep the ratio above 
the minimum threshold, a regulator ensures that bank shareholders are also 
contributing their own money in every financial transaction. Advocates of this 
justification for regulation consider this shareholder contribution as the 
internalization of the bank's risks. While it has theoretical merit, this rationale of 
internalization has a major flaw. If we take Basel II as a tool of banking regulation 
that ultimately aims to internalize risk (in keeping with the arguments of Baldwin et 
al.), we find that Basel II did not reduce the externalities witnessed in the 2007 crisis. 
In a banking context, externalities are produced by one major factor: systemic risk. 
Systemic risk, in turn, is aroused by market failures. Although there is no unified 
definition of market failure in the literature, we deduced from the available studies 
that a market failure occurs when there is information asymmetry, inefficient 
allocation of resources amongst market players due to distortions of pricing 
mechanisms,10 and high levels of interconnectedness amongst bad performers in the 
market. For banking regulations to reduce externalities, their design must typically 
include measures to quantify these determinants of market failures and also contain 
tools to mitigate them. This means that a regulator should have a measure that gauges 
the interconnectedness amongst the banks in place, predetermine the benchmark, have 
identified in advance which triggers actions should be taken by the regulator if this 
benchmark is reached, and the supervisory actions plan to be utilized in times of 
market failure. There would be no account in the literature if such measures were 
designed in banking regulations prior to Basel 1. Furthermore, Basel, I and II did not 
include such measures. Basel III extended the scope of the accords by including a 
                                                 
10 Distortion of pricing mechanism in the market may take place due to either a monopoly or the fire sale of 
financial and non-financial assets. Fire sale refers to the disposition of a firm’s assets at deep discounted price. 
This might take place in times of crisis when banks are faced with severe liquidity risk; in order to honor their 
due obligations, and in absence of any other funding sources, they resort to the sale of their assets. The sale of 
these assets exacerbates the adversity of the market condition because in times of crisis the market is already in 
disequilibrium stage, i.e., the supply is not equivalent to the demand.  
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measure to partially mitigate the interconnectedness of banks through the 
systemically important bank buffer and the liquidity new ratios. The point that we are 
trying to make in here is that there is no account in the academic or professional arena 
that substantiates the claim that banking regulations can effectively reduce 
externalities.  
 
In order for the public interest theory to work, there are three main assumptions: the market 
is efficient, the government will always intervene to the best interest of the public, and the 
public participate in the political space of the country. (Hertog, 1999)  
When I apply the above benefits, assumptions, and arguments of the merit of the public 
interest theory to the case of Bahraini banking system, I found that the banking system in the 
past 10 years did not satisfy these assumptions. Due to the political structure in Bahrain, the 
public does not have any tools in which they can administer the banking regulatory process 
or hold the regulator accountable for actions if those actions turned out to be a detriment to 
the public interest. The sole regulator in the country does not share its strategic objectives 
neither does it disclosure the pros and cons of the actions taken. For instance, prior to the 
banking crisis of 2007, the CBB licensed many financial institutions (Islamic and non-
Islamic, retail and wholesale) to work in Bahrain. The announced objective was, of course, 
for the public benefit by increasing competitions, reduced cost of credits, creating more jobs, 
etc. After the financial crisis, some of those institutions faced a challenge withstanding the 
crisis.  The regulator “blessed” and encouraged those financial institutions to merge and the 
announced objective was, again, for the benefit of the public as those merged institutions 
would be well-capitalized banks offering longer and wider list of products. I argue here that 
if the public interest was the optimum objective right from the beginning, why no proper 
diligence and scrutiny of the business projections were carried out by the regulator in those 
institutions at the licensing stage. If proper due diligence was carried out, it would have 
become clear that those banks were not well capitalized to sustain their growth and desired 
business model. There have never existed a tool or a body in Bahrain that enables the public 
to assess whether any economic regulations or policy is either in favor or detrimental to their 
interest. That is not only peculiar to Bahrain; most of the developing economies in which the 
public has no or minimum participation in the political process face the same issue. 
Therefore, one cannot conclude banking regulations, in general, and Basel II in specific are 
for the best interest of the public. To argue that Basel II is beneficial to the banking system, 
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and in turn to the public interest, there should be key performance indicators against which 
the public can make the assessment of the regulations and the most important of all, 
mechanism and systems that enable them to make such as assessment. Currently, neither of 
these requirements are available in the Gulf States, including Bahrain.  
 
2.2.2 Private Interest Theory Justifications  
 
The private interest theory of regulation is the extreme opposite of the public interest 
justifications. According to this view, regulations aim to enhance the welfare of private 
individuals or groups in disregard of the public welfare. This means that regulations are 
designed and implemented in order to enhance the welfare of the regulator, the regulated 
entities, or any other related parties (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001).  According to this view, 
regulation is akin to a product that is governed by the laws of supply and demand. 
Governments intervene by supplying regulations to earn benefits in return (Barth et al., 
2006). These benefits vary based on the political, economic, and social environment in a 
country. A government action to gain these benefits is not confined to the design of a 
regulatory policy that is biased towards regulatees; the regulatory policy might be 
“balanced,” but a government could use its power to adjust the policy’s implementation so as 
to favor its interests. For example, a country has a regulatory limit that the single obligor 
limit is 15%11. If individuals or corporations with close ties to the government need bank 
financing that exceeds 15% of the bank’s equity (i.e., a breach of this regulatory limit), the 
government could choose to make an exception to this limit for this situation. Another 
example of government interest is banks financing political electoral campaigns in exchange 
for the waiving of certain rules and regulations that benefit the campaign funders. This theory 
is also referred to in the literature as “capture theory.” This theory hypothesizes that if 
regulations were designed to serve a private group then eventually the regulator would be 
controlled by the regulated entities, and the regulatees would be the ones pulling the string; 
hence, the regulator is “captured” by the desire of the regulatees. Our take on this theory is 
that it does not spell out what distinguishes a relationship that is in pursuit of private interest 
versus one that serves the interests of everyone. For instance, let us take the example of Basel 
                                                 
11 Single obligor limit is a limit placed on banks to cap the credit facilities extended to a single customer at an 
amount representing 15% of the bank’s equity. There is no internal consensus on this limit; some countries have 
it at 15% or 25% and in some extreme cases, it is set at 50% (e.g., Sudan).  
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II implementation. A regulator might choose not to implement Basel II because of pressures 
exerted by certain interest groups, chiefly the bankers, that they might be negatively 
impacted if Basel II was implemented, even though the implementation could help the public 
as discussed in the above section. Nevertheless, we might ask why this scenario must be 
viewed as a battle between the regulator and the banks where the banks eventually win 
through halting implementation of Basel II: why not instead look at it as a bargaining 
process, which is perfectly normal and typically practiced amongst regulators and banks in 
many countries. Another unanswered question is why the theory assumes that if interest 
group(s) benefit from regulation, it must necessarily be to the detriment of the public or 
interest groups (Posner, 1974).  
 
2.2.3 Conclusion  
 
I found that the literature offers public interest theory as a justification for regulation. I tried 
to apply this theory to banking regulations and attempted to uncover whether the 
justifications given by the theory could be linked to the practice of Basel II regulations. I 
found that studies in the literature do not support the claim maintained by regulators that 
banking regulations reduce information asymmetry, principal-agent problems, or 
externalities. I found that the literature does not provide evidence of the applicability of this 
theory to banking regulation and does not answer the above questions, in general.  
 
2.3 How Do Governments Intervene? 
 
Governments intervene via a set of regulations and supervisions programs carried out by a 
government agency (i.e., a banking regulator). The scope of the set of regulations is typically 
extensive; it covers the principles of activities that banks are permitted to conduct, corporate 
governance requirements, capital regulation, etc. For the purpose of this study and as outlined 
in Chapter One, I limit my discussions to capital regulations. I discuss capital regulations in 
the section below.   
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2.3.1 Capital Regulations 
 
Capital regulations mean using the amount of capital reported in a bank’s financial 
statements in a mathematical ratio in order to control the bank’s activities. Prior to Basel 1 
(issued in 1989), there was no uniform ratio or measure for capital regulations across 
countries. Basel 1 came up with the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) which is calculated by 
dividing the bank’s capital by its risk-weighted assets. CAR is set at a threshold of 8%. Basel 
I and II maintained this threshold while Basel III12 proposes to increase it up to 10.5% by the 
end of 2018. Basel 1’s definition of risk-weighted assets (i.e., in the denominator of the 
CAR) was confined to credit risk. Basel II modified the structure of the CAR and added new 
requirements.  
  
There are a lot of studies in the literature that discuss the influence of bank capital on a 
myriad of variables such as the lending process, portfolio risk, risk taking, etc. For the 
objective of this thesis, we seek to review the literature on capital regulation that is relevant 
to why bank’s regulation is capital-based, and why the BCBS has not augmented the 
minimum capital requirement with another requirement that is based on a bank’s assets or 
liabilities.  
 
Before we explore the literature on banking regulations, we thought it might be useful to 
provide some context for a bank’s capital. The bank’s capital is not deposited into an 
“untouched” bank cash account awaiting use as a “last cushion” for an unexpected loss, to 
meet excessive withdrawals of deposits, or to withstand financial crises. The capital is 
primarily spent on acquiring the assets on the bank’s balance sheet. In some countries, the 
capital in the banking industry is very nominal; the major source of funding for banks in 
these countries (e.g., Sudan and Algeria) is deposited. This is because the deposits are 
considered extremely cheap or free. Depositors in these countries do not ask for a high-
interest rate on their money, and this is due to the political, economic, and social 
environments of these countries. Yet, Basel II regulations focus only on the capital; Basel II 
                                                 
12 Basel III refers to the changes issued by the BCBS in the aftermath of the 2007 crisis. It was issued in 2009 to 
provide: a) newly issued ratios to manage liquidity risk, and b) enhance the existing capital regulations by 
introducing three new buffers, namely: countercyclical buffer, capital conservation buffer, and systemically 
important bank buffer. These buffers are discussed in some detail in Chapter 4.   
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regulations do not have any requirements for other sources of funding (e.g., deposits), 
thereby ignoring the main sources of risk (i.e., the bank’s assets).  Ignoring assets here refers 
to the fact that BCBS has not stipulated any requirements on the size, type, or quality of 
assets commensurate with each bank’s size of capital, business model, risk appetite13, risk 
tolerance14, etc. In Basel II regulations, capital is used as a proxy against which the risk 
appetite and profile of a bank’s board of directors and management are measured. The more a 
bank opts for risky lending and investments, the higher the charge against the capital, and 
subsequently the lower the CAR. Decreasing levels of CAR may lead to restrictions on the 
distribution of cash dividends to shareholders because that would push the CAR even further 
downward (Berger et al., 1995; Keeley and Furlong, 1990). This pressure on the CAR would 
motivate the bank’s executive management and its board members to be vigilant about their 
financing and investments decisions and to encourage them to align their decisions with the 
level of risk assumed and the amount of capital available, which is the objective of capital 
regulation.  
 
There are two distinct strands of literature on the capital-based approach: one strand argues 
that capital-based regulation is inefficient and relying on capital as the sole proxy is 
inadequate, and the other strand argues that capital-based regulation is effective in aligning 
the interests of the regulator, the bank’s shareholders, and the depositors. I discuss the 
literature for each of these strands below.  
 
First, we start with literature that discusses the efficiency of capital-based regulations. Koehn 
and Santomero (1980) examined the effect of minimum capital requirements on a 
commercial bank by investigating the behavior of the assets portfolio in relation to the capital 
requirements. The major assumption of this investigation was that the probability of a bank’s 
failure primarily resided with the portfolio risk. Portfolio risk was implicitly defined as an 
inefficient portfolio allocation (or diversification). The hypothesis was that capital regulation 
should reduce the bank’s portfolio risk. According to the financial model designed by the 
authors, they found that a commercial bank portfolio’s risk does not decrease when the 
minimum capital requirements are factored into the model. The conclusion was that a bank 
                                                 
13 The size of the risks that a bank is willing (and has the capacity) to assume in pursuit of is objectives.  
14The size of variation of the appetite a bank is willing to accept.  
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regulator should not rely solely on capital regulation in the form of minimum thresholds, but 
should combine its minimum capital thresholds with restrictions on assets and liabilities 
composition in light of the bank’s risk appetite. This means that in addition to the capital 
threshold, a regulator should also observe the portfolio composition and the diversification 
process15 of banks.  Koehn and Santomero’s (1980) conclusion was that capital regulation 
could not align a bank’s risk appetite with the safety of the bank. An argument that could be 
made against Koehn and Santomero’s model is that it focused too heavily on credit risk; it 
did not take into consideration the market, operational risk, or liquidity risk. Thus, their 
conclusion might be altered if they took into consideration the risks that Basel II and III 
subsequently included in their scope.  Kim and Santomero (1988) addressed this drawback 
and studied the impact of capital regulation in relation to the liquidity and solvency of a 
commercial bank by utilizing the same mean-variance model used by Koehn and Santomero 
(1980). The hypothesis studied in their research study is that capital regulation reduces the 
bank’s risk of insolvency16. Likewise, Kim and Santomero concluded that capital regulation 
could not reduce the risk of liquidity and solvency at a bank.  
 
Moving to a wider scope of examination than capital regulation’s effect on solvency and 
portfolio risk, Gehrig (1995) investigated the impact of capital regulation on the risk-taking 
behavior of a commercial bank. Gehrig raised the question, “Is it true that capital requirement 
reduces failure risk and hence increases safety and soundness of banks?”  In this study, risk 
taking was defined as: a) direct investments in risky assets, b) negligence around conducting 
proper monitoring, and c) improper hedging for diversifiable risks. The conclusion Gehrig 
drew was that capital requirements do not reduce risk-taking by banks. One analysis of this 
study is that Gehrig did not show how he reached this conclusion. In particular, he did not: a) 
indicate if he applied the above definition of risk-taking on bank’s cross-sectional data and 
compared the influence of capital regulation on the variables in the said definition, b) clearly 
distinguish between the influences of deposit insurance, competition, management 
incentives.  
 
                                                 
15 The factors a bank’s management take into consideration in allocating its portfolios such as risk appetite, 
desired level of return, etc.  
16 Insolvency: a bank’s going concern value is less than the expected value of its liabilities.  
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In a similar vein to Gehrig, Blum (1999) designed a dynamic model to gauge the influence of 
capital regulation on a bank’s behavior. Blum criticized Koehn and Santomero (1980) for 
assuming a “static effect” in their examination of the impact of capital regulation on a single 
variable, ceteris paribus. Blum attempted to address the static effect by assuming that capital 
regulations keep changing, i.e., it is firstly imposed then tightened from one period to 
another. The outcome of this model, however, was not different from the ones criticized by 
Blum. He concluded that capital regulation could not reduce the insolvency risk of a bank. 
Blum’s approach, however, might not be realistic. Capital regulations, once they become 
binding, do not change from one period to another. For instance, if a regulator imposes a 
minimum capital requirement of 8%, this threshold would not be changed from one period to 
another. The impact of the capital regulation, if a dynamic approach needs to be examined, 
should be studied by comparing changes in  the size of a bank’s loan portfolio from one 
period to another in relation to the capital requirement, or changes in the level of 
collateralization or provisions in the loans portfolio. These are some of the variables that 
typically change from one period to another, not the tightness of capital regulation.  
 
Diamond and Rajan (2000) tackled capital regulation the angle of liquidity risk in the 
banking system and  argued that capital-based regulations could reduce the probability of 
bank bankruptcy but would bring about liquidity shortages in the financial system. Diamond 
and Rajan (2000) reached this conclusion by constructing a model that studied the influence 
of capital requirement on a bank’s capital structure, liquidity creation, the cost of funding, 
and the ability to force bank’s borrowers to repay. The outcome of their study was that the 
CAR would increase the returns that the equity holders of the bank require and expect, which 
would eventually increase the cost of capital. This would ultimately affect the pricing of the 
loans, and the credit facilities might be negatively impacted as a result of the higher funding 
costs. Higher funding costs affect a bank’s ability to make loans and increase its liquidity risk 
because if funding costs are high in normal times, then it would escalate in times of 
adversity; for adverse business times, banks needs to develop a contingency funding plan. 
The plan enlists all of the possible sources of funds that are akin to the reservoir the bank can 
lean on to survive adversity. The higher the costs of funding, the lower the number of 
alternatives for funding. Fund providers (e.g., banks or other financial institutions) become 
very selective in times of crisis to funding institutions troubled with liquidity shortage.    
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Related to the cost of funding discussed above, Bhattacharya et al. (1998) examined the 
impact of capital-based requirements on a bank’s cost of funding and efficiency. CAR would 
increase the bank’s funding costs. The bank’s efficiency could be distorted because 
competition might prevent them from adjusting their pricing strategy in times of increasing 
funding costs, especially in times of crisis and liquidity shortages. At the time that banks are 
unable to attract more deposits or secure lines from other financial institutions, they might be 
forced by their regulators to either inject capital or issue equities in order to restore the CAR 
and reduce the liquidity risk.   
 
Brunnermeier et al. (2009) stated that capital–based regulation, especially after the proposed 
incremental increase to the capital thresholds specified in Basel III, would lower the capital 
returns in banking. Tightened requirements on capital would drive a bank’s management 
team to either shrink its investment and financing activities, opt for risky investments 
because of the higher returns associated with increased risk, or shift from banking to 
unregulated activities (i.e., extending credit facilities under a license of investment or 
financing companies instead of a banking license).     
 
2.3.1.1 The Basel Accords  
 
The Basel Accords have been called capital-based regulations because all of their versions 
(i.e., Basel I, Basel II, and Basel III17) they have essentially revolved around one important 
threshold. This threshold is the percentage of a bank’s capital to the level of underlying risks 
in the bank’s assets, which is referred to as the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR). After 
reviewing the literature on capital-based regulations, we found it useful to review the 
literature studies of the detailed requirements, especially the quantitative requirements, of 
Basel II and III (Basel I is obsolete in most countries). This review will provide perspective 
and context to the questions raised in the questionnaire and survey as well as the responses to 
them that are discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
                                                 
17 In this study I chose to examine the implementation of only Basel II and not include Basel III because Basel 
III’s full implementation will be by end of 2018.Hence, the effectiveness of its implementation cannot be 
examined before that.  
30 
 
The Basel I Accord was designed as a response to the Latin American debt crisis of the early 
1980s. The BCBS was motivated by the need for convergence amongst the Group of Ten 
(G10)18 countries of their capital measurement standards because it was believed that such a 
crisis occurred due to the lack of standardized capital regulation amongst countries (BCBS, 
2014). The initial focus was only on credit risk19. Basel I methodically introduced the 
concept of capital-based regulation, in the sense of the capacity of banks to absorb 
unexpected losses (i.e., their capital adequacy) that might occur during the course of their 
business, as measured by their capital-based ratio. This ratio, termed CAR, is calculated by 
dividing the bank’s capital by its Risk-Weighted Asset (RWA). The latter is the outstanding 
amount of assets that are exposed to the credit risk, and that could be lost if the triggers of 
this risk take place.  
 
BCBS amended Basel I from November 1991 until June 2004, in light of the industry’s 
comments and central banks’ feedback. In June 2004, the BCBS announced its “Revised 
Capital Framework” that includes, in addition to credit risk, market and operational risks and 
provides options for approaches to quantify each of these risks. This framework was confined 
to the capital requirements for the banking book20. In 2005, the BCBS addressed the capital 
requirements of the trading book21 and added them to the 2004 framework, in its document 
titled “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards” which 
came to be known as Basel II.          
 
2.3.1.2 Structure of Basel II 
 
This section will provide an overview of the structures of Basel II, as stipulated by the 
BCBS. This overview includes the terminologies, concepts, and acronyms that are used 
within the literature and throughout the chapters of this thesis. It also includes my stand on 
the approaches, which underlies the motivations of the research and should help illuminate 
how the interviews and the questionnaire questions were designed and conducted.   
                                                 
18 Group of Ten (G10) countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherland, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
19“Credit risk is most simply defined as the potential that a bank borrower or counterparty will fail to meet its 
obligations in accordance with agreed terms.” (BCBS, 2000) 
20 Banking book: an accounting term that refers to the record of assets held to maturities, loans, long-term 
investments that are not held for trading purposes, and fixed assets.  
21 Trading book: an accounting term that refers to the record of assets held for trading purposes.  
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Figure 2.1 illustrates the requirements of Basel II.  It is based on three pillars. In Pillar 1, the 
BCBS sets out all of its quantitative requirements for the calculation of the CAR. These 
requirements cover only three types of risks: credit, market, and operational. In Pillar 1, a 
bank should quantify its regulatory capital. The regulatory capital is the amount of a bank’s 
equity that is reported on the bank’s balance sheet and adjusted for regulatory requirements 
such as deduction of goodwill. Also, in Pillar I the bank should quantify its credit risk 
weighted assets (CRWA), Market Risk Weighted Assets (MRWA), and Operational Risk 
Weighted Assets (ORWA). CRWA is the underlying risks in the credit exposures22 in the 
bank’s loans portfolios. To arrive at the amount of the CRWA, one applies a percentage of 
risk, called a risk weight23, to its exposure, as reported on its balance sheet. For instance, a 
loan receivable from client A of $100 is reported a bank’s balance sheet. If we assume that 
the risk weight for this exposure is 50%, then the CRWA for this exposure is $100 × 50 % = 
$50. This exposure with a 50% risk weight means the bank could lose up to 50% of its 
money by having such exposure in its credit portfolio and could only recover the other 50%. 
I will discuss below how are these risk weights set. MRWA reflects how much could be lost 
from an investment transaction because of fluctuations in interest rates, foreign exchange 
rates, share prices, or commodity prices. Finally, ORWA represents the amount that could be 
lost due to a breakdown of a bank’s systems, internal controls, staff conduct (e.g., a  bank’s 
staff committing fraud or misappropriating the bank’s assets), or externalities (i.e., things that 
are beyond the control of the bank such as a hurricane that affects the bank’s building, 
electricity outages that disrupt the banking system, etc.).  
 
For credit risk, the committee outlines the following three methods to determine the risk 
weights:  
• Standardized Approach (SA): predetermined risk weights are given by the Basel 
Committee to arrive at the CRWA. 
• Foundation Internal Rating Approach (FIRB): the risk weight is determined internally 
by banks; banks should calculate the default probability of each customer in their 
portfolios and the exposures on their books. The banking regulators provide banks 
                                                 
22 Exposures refer to any outstanding amount owed by a client to a bank that is not covered by provision or 
collateral. Collateral is the financial and non-financial assets pledged by the client to the bank that the bank can 
lean on in case the client defaulted on the repayment of his/her obligations.  
23 Risk weight is a percentage of an estimation of how much could be lost in a banking transaction.  
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with the loss given default (LGD).  The LGD is the amount of loss expected to be 
incurred as a result of a loan’s default.  
• Advanced Internal Rating approach (AIRB): similar to the FIRB, but in this approach, 
banks develop their own default probabilities, exposures at default, and LGD.  
 
In this study, we mainly focus on the literature that addresses the SA because this is the 
method adopted by the CBB in Bahrain.  
 
The CAR is calculated according to the following formula:  
 = Regulatory	Capital + + 	 ≥ 8% 
The mathematical interpretation of the CAR ratio is that for each $12.5 of total risks in assets 
(i.e., CRWA, MRWA, and ORWA), a bank is required to have $1 in capital to support these 
risks. Hence, $1 is also referred to in the literature as “capital charge.”  I will discuss and 
examine the literature on the components of the denominator of the CAR in the follow 
section as follows: 
• Credit Risk Weighted Assets (CRWA) 
• Operational Risk Weighted Assets (ORWA) 
• Market Risk Weighted Assets (MRWA) 
 
I. Credit-Risk Weighted Assets (CRWA) 
The CRWA is a measure that reflects the credit risk level of a bank’s “banking book.” Under 
Basel II, banks can choose from three methods to calculate their credit-risk-weighted assets24, 
as follows:  
                                                 
24 Banking book: a virtual record of long-term bank assets; it can also be defined as a record that includes all of a 
bank’s assets other than those held for short-term trading and capital appreciation purposes. It includes loans 
portfolios, long terms investments, fixed assets, investments in associates, etc.    
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Under the SA, banks should classify their assets into the following counterparty 
classifications (BCBS, 2004):  
• Claim on sovereigns  
• Claims on banks  
• Claims on corporates 
• Claims on retail  
• Claims on multinational banks  
• Claims on investment companies  
• Past due assets  
• Other assets  
 
These are the pre-determined categories given by Basel II. Every entry on the assets’ side of 
the bank’s balance sheet must be mapped to one of these categories.  
 
After classifying the exposures in the banking book into one of the above categories, risk 
weights are applied to each exposure. Risk weights are predetermined and given by Basel II. 
These risk weights were based on the external ratings of the client. For instance, Basel II 
states that if a bank has an exposure with a corporation that is rated by a rating agency (e.g., 
by Standard & Poor’s) at AAA, then this exposure should be multiplied by a risk weight of 
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only 20%. However, if the corporation was not rated, then the exposure should be multiplied 
by 100%. In essence, the SA is purely dependent on the rating agencies’ assessment of a 
bank’s credit exposures.   
 
Basel II, however, has been heavily critiqued for relying on ratings by rating agencies to map 
exposures to predetermined risk weights.  The predetermined fixed risk weights have been 
critiqued because they lack proper risk alignment with the bank’s capital.  Altman and 
Saunders (2001) argued that reliance on rating agencies produces “cyclical lagging rather 
than leading capital requirements.”  During a crisis, a bank’s rated clients that are affected by 
the crisis might be downgraded; if a client is downgraded then the risk weight that should be 
applied to exposure with them would be higher. This results in a higher CRWA, and as we 
saw in the above CAR ratio, the higher the CRWA, ceteris paribus, the lower the CAR. The 
decrease in CAR might exacerbate the financial performance of the bank as the outstanding 
amount of the credit facility might become delinquent or non-performing25 due to 
downgraded counterparties, and possible liquidity risk ensues due to increased borrowing 
rates as a result of a lower CAR26. The opposite scenario would take place during the “boom” 
stage of the economy. This “cyclical lagging” of Basel II due to its reliance on the rating 
agencies has been considered one attribute of the 2007 financial crisis (Moosa, 2010).  
 
Another problem of the SA’s sole reliance on rating agencies to determine the CRWA is the 
fact that clients in many countries, especially corporates, are not rated by any acceptable27 
rating agencies. Moreover, the country in which these clients are incorporated is itself not 
rated. BCBS suggests the application of the following risk weights to unrated corporates, 
banks, and sovereigns: 100%, 50%, and 150%, respectively. The majority of business models 
within most of the countries in the Middle East and North African regions, for instance, are 
targeted towards their local markets, in which corporations or banks seeking a credit rating 
are not a norm. For instance, corporations in Bahrain are predominantly family-based 
business. These corporations are not listed, operate solely in Bahrain, and they are not rated. 
                                                 
25 If provisions become non-performing, they have to be charged to the income statement  
26 As a bank’s CAR decreases, other banks view them as increasingly risky, due to their lower level of 
capitalization. To compensate for the higher risk, other banks ask for higher interest rates on any funds loaned.   
27 Each central bank in all Basel-compliant countries was the discretion from the BCBS to name the rating 
agencies and credit ratings to be used in the SA calculation. The Central Bank of Bahrain recognizes the ratings 
from Standard & Poor’s, Fitch, Moody’s, and Capital Intelligence only.   
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Extending credit facilities to an unrated corporation in any of these countries28 does not mean 
that a bank can potentially lose 100% of its outstanding exposure with its client, as the 100% 
risk weight would imply. On the contrary, the corporation could be of high quality, credit-
worthy, profitable, and liquid, and the fact that it is not rated could be attributed to a wide 
range of reasons, chief amongst them are cultural and political ones.  Exposure to an unrated 
bank is another example of this problem.  An unrated bank does not necessarily expose a 
lender to a similar level of risk as that of a bank rated by an agency with a risk weight of 
50%.  Jones and King (1995) examined the RWA requirements and concluded that they need 
improvements, especially the treatment of non-performing loans (NPL)29. They indicated the 
need for increasing the risk weights for all NPLs. Their argument to increase the risk weights 
of NPLs, however, ignores the fact that a bank could have NPLs in its loan portfolios but 
these loans are provisioned or collateralized and guaranteed. Thus, from risk management 
perspective, the bank is hedged in this case and does not need to allocate capital for its 
unexpected loss. Hence, the bank might not need higher risk weights for this NPL.  
 
There is, however, a deficiency in the literature about examining whether or not bankers 
consider the SA, as adopted by any bank regulator, to be reflective of the essential credit risk 
in the bank’s portfolios. There is also a deficiency on studying what the bankers consider 
viable alternatives to the SA if it is deemed insufficient in quantifying the credit risks of the 
bank. This study would contribute to the body of literature by providing bankers’ 
perspectives on whether or not the SA reflects the essential credit in their portfolios.  
Therefore, we think it is important that a regulator does not confine itself to the mere 
adoption of SA requirements. There is a need to address the shortcomings of SA. If a bank 
regulator adopts the SA, we think it is important for the regulator to examine the credit 
portfolio of the bank and assess if the capital requirement calculated by the SA is reflective 
of the credit risk assumed. However, the literature does not provide alternative methods that 
could augment or even replace the SA.  
 
 
                                                 
28 Examples of these countries include Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Turkey, and Jordan. Source is based on 
the actual experience and involvement of the researcher in these regions. We are in charge of implementing Basel 
II and III in these countries in the subsidiaries that our bank owns.  
29 Non-performing loans (NPL) are loans in which the clients failed to pay the due installments for more than 
90 days.  
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II. Operational Risk- Weighted Assets (ORWA) 
 
In this subsection, we will discuss Basel II requirements for quantifying operational risk, and 
the literature that discusses these particular requirements. Operational risk (OR) is defined in 
Basel II as the risk of loss incurred as a result of the failure in internal controls, technology 
systems, people, and externalities30. (BCBS, 2004). Basel II recommends three approaches to 
quantify the ORWA, namely, the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA), the Standardized 
Approach (SA), and the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA). For the purpose of this 
study, we focus on the BIA because this is the only method accepted for implementation by 
Bahrain’s banking regulator. 
 
The BIA is considered the most simple and straightforward of the three approaches offered in 
Basel II to quantify the ORWA.  According to this approach, the ORWA is calculated by 
taking the arithmetic average of the current and past two year’s Gross Income (GI). The 
average GI is then multiplied by a predetermined fixed risk weight as follows:  
 
	 = GI1 + GI2 + GI33  !	187.5% 
Where:  
GI= Gross positive income in the last three years  
187.5%= a predetermined fixed percentage specified by Basel II to approximate the OR in 
the GI 
 
According to the BIA, if any of the last three-year’s income is negative, then it should be 
excluded from the numerator, and the denominator is adjusted accordingly. This means that 
if in the past three years a bank had a net loss, then only the two positive years are included 
in the numerator, which should be divided by two only. If all of the three years are negative 
or the bank just started its operations (i.e., it does not have three years of income), then the 
matter is left to the regulator to decide, on a case-by-case basis, the best course of action.  
                                                 
30 Examples of failure in internal control are segregation of duties, lacks of policies and procedures, etc.  People 
risk typically refers to fraud, misappropriation of banks assets by its staff, errors in judgments, etc. Externalities 
are events beyond the direct control of the bank such as hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, etc.  
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The BIA uses GI as a proxy to estimate the operational risks faced by a bank during the 
financial year.  
Several observations can be made about the BIA. If net losses are excluded from the 
calculation, then there might be an underestimation of the ORWA as well as misalignment of 
the ORWA concept with the CAR. Exclusion of net losses means that the average GI is 
divided by a smaller number (i.e., the number of positive GI years only) which results in a 
higher CAR. The misalignment is that a bank that generates a negative GI will end up with 
higher a CAR than a bank that is identical except for the negative GI, ceteris paribus. For 
example, if the GI of a bank over the last three years is -$100 million, -$85 million, and $0.1 
million, then the ORWA will be $0.10 million, which disregards the implications of the 
losses during the previous two years. These losses could be a result of important external or 
internal factors such as fraud, large human errors, and considerable fines paid for negligence, 
etc. In this example, the BIA would paradoxically fail to reflect the OR if a bank incurs 
losses. In addition, the BIA penalizes banks for making large profits. In principle, the higher 
the GI, the higher the ORWA, and the higher the ORWA, the lower the CAR. A low CAR 
means restrictions on financing and investments activities to avoid approaching the minimum 
threshold. Another paradox of BIA is that a bank with higher GIs is penalized with a lower 
CAR, while if a bank has a lower GI compared to the bank with a higher profit (or even 
incurs a loss), then their ORWA will be lower, and their CAR will be higher. The conceptual 
problem here is the implicit assumption that the OR events and the resultant losses that took 
place in the past would still occur in the present and in future years. Once banks have been 
exposed to internal or external fraud, system failures, etc., would logically mobilize 
rectification measures, as well as corrective and preventive tools, in order to ensure that these 
events do not occur again. This implicit assumption shows conceptual misalignment between 
the BIA and the essential operational loss events occurring in a given period.  In this research 
study, we will explore whether bankers in Bahrain consider the BIA (which is imposed by 
the CBB) as a measure that adequately reflects the OR loss events of their banks. 
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******** 
Example 2.1  
Assume Banks A, B, and C have the following information:  
  Bank A Bank B Bank C 
Capital  1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 
CRWA 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 
MRWA 500,000 500,000 500,000 
        
Year 1 
income  
20,000 3,500 4,000 
Year 2 
income  
15,000 1,500 -5,000 
Year 3 
income  
10,000 -4,000 -6,000 
        
ORWA 28,125  4,688  7,500  
CAR  18.09% 18.17% 18.16% 
 
I assumed that the three banks have identical amounts of capital, CRWA, and MRWA. They 
only differ in the ORWA. According to the BIA, the negative figures should be excluded 
from the calculation. Bank A has the lowest CAR even though it has the highest profitability; 
Banks B and C both have higher CARs despite their net losses.  
******** 
I move at this stage to discuss the literature that examined Basel II operational risk capital 
requirements. There are numerous conceptual and technical arguments and disagreements on 
the definition of operational risk. 
 
The conceptual arguments surround the definition of operational risk. In the academic and 
professional literature, it has been argued that operational risk (i.e., within the context of 
banking regulations) is highly controversial and that it is not yet clear why regulators 
emphasize its quantification (Moosa, 2007). One reason behind this controversy is the lack of 
understanding of the crux of this risk. Metcalfe (2003) dubbed operational risk as “Risk X,” 
while Crouhy (2000) called it a “fuzzy concept” because “it is hard to make a clear-cut 
distinction between operational risk and the normal uncertainties faced by the organizations 
in its daily operational.” However, Crouhy confuses operational risk with operations risk. 
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Operations risk is the risk of loss that results from the operations department (i.e., back-office 
activities such as treasury settlement, accounts reconciliations, etc.) Risks from these 
activities are distinctive from risks that arise from the lack of policies and procedures, 
internal control, or segregation of duties in a bank as a whole. 
 
The academic and professional literature addresses two types of definitions of operational 
risk, the negative definition and the positive one. Negative definitions of operational risk 
define it as anything that is neither credit nor market risk. In other words, operational risk is a 
residual risk (Rao and Dev, 2006).  Lopez (2002) suggests a brief but dubious definition of 
operational risk. He states that operational risk is “every type of unquantifiable risk faced by 
a bank.”  This argument is dubious because it could eventually lead to the confusion of this 
definition with other distinct types of risk such as liquidity risk, merely because it is 
unquantifiable. For instance, there are three facets of the definition of liquidity risk. First, 
liquidity risk is the risk of the inability of a bank to pay its obligations when they fall due. 
Second, liquidity risk is the risk of the inability to liquidate or sell a bank’s assets within a 
short period with very low transaction costs. Lastly, liquidity risk is the risk of the inability to 
raise funds from the market at a time of stress. There are currently no practical methods to 
quantify the last facet of liquidity risk.  
 
If we apply Lopez’s (2000) definition of operational risk to the latter definition of liquidity 
risk, we would include liquidity risk under operational risk, which is rather confusing.  
Lopez’s definition of operational risk is parallel to that of the Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia (1999). Namely, that is it is “all risks other than credit and market risk, which could 
cause volatility of revenues and expenses and the value of the bank.”  It is unacceptable to 
consider the operational risk to be a residual risk to credit and market risks or as an aggregate 
of anything that is difficult to measure.  Buchelt and Unteregger (2004) agree that this 
manner of addressing operational risk is not acceptable and that it is not suitable for a precise 
identification of all the risks a bank faces.  
 
The positive definition of operational risk, on the other hand, portrays it not as a residual risk 
but instead as “the direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
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processes, people, and systems” (Robert Morris Associates et al., 1999). The BCBS’s 
definition is very close to that of Robert Morris Associates.   
 
I now discuss the quantitative part of operational risk as defined under Basel II.  Several 
issues are of interest and discussion amongst bankers, including a) why consider operational 
risk in the denominator of CAR instead of liquidity risk, which is structurally considered the 
second most important risk for banks after credit risk, and b) the methods of quantifying the 
capital needed for operational losses risk, particularly the BIA.  
 
Herring (2002) criticized Basel II in charging capital requirement for operational risk. In his 
opinion, CAR should not include operational risk because of all attempts to quantify it is 
futile. He also criticized Basel II’s definition31 of operational risk because it excludes 
business risk. Business risk is the operating leverage (i.e. the inability of banks to reduce 
costs or expenses as revenue decreases). His argument had no empirical evidence or case 
studies to validate his statements. Herring went on to criticize the treatment of operational 
risk by arguing that it is an idiosyncratic risk. He argued that if a loss event occurs due to 
fraud, lack of internal controls, or policies and procedures, then the loss would be confined to 
one institution only and would not spread to the whole banking system. Therefore, Herring 
argued that a bank regulator should not concern itself with a risk like an operational risk that 
does not cause systemic damage.  Moreover, Herring argued that since operational risk loss 
events negatively affect the net income of banks and that they would, therefore, be more 
inclined to reduce these losses to increase their net income and subsequently their 
remunerations, regulators would not need to use a capital requirement tool to encourage them 
to reduce their operational risks. Furthermore, to ensure that banks are taking the operational 
loss seriously and prudently, regulators have several mitigation tools that could be deployed 
to ensure banks have them in place.  An example of these mitigations tools might be 
insurance32 to cover unforeseen external events, such as fire insurance for the bank’s 
building, deposits insurance against robbery or fraud (both internal and external). Another 
                                                 
31 Basel II defines operational risk as a risk of incurring a loss resulting from people risk, externalities (e.g., 
hurricane, volcano, flood, etc.), failure of internal controls, and failure of IT systems. The definition excludes 
legal risk. 
32 Moosa (2007) argues that insurance does not transfer operational risk and that it should not be regarded as an 
operational risk mitigants. Despite the validity of the point of transferability, from the point of view of the 
regulator insurance could reduce the size of the loss and hence protect the bank’s profitability and solvency. Thus, 
to a regulator insurance is a valid operational risk mitigants.  
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mitigation tool is the proper policies, procedures, and frameworks for internal controls, such 
as a work manual for each department, proper job descriptions, approved and updated credit, 
and risk and governance policies. Periodic validation of the soundness of these policies and 
procedures for internal controls, by way of continuous monitoring and follow-up, is the third 
example. 
 
Danielsson et al. (2001) agreed with Herring (2002) that Basel II should not charge capital 
through CAR for operational risk because the operational risk is “predominantly 
idiosyncratic”33 in nature, as opposed to credit or market risk. The basis of this argument is 
that the definition of operational risk is vague and that a bank’s estimation of the size of 
operational risk would be hampered due to the lack of adequate data.  There are some points 
that can be raised against this argument. First, while it is true that operational risk is 
predominantly idiosyncratic, that does not mean it should be disregarded in the capital 
allocation for risks because it is a far-reaching risk. Operational risk management touches 
every single department at the bank as well as the board of directors. In addition, operational 
risk is unique because not all of its triggers can be hedged or insured. For instance, people 
who make bad judgment and decisions on credit and investment due to insufficient 
competence are an operational risk caused by people risk, as defined by the BCBS. This 
example of risk is not hedged; therefore, it would not be appropriate not to allocate capital 
for this risk. There should be a distinction between the importance of operational risk to a 
bank and what the BCBS stipulates in its regulations. There might be a disagreement or a 
challenge to the methods recommended by the BCBS to quantify the operational risk, but 
there should be no dispute that operational risk is an important risk for banks and other 
institutions.  Operational risk, as defined by the BCBS, has inherently existed in banks long 
before Basel II. Potentially, every organization may suffer from a loss that occurs because of 
fraud or lack of internal controls. What prevents such loss from occurring is the scope and 
effectiveness of the controls put in place to circumvent it.  Second, credit risk in banks occurs 
from insufficient due diligence, inappropriate credit mitigation, lack of credit culture and 
monitoring, insufficient follow-up, etc. All these are idiosyncratic in nature.  Thus, if we 
apply Danielsson et al. (2001) reasoning around operational risk to credit risk, then we would 
                                                 
33 Characteristics that are peculiar to certain entities.  
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conclude that since credit management is idiosyncratic, there should be no capital 
requirement for credit risk. 
 
III. Market -Risk Weighted Assets (MRWA) 
 
BCBS requires the calculation of MRWA for investments vulnerable to fluctuations in equity 
prices, foreign exchange rates, interest rates, and commodities. These are also called the 
market risk drivers or triggers. Basel II recommends the adoption of two approaches to 
quantify the MRWA: the Standardized Approach (SA) and the Internal Models (IM) 
approach.  
 
The SA for MRWA applies a predetermined fixed risk weight for exposures in equities, 
interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and commodities. There is a deficiency in the literature 
examining the SA of MRWA. Contrary to the SA for CRWA, we have not found a study that 
examined or criticized the SA to calculate the MRWA.  The SA for MRWA, as the name 
might imply, uses risk weights that are predetermined and fixed. Thus the calculation of the 
MRWA under this method could easily be described as risk-insensitive. For instance, the SA 
for MRWA requires that a bank’s investments in shares of a company should be multiplied 
by a 300% risk weight if this company is listed on a stock exchange and 400% if it is not. By 
risk insensitive, we mean that the SA treats all listed stocks the same. The stocks of both 
newly established and listed company carry the same level of risk as the company that has 
been in the market for decades, is profitable and is liquid.  The IM is an alternative approach 
given by the BCBS to address the risk-insensitivity drawback of the SA and allows banks to 
calculate the market risk of their trading and investment portfolios. One famous model is 
Value at Risk (VaR), which has been under a lot of scrutinies after the financial crisis of 
2007 (for market risk and IM, VaR34 is the most used model at banks). Banks have, however, 
been adopting VaR since it was launched in 1995 (i.e., before the announcement of Basel II). 
What the BCBS does for VaR is to provide recommendations on the parameters (e.g., time 
horizon of the data, the confidence level, etc.) of the model and monitoring framework. 
Acharya et al. (2010) analyzed the reliance of the regulators on VaR because “VaR was 
                                                 
34 VaR is defined as an estimate of the probability and size of the potential loss to be expected over a given 
period, and is now a standard tool in risk management (McAleer et al., 2013). 
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meant to be useful for comparing risk across desks and asset classes within a bank,” and they 
concluded, “lack [of an alternative measure to VaR] …is at the root of practical failures of 
regulation.” Their argument is that VaR cannot capture loss events that have a less than 1% 
probability of occurrence (known as “tail events” in the literature).  
 
Similarly, Danielsson et al. (2001) expressed worries on the reliance on VaR by regulators 
and they argued that VaR is insufficient for several reasons. First, VaR considers risk an 
exogenous process.  Market risk, as we have defined earlier, is triggered by changes in equity 
and commodity prices, FX and interest rates (McAleer et al., 2013; BCBS, 2006). All of 
these factors are exogenous. In addition, the VaR for market risk is calculated based on 
historical or simulated market data, which is also exogenous in nature. This means that the 
argument against the use or recommendation of adopting VaR from the angle the market risk 
triggers are exogenous is debatable (Jorion, 2002).  Second, Danielsson et al. (2001) argued 
that the VaR is not helpful if the returns are not normally distributed, as is the case with 
credit and operational risk. They argued that the VaR’s shortcomings can be avoided and that 
the Basel Accords did not account for methods to complement the VaR. The Basel Accord’s 
guidance on market risk, however, has always stressed the importance of having a robust 
framework to stress test and backtest the VaR model’s inputs and outputs (BCBS, 1995, 
1996a, 1996b, 2004, 2011). Both of the techniques are considered acceptable and reliable 
tools for enhancing the VaR framework (Jorion, 2002).  
 
So far, I have covered Pillar 1 of Basel II as illustrated in Figure 2.1. We have seen that the 
SA to quantify the CRWA has been criticized and accused of caused cyclicality in the 
market. I have also discussed the BIA for operational risk, reviewed the literature that 
examined this method of calculation, and concluded that the BIA is not commensurate to a 
bank’s operation and does not measure what it is designed to measure. For the MRWA, I 
found that the literature lacks an examination of the SA for the MRWA. The IM is an 
alternative to SA for the MRWA that has been examined in the literature, and it was found to 
be suitable for market risk only but needs to complemented with a stress testing and back 
testing framework.  
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2.3.1.3 Pillar 2 – The Supervisory Review Process (SRP) 
 
In this section, we discuss the second pillar of Basel II and the Supervisory Review Process 
(SRP). The SRP involves dialogues, continuous discussions, and consultations between the 
regulator and the banks about the following questions:  
a) How do banks manage risks other than those calculated in Pillar 1(i.e., other than 
credit, market, and operational risk)?  
 
b) Is the CAR in Pillar 1 sufficient or does it require additional charges against capital, 
in light of the assessment in (a) above?  
 
Conceptually, in quantifying capital adequacy, a regulator’s capital adequacy assessment 
should include all of the risks to which a bank is exposed. The BCBS has not provided 
reasons of confining CAR to credit, market, and operational risks only, and for excluding 
liquidity risk, for instance, which is very much related to the fundamental role of banks in the 
economic system (i.e., liquidity transformation35).  Another important risk that was not 
included in the Pillar 2 of Basel II is concentration risk. The definition of concentration 
differs based on the context. For instance, concentration risk in credit risk refers to the fact 
that a bank’s loans portfolio is not spread across a large volume of customers but focused 
only on few clients. Similarly, concentration risk in a market risk management context might 
refer to the fact that the bank is focusing its investments in equity and not diversifying into 
real estate, commodities, etc.  
 
Basel II requires banks to quantify all the risks they are exposed to and which are not 
included in the CAR (i.e., other than credit, market, and operational), and to report them in a 
document termed the “Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP).” ICAAP 
should be designed by each bank, submitted to the regulator, and periodically updated. Basel 
II does not provide predetermined fixed risk weights or stipulate the use of any statistical 
methods to quantify the risks. Basel II leaves it open to each regulator to impose the 
quantitative methods that they find most commensurate with the nature of the business and 
                                                 
35 Liquidity transformation is a process of accepting deposits from depositors (market participants who have 
surplus of funds) on short terms and channel them through to creditors (market participants who have shortage 
of funds) in the form of long-term finance and investments.   
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sophistication of their banks. ICAAP is submitted to the regulator for validation. The 
regulator should, in principle, examine the quantitative analysis, assess its robustness and 
correctness, and decide whether it needs to be re-assessed by the bank or whether it is 
approved. The outcome of Pillar 2 is that the regulator should add the size of the risks 
calculated in Pillar 2 to those of Pillar 1 in order to determine the adequacy and resiliency of 
the bank’s capital. Since it covers all of the risks not in the CAR, the validity of ICAAP has 
important implications for both banks and regulators. The literature is deficient in examining 
ICAAP in particular and Pillar 2 of Basel II in general. I did not find any studies on ICAAP, 
its implementation, and its usefulness. This study would contribute to the examination of a 
regulator how to handle the ICAAP process and optimized it. After all, ICAAP is the core of 
Basel II. It is, by its definition and scope, the handbook of a bank’s risk management. It 
covers how risks are identified, measured, monitored, reported, and how much capital is 
allocated to each one of them. In its process, the regulator is given a chance to validate the 
measures carried out to examine whether or not each measure of risk has achieved what it has 
been designed to achieve. Therefore, ICAAP is a great source of risk management 
frameworks for both the bank and the regulator. Yet, no attention has been given in the 
market to examining the effectiveness or efficiency of ICAAP’s implementation in practice.  
 
After having an overview of what constitutes Pillar 2, and after learning that banks are “left 
alone” to undertake the assessment process of all the other risks that were not covered under 
Pillar 1, how can a regulator trust that the internal assessments are done properly? The 
BCBS’s answer to that question is that a regulator would have a comfort that the internal 
assessments have been carried satisfactorily if it can satisfy itself that the bank has in place a 
sound corporate governance framework. This framework would act as a backstop, i.e. the 
conduct and operations at the bank cannot slide below the minimum established objectives as 
laid out by the regulator and the board of directors. Thus, a corporate governance would need 
to be defined in here, and the relationship with the Basel II implementation would have to be 
reviewed in the literature and examined in the context of banks in Bahrain.  
Corporate governance is a set of principles, policies, and procedures that clearly delineate the 
responsibilities and accountabilities of each party in an organization to reduce conflict of 
interest and achieve the organization’s objectives.   
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The literature on corporate governance is voluminous. I intend to discuss in here only works 
on corporate governance that studies the relationship between corporate governance and risk 
management at banks, systemic risks, and financial crisis to be in line with the research 
questions and the research objective.  
  
I shall first provide a context of the definition of corporate governance then survey the 
literature on it. In any commercial organization, there are three sets of people, the owners or 
the shareholders, the board of directors, and the management. The objectives, motives, and 
actions of the people in theses sets vary, in some instances considerably. The optimum 
objective is, however, that the organization continues in its venture and its discontinuity 
negatively affects none of its stakeholders. Thus, there is a need for a set of principles, and 
subsequently, rules that align the objectives and motives of the people in the three sets 
toward the common objective, the prosperity, and continuity of the organization, that is. 
These principles should draw the lines of the relationships among these people, set the 
requirements for accountability of each party, and monitor how each one of them performs in 
light of the optimum organization objective. If we go back again and look at the three sets of 
people, it will come clear why corporate governance is particularly important for banks 
because that sets will be expanded to include the investors and depositors as well as the 
public in the society. It is also for the same reason why corporate governance at some 
organizations is rarely talked about such as the family business or in closed-net partnerships. 
That is because the owner's category of people is the same as the management as well as the 
board of directors. It is very important to note that there is no internationally accepted 
uniform set of principles of corporate governance. Even when practitioners talk about 
“international best practice” repeatedly after the crises, scandals, and risk management 
incidents, it has been found that the tag (the international best practice) is illusive and vague. 
What is considered as best practice corporate governance rules in a country is not considered 
so in another country. The differences are sometimes significant. Let us take the example of 
the position of Chairperson of the board and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). In Bahrain, 
for instance, it is not permissible to mix these two rules. The reason is that to avoid the 
influence the Chair would have on the management of the organization. In the USA, it is 
acceptable and allowed to mix the two positions, and the regulator finds a great advantage of 
having one person assuming the two positions. In addition, they can argue quite well to 
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support that claim36. The regulator in Bahrain relies on the principles of corporate 
governance issued by the BCBS and the UK regulator. 
 
To understand the relationship between corporate governance and risk management one has 
to understand first the objectives and elements of the corporate governance. The corporate 
governance is about the following objectives:  
• Fairness: all stakeholders of the establishment are treated equally 
• Accountability: Board and management are responsible for discharging their 
responsibilities toward the owners, regulators, and the society  
• Independence: there is an independent function that monitors the conduct of 
the management  
• Transparency: all stakeholders have access to all the information they need to 
make an informed decisions.  
To achieve the above objectives, the following elements have to be in place:  
• Board of directors’ commitment toward the responsibilities of monitoring, corporate 
culture, and control environment.  
• Effective internal control environment  
• Transparent disclosure  
• Board practice aligned with the objective and strategy of the organization.  
To satisfy Pillar 2 requirements, banks would need to have in place policies and procedures 
for each identifiable risk, measurement methodologies, reporting mechanism, and 
information technology systems to help in managing the risks. Having policies and 
procedures demarcate the responsibilities of each function in the organization and align them 
to the organization’s objectives, measuring and reporting the risks facilitate the disclosure 
requirements that help each stakeholder to study the disclosure and make an informed 
decision. In addition, in order for the policies and procedures to be effective would require 
that that boards of directors periodically monitor the implementation, have access to the right 
                                                 
36 Look at the Warren Buffer and Bill gates. Did their companies suffer financially, operationally, or structuraly 
because they once assumed the two posts? The answer is no. 
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information and raise the right questions on the rights information. With that in place, the 
executive management would be remunerated according to the risks they bring on board.  
We move now to survey the literature that examined the relationship between corporate 
governance and risk management. Kleffner et al. (2003) examined such relationship on 
Canadian banks. They surveyed the listed companies and unlisted company on the Canadian 
stock exchange. The listed companies are obliged to comply with the local regulatory, 
corporate governance standards while the unlisted companies do not. They found in their 
study that there is no significant change in the enterprise risk management in the two groups 
of companies. Although the explanation behind this indifference was not indicated in their 
study, my interpretation of Kleffner et al. (2003) study that the indifference is due to the 
cultural attributes of resistance to change to an enhanced risk management environment.  
Wang et al. (2016) studied corporate governance from the perspective of risk management 
and the executive management incentives of listed companies in the financial sector and 
found that there is a non-linear relationship between corporate governance and risk 
management. What they actually found to make a significant impact on corporate governance 
and the corporate value was not the whole corporate governance principles but the executive 
management pay.    
 
OECD (2014) report on the relationship between risk management and corporate governance 
found, after surveying some developed countries such as Norway, Switzerland, and 
Singapore that the current principles of corporate governance are “high-level” which makes 
issues of their implementation and assigning performance indicators for each principle fuzzy 
and argumentative.  
 
The lack of correlation between corporate governance and risk management as concluded in 
the above and other studies is not surprising. After the financial crisis of 2007, it was 
examined by regulators and practitioners that what was lacking was not the risk management 
culture but also the proper code of governance that enforce the implementation and 
accountability of risk management functions and practice and culture. Aebi et al. (2012) 
provided partial evidence on that. They  investigated whether risk management-related 
corporate governance mechanisms, such as for example the presence of a chief risk officer 
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(CRO) in a ban’s executive board and whether the CRO reports to the CEO or directly to the 
board of directors, are associated with a better bank performance during the financial cri-sis 
of 2007. They measured bank performance by buy-and-hold returns and ROE and indicators 
for strong corporate governance through CEO ownership, board size, and board 
independence. They found that banks, in which the CRO directly reports to the board of 
directors and not to the CEO (or other corporate entities), exhibit significantly higher (i.e., 
less negative) stock returns and ROE during the crisis. In contrast, standard corporate 
governance variables are mostly insignificantly or even negatively related to the banks’ 
performance during the crisis.   
 
Datar (2004) calls for a distinction between corporate governance in each industry. To Datar, 
there should be corporate governance code to each industry because every industry is unique 
in its risks infrastructure, ownership, and management structure. Datar (2004) indicated three 
examples, which warrant a customized code of corporate governance, risk appetite, credit 
lending and liquidity risk. From a practical point of view, Datar (2004) view is valid. After 
the financial crisis, shocked by the repercussion of the crises, governments in developed and 
developing countries formed committees in the Congress, Parliament, Central banks and 
standards setters’ level. The optimum objective was to come up with a code that is 
comprehensive in its scope, detailed in its depth yet simple and implementable to save the 
world from another crisis. Encouraged by the standards of fairness, accountability, and 
reliability, non-financial institutions and their regulators followed the practice of installing 
corporate governance in their frameworks. In some occasions, like the case in Bahrain, one 
could see that regulators share the same code and apply it to its own regulated entities. 
Nevertheless, what Datar (2004) did not address is that it is the lack of standards or codes 
neither it is the lack of industry specificities. The issue is the lack of implementation of these 
standards. In addition, when we ask ourselves why were all these corporate governance 
standards not implemented we find that, in my assessment, all the reports and codes issued 
by standard setters are rhetoric and generic in their terms. They are open for interpretation. 
Amid these interpretations, the substance of accountability, legitimacy, and independence are 
lost. Let us take for instance the Turnbull Committee, the focus of the outcomes is that any 
organization is free to pursue the shareholder's wealth maximization, but it should observe 
managing its risk while pursuing this objective and to ensure internal control and reporting 
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mechanism are efficient and effective. Which proxies are used to assess the efficiencies and 
effectives, who should assess the effectiveness of internal control, how frequent, and in 
which forms, are just a few questions that no code of corporate governance has addressed so 
far. If we take the example of Bahrain, the regulator expects banks to have a sound risk 
management department, and that should be linked with the objective of the organization. 
Yet, no benchmarks are provided as the minimum against which the implementation of the 
governance code is examined. It is not only the case in Bahrain; it is the same in the UK, 
USA, Singapore, Hong Kong, etc.  
 
Macy and O’Hara (2003) after the delineated the differences in corporate governance 
between the Anglo-American and Franco-German systems, the similarities of the need for 
the governance among all commercial enterprises; they concluded that banks should be 
looked differently. The distinction feature of the bank’s balance sheet about the acceptance of 
the depositor's money necessitates the need for a wider scope of motivation for a robust 
governance system. Traditionally, the governance is to make that all the components and 
parties on entering rouse work toward a single objective, shareholders maximization. In 
banks, according to Macy and O’Hara (2003) deposits protection is as important as wealth 
maximization for the shareholders. Thus, Macy and O’Hara suggested a design of a 
mechanism through which depositors could hold shareholders accountable for any 
negligence. Albeit this suggestion is made more than a decade ago by the authors, the need 
for its implementation is validated by cotemporary banking scandals. For instance, Wells 
Fargo bank created more than one million phony accounts for existing customers and 
charged them fees for overdrafts or penalty of minimum account banks without their 
knowledge; the depositors could not hold any of the executive management team 
accountable. It was just the government, which imposed a penalty charge to be paid to the 
government and to compensate the depositors of the fees incurred. Leaving the compensation 
aside, how can depositors hold the CEO, for instance, for this negligence? Most importantly, 
how can the depositors ensure that those who manage their funds are not taking too much 
risk to jeopardize their money? There is the existing mechanism.  The only mechanism is 
through a government, which takes us to the discussion of the public interest theory of 
regulation and the surrounding argument whether the government really acts solely for the 
interest of the public.  
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McCrae and Balthazor (2000) examined the risk management component of the Turnbull 
Guidance and argued that Turnbull guidance to the directors, once implemented will give the 
compliant companies a competitive advantage over those companies, which do not 
implement the Guidance. Risks, according to the McCrae and Balcthazor reduce net income, 
minimize shareholders wealth and affect the competitive advantage. When implemented, the 
guidance could reduce fraud incidents, reduce the need for expensive risk hedging tools, 
increase the quality of the investments and lending portfolios. Turnbull guidance should be 
given credit for addressing risk management in a better way than the other guidance issued 
by regulators or standards setters particularly in explicitly addressing the fact that accepting 
risk is not an immoral act of any enterprise. Risks should be accepted given that it is properly 
calculated along with prudential decisions taken in an environment of high internal control, 
accountability and risk management monitored directly by the board. Turnbull Guidance is 
the only guidance that promotes self- regulation through robust internal control without the 
need for requirements imposed by regulators.  
 
2.3.1.4 Pillar 3 – Market Discipline  
 
The main objective of this pillar is to enhance the level of banks’ information disclosure to 
the banks’ stakeholders. Before Basel II, there were no minimum requirements for the type, 
width and depth of information to be disclosed to the investors, depositors, shareholders and 
regulators. This lack of disclosure requirements was considered as one of the reasons of the 
financial crisis in 2008. (Vauhkonen, 2012). The requirements in Pillar 3 focus on the 
disclosure of the inputs needed to calculate the Capital Adequacy Ratio calculation, i.e. the 
bulk of the disclosure requirements are focused on the calculation of the regulatory capital, 
credit risk, market risk, and operational risk in the CAR. There are, however, qualitative 
disclosure requirements of banks’ policies and procedures, strategies, and processes of the 
banks’ risk management. The BCBS’s objective of Pillar 3 is to enable the stakeholders 
(chiefly the depositors, investors and the regulators) to monitor by themselves the 
performance of their banks. When these stakeholders have access to the information of the 
risks and capital adequacy of a bank, they will be able to make prudent decisions of investing 
or placing deposits at a specific bank instead of other banks. This ability to make such 
decisions based on adequate disclosure enhances the discipline in the market as all market 
participants have access to the same information and similar right to act on it. Hence, the 
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BCBS called Pillar 3 a “Market Discipline.” There are two types of market discipline, direct 
and indirect. In the direct market discipline, market participants can directly exert an 
influence on a bank through the cost of funds supplied. When a bank is issuing debt 
securities or seeking to attract more deposits, market participants require a return based on 
their analysis of the bank’s risk profile as disclosed in the bank’s annual report. In the 
indirect market discipline, on the other hand, the prices of equity securities issued by a bank 
would be influenced by the demand of market participants on these securities. The demand is 
determined by the disclosed financial performance parameters (i.e. liquidity, profitability, 
solvency, leverage, and capital adequacy). The disclosure of these parameters acts as a signal 
to the market participants to guide their decisions.    
 
In the literature, there are studies that examine banks’ disclosures but from the perspective of 
corporate governance or the impact of the disclosure on the spread37 on the debt securities 
issued by a bank. For the objective of this study, I was looking for papers that specifically 
address the relationship between the disclosure requirements and the areas in the research 
questions, i.e. I was looking for the impact of disclosure requirements on the advancements 
of risk management practices, systemic risk, and financial crisis.  
 
2.3.1.5 Basel III 
 
What was wrong with Basel II so that the BCBS found it necessary to have to upgrade Basel 
II and to Basel III? How successful so far is Basel III in answering some of the research 
questions? How the practitioners and academic assess the changes in Basel III? In this 
subsection, I will first provide a context of the Basel III requirements then I will address the 
literate to answer the last two questions.  
 
Basel III came into existence because of some weaknesses in Basel II. It is only during and 
after the crisis of 2007 that these weaknesses were realized. These weaknesses were:  
 
• Lack of leverage measure  
• Lack of liquidity measure 
                                                 
37 The differences between the return from risk-free securities (e.g. treasury notes) and the premium required by 
the suppliers of funds based on the risk profile of the organization issuing the securities.   
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• Cyclicality of the standardized approach for credit risk  
• Reliance on rating agencies  
• Reliance on internal models 
 
I. Lack of leverage measure  
 
Every bank finances its assets either from its depositor’s money (i.e. borrowing) or by its own 
money (i.e. capital). Leverage is the size of borrowing or debt in relation to the total size of 
assets. The higher the leverage, the higher the fixed charges (interest expenses) and the higher 
the risk. If given the option, banks would prefer to borrowing than their own funds because 
borrowing is typically cheaper than the equity. This is because the required rate of return on 
capital by the shareholders is higher than the interest paid on saving accounts.38 By definition 
indicated above one would conclude that high leverage is risky for all types of business, banks 
and non-banks alike. While this is true but high leverage at banks is riskier at banks than non-
banking institutions because of the following distinguishing factors:  
 
a) Assets transformation  
Banks generally borrow on short term and lend on various terms. A Bank has a unique risk that 
it is the only institution at which its creditors may come overnight and claim their dues. 39 This 
requires a stock of highly liquid assets to honor deposits’ withdrawals at an unexpected time 
to avoid a run on the bank40.   
 
b) Off-balance sheet exposures  
 
One of the most important categories of banking products is off-balance sheet commitments, 
which include a letter of credits, letter of guarantees and bankers acceptance. The risk of these 
products that they are mostly irrevocably non-cancellable by the banks and when they are 
drawn or utilized by the clients, they require the presence of cash to be paid to the beneficiaries. 
                                                 
38 Some banks are financed by zero cost of funds as they rely on saving or current accounts on which no interest 
rate is paid.  
39This includes the current accounts and all types of saving deposits because the depositors can still pay the 
penalty charges of early deposits redemption for termed deposits and withdraw their funds.   
40 A famous real-life case of this risk, run on the bank, is Northern Rock Bank in the UK. Shin (2009) provided 
an adequate reflection of the case and discussed a number of studies on the same subject.  
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it is because of this potential burden on cash that regulators put various limits on the tolerable 
level of off-balance sheet exposures in relation to total equity or total assets.  
Basel II it is CAR did not address the liability side of the balance sheet neither did it address 
the risk of having excessive off-balance sheet exposures.  
 
After the crisis, the BCBS has realized that their banks are operating well above the minimum 
threshold of CAR yet have excessive leverage either by the large volume of debt on their 
balance sheet or by off-balance sheet products. To reduce this risk, the BCBS recommended 
in Basel II that each bank adheres to the following leverage ratio:  
%&'(%)	
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II. Lack of liquidity measure 
 
CAR under Basel II addresses the credit, market and operational risk. Liquidity risk, as well 
as a myriad of other risks, were addressed under Pillar 2 of Basel II in which there were no 
minimum quantitative measures or limits to manage these risks. As I explained in Pillar 2 
section that every bank is obliged to “write” to the regulator how it manages and measures its 
liquidity risk ( and other risks) in an unstructured policy and supervision program. Regulators, 
as a result of that, did not have a clear picture of the liquidity position of individual banks or 
the liquidity in the whole system. One could confidently say that thanks to Basel II, liquidity 
risk was not much of concern to the regulators then. Again, after the financial crisis of 2007, it 
was found that banks who suffered from liquidity shortage had a strong capital adequacy ratio. 
Those banks seemed to have managed their credit and market risk well but had an imprudent 
practice of liquidity management.  
To address this risk quantitatively, Basel III recommended the adherence to the following two 
ratios:  
a. Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR): this ratio measures the ability of a bank to have a 
high-quality liquidity assets within 30 days that can cover the 30-day cash outflow at 
the time of stress. This ratio is akin to the current ration in the credit analysis in which 
current assets is divided by current liabilities. The different between this ratio and the 
current ratio is that the LCR is forward looking while the current ratio is a historical-
based ratio, i.e.,.e. it does not take into account the potential cash outflow leaving the 
bank within 30-day. The minimum threshold for this ratio is 100%, which means that 
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every bank should have at least an equal of amount of cash outflow in the form of either 
cash of high liquid assets to honor its shorter obligations.  
b. Net stable funding ratio (NSFR): this ratio takes a wider time horizon than the LCR. It 
measures the bank’ ability to have stable funds to either grow or at least continue 
offering the same level of operation for a period of one year or more. The minimum 
threshold for this ratio is 100% as well.  
 
III. Cyclicality of the Standardized approach  
 
I have highlighted the issue of procyclicality of the SA under section 2.3.1.2 and defined “pro-
cyclicality” under section 2.4.1. To circumvent the cyclicality risk, the BCBS had proposed a 
macro-prudential measure to act as a buffer in which each bank, during times of excessive 
credit or growth in the economy, create a reserve that can be used at times of crisis. The purpose 
of this buffer is to streamline the credit supply in the economy as banks would normally tend 
to decrease their credit supply in recession, this buffer would enable them to avoid a sharp or 
abrupt decline in credit supply because of capital requirements.   
 
IV. Reliance on rating agencies 
 
As explained in section 2.3.1.2 that CRWA is calculated by multiplying the credit exposure to 
a given risk weight determined by the rating of the client by certain rating agencies approved 
by the local banking regulator. The practitioners have brought the diligence and credibility of 
the rating agencies to scrutiny after the crisis of 2007 because it was found that various 
instruments issues and financial institutions, which suffered dire financial consequences, were 
well rated shortly prior to the crisis41. The reliance on the rating agencies is not only manifested 
in Basel II, but it is also seen in various facets of the financial systems. According to Bahena 
(2010), page 5, “In the United States, as of September 2008, at least forty-four regulations of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) incorporate the use of ratings. For example, the SEC 
limits money market funds to investments in the top two rating categories. Other countries, 
including Canada, Belgium, and Poland, require certain investors to obtain prior approval before 
                                                 
41 There are two famous case studies of this controversy, Enron and Parmalat ( Daiy Italian company). Both of 
them were highly rated shortly before their collapse. Melis (2004) studied the case of Parmalat Scandal in detail 
in light of the corporate governance regime in Italy.   
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purchasing certain low-rated instruments and ban other investors from investing in low-rated 
investments at all. In Italy, securities must be rated before they can be offered to non-commercial 
investors.”  
 
The BCBS has attempted to address this risk of relying on rating agencies for the calculation 
of the Standardized Approach by proposing a metric system for credit risk quantification. In 
its paper dated December 2014 titled “revisions to the standardized approach for credit risk- 
consultative document,” the committee proposed determining the risk weights of each credit 
exposure based on the specific features of the bank’s client’s financial performance such as the 
client’s leverage and turnover for corporate clients. For banking clients, the parameters would 
be the capital adequacy and assets quality. There is still no final stance of the Committee of 
whether it would adopt this methodology of calculating the credit risk. as it was only a 
consultative document that has not been implemented, I did not find a study in the literature 
that examined the proposed changes. 
 
Having provided the context of Basel III, its requirements and the reasons behind its creation, 
I would discuss here the studies in the literature on Basel III. 
 
Angeleni and Gerali (2012) examined the macroeconomic aspect to Basel III. In their study, 
they attempted to answer the questions of the impact of adhering to Basel III on the overall 
economic performance in a country and whether the implementation of the new accord will 
dampen the cyclicality problem Basel II created. The result of their study was in favor of 
Basel III. They found that the implementation of the new accord would not considerably cost 
the banking sector, as the capital requirements changes will insignificantly increase the cost 
of equity. Furthermore, it was found that Basel III could reduce the systemic risk. These 
outcomes have been supported by another study by Šútorová  and Teplý (2013) who studied 
specifically the impact of Basel III implementation of the number of loans and lending rates 
of Europeans banks. Through their quantitative model, it was found that most of the 
Europeans banks are already in compliant to the Basel III’ new capital requirements and 
there will be minimal impact on the cost of loans. Apart from the technical quantitate part of 
Basel III, Howard (2014) discussed the impact of Basel III on the corporate governance. He 
argued that the changes in the Pillar 3 that address the disclosure and transparency 
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requirements will be improved which results in benefits to investors, creditors, and regulators 
alike.  
 
Regarding the specific case of Islamic banks, Rizwan et al. (2012) collected data from 
countries that have a high number of Islamic banks to examine the impact of the Basel III on 
these institutions in comparison to the conventional banks. The examination was to the 
capital requirements, leverage ratio, and liquidity ration. It was found that even though 
Islamic banks are well capitalized and can meet the minimum capital requirement; these 
banks would face difficulty, in the long run, to meet the minimum thresholds off the liquidity 
measures, as there are very limited sharia-compliant products through which banks can 
satisfy their funding requirements. Boumediene (2011) criticized Basel III for not addressing 
the special characteristics of the Islamic banks despite that growth of the Islamic banks is 
rapidly increasing worldwide. He used one Islamic Bank in Saudi Arabia as a case study and 
applied the Basel III liquidity requirements on the bank to assess the impact. He concluded 
that although the bank in the case study is one of the liquid banks in the whole region, the 
Basel III liquidity indicators resulted in unfavorable outcomes. Obviously, it was concluded 
in his study that Basel III should no longer overlook the particularities of the Islamic banks 
and the BCBS intends to make its accords benchmark for international best practice it should 
provide comprehensive regulatory measures that address both, conventional and Islamic 
banks.     
 
The argument by Angeleni and Gerali (2012) the Basel III would reduce the systemic risk 
and that it would eventually dampen the cyclicality can easily be refuted. Basel, albeit the 
significant changes made on the criteria of high quality capital components, the liquidity 
measures, etc., it did not change the optionality of using the Standardized Approach for  the 
CRWA, the major source of cyclicality that Basel II was criticized for. In fact, the BCBS has 
attempted in 2015 to eliminate the usage of the SA for credit risk to decrease the reliance on 
the rating agencies to prevent the cyclicality impact but receded that consultative document 
and did not proceed further due to lack of another alternative. So, for most of the developing 
countries, at least in the Middle East, the SA is still and will be in the foreseeable future, the 
preferred method for the CRWA for its simplicity. In addition, as long the SA is allowed 
there will always be a cyclicality impact. Thus, Basel III cannot promise to reduce the 
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cyclicality as long as regulators can choose SA from the approved methods for the CRWA. 
Moreover, as long as the cyclicality is not eliminated it would be difficult to eliminate the 
systemic risk.  
  
In regard to Howard (2014), what derives, in practice, the banking industry for enhanced 
disclosure and transparency is not only Basel II or Basel III but the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRs) and the local corporate governance and public disclosures 
requirements by each regulator, Pillar 3 of Basel II plays a role but not the major driving force. 
When bankers refer to public disclosure, the first thing that they refer to is those requirements 
related to the IFRS. The IFRS requirements are rapidly updated and changing, at a faster pace 
than those of Basel Accords, as well as the case studies from corporate governance. So, it 
would require a thorough empirical examination to state the  Pillar 3 of Basel III would increase 
the corporate governance because we need to isolate first the impact of the IFRS and other 
governance standards to arrive at a situation that convincingly asserts this governance and 
disclosure situations is due to Basel III.  Regarding the Islamic banks, it is true that Basel III 
did not recognize the need to address the particularities of Islamic Banks. Islamic banks are 
left to do their homework of mapping the conventional banks instruments and in the details, if 
the Basel III, especially those related to liquidity risk, to come up with their own structure of 
the LCR and NSFR. There are attempts made by the Islamic Financial Service Board (IFSB) 
to “Islamize” Basel III and their attempts have been used in practice by some Islamic Banks in 
the market. The IFSB efforts have proved be working in that respect. Boumediene (2011) may 
not have examined the IFSB’s work on liquidity risks on his case study because it exactly 
addressed his concern.   
 
2.3.2 Conclusion  
 
I found that studies in the literature did not find the capital regulation to be efficient.  
Moreover, studies showed found that it can a trigger insolvency and illiquidity at banks. 
Various studies have shown that capital-based regulations would increase the cost of funding 
for banks, which might negatively affect the banks’ attitude toward risk. With regards to the 
question about why a banking regulation should be capital based, we found few satisfactory 
answers in the literature. The literature did not address the following: why is bank regulation 
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capital-based? Why has the BCBS not augmented the minimum capital requirement with 
another requirement such as limits on asset quality (e.g., the percentage of delinquent loans 
to total loans) or limits on liabilities? The literature also lacked studies that compare pre- and 
post-capital regulation in certain countries, which would have really assessed the usefulness 
of the capital regulations on the soundness of that country’s financial system. Furthermore, 
the literature does not include a comparison of a banking system of a country that has not 
adopted Basel II regulations with a country that has adopted a Basel II regulation.  
 
With regards to credit risk, there is a deficiency in the existing literature on examining 
whether or not the FIRB and AIRB reflect the essential credit risk faced by the bank.  
Moreover, we could not find any study that examines whether bankers consider the SA 
approach to be reflective of the essential credit risk in the bank's portfolios. I could not also 
find a study on what bankers think would be viable alternatives to the SA if it is indeed 
deemed to be lagging in quantifying the credit risks of the bank.  
 
There is no consensus in the literature on operational risk in banking regulation that 
definitions of operational risk are not crystallized. There is a deficiency in the literature on 
examination of the question: why include operational risk instead of liquidity in the 
denominator of the CAR. In addition, there is a deficiency in studies that investigate whether 
bankers believe that Basel II’s methods for calculating capital for operational risk are 
sufficient and aligned with the bank’s business conduct. Concerning the internal models for 
market risk, the focus of the literature predominantly centers on the VaR, and this model is 
considered to be inadequately regulated by Basel II. Under Pillar of Basel II, Corporate, 
argued to be the only viable way through a regulator could use to ensure that the Internal 
Capital Adequacy Assessment calculation reliably calculated, were not found to enhance risk 
management functions and processed. We found that Basel III although claimed in some 
studies that it would enhance disclosure, reduce systemic risk and cyclicality, banks are still 
allowed in Basel III to choose SA to quantify the CRWA, which is the major trigger of 
cyclicality.  
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2.4 What Are the Government’s Intervention Objectives? Have They Been Met? 
 
In this section, we address the objectives stated in Basel II accord as well as in the CBB 
literature. I found that the objectives stated are: a) contain systemic risk, b) enhance risk 
management practices at banks, and c) help banks withstand the crisis. I address the literature 
on these objectives in the following three subsections.  
 
2.4.1 Contain Systemic Risk  
 
Systemic risk is the risk of “distress in the financial system caused by an imbalance or a 
failure of a significant part of the financial sector – one large institution or many smaller ones 
– that has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real economy.” 
(Schwerter, 2011; FSB, 2009a, pp. 5-6; Acharya et al., 2010, p. 1)  
 
From this definition, it is apparent that systemic risk arises from a failure and the subsequent 
spread of the negative outcomes of this failure to other banks, due to the interrelationship 
amongst them. Ultimately, the failure could spread across all banks. What exacerbates the 
impact of the banks, due to their regulations, on the economy is the fact that the Basel 
Accords are pro-cyclical42 (Goodhart and Persaud, 2008; Moos, 2007). During the growth 
phase of the economy, there is an excess of liquidity, lending rates are high, asset quality is 
high, and the level of bank capital is high. According to the Basel Accords, the CAR is also 
high because of clients, rated by rating agencies, enjoy lower risk weights due to these 
market conditions (this is especially true in the SA). During times of crisis or troughs in the 
economic cycle, bank client ratings deteriorate due to lower demand, and the bank’s asset 
quality deteriorates because of their clients’ inability to honor their financial obligations. 
These phenomena lead to higher risk weights, lower net income (i.e., due to higher 
provisions), and lower CAR. When the bank is faced with a lower CAR, banking regulations 
force it to either inject capital or slow down its business to maintain the CAR at the set 
thresholds. The most viable option for the bank is to slow down its business (i.e., loans to 
                                                 
42 Pro-cyclical: in the context of an economic cycle, product life cycle, or any life cycle whose structure includes 
ups and downs, any variable that triggers fluctuations, causes greater fluctuations in the cycle, or exacerbates the 
impact of the ups and downs are called a pro-cyclical variable. If it does the opposite then it is called a counter-
cyclical variable. 
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retail and corporations as well as investments), which means exacerbating the credit and 
liquidity problems in the economy.  
 
In this section, we will survey the literature that specifically address the relationship between 
Basel II and the systemic risk and whether countries imposing Basel II would be less prone to 
systemic risk. I also seek studies in the literature that investigate whether or not bankers think 
that Basel II implementation can reduce systemic risk.  
 
Acharya (2009) argues that because Basel II is a capital-based regulation, it cannot 
structurally address systemic risk. This is because capital-based regulations focus on each 
bank within the whole banking system on an individual basis.  However, the correlation 
among banks is not taken into consideration in the Basel Accords43. Thus, Acharya (2009) 
proposes that regulators direct their attention towards adding correlations among banks on 
their supervision checklist but does not discuss any mechanism for doing so. Similarly, 
Schwerter (2011) found that Basel II was too weak to address the requirements of reducing 
the systemic risk and Basel III still requires further enhancements in this respect, despite the 
major milestones outlined within it to rectify this weakness. He attributed this weakness to 
the structure of Basel II, as it focuses on the wellbeing of every bank on a solo basis and 
ignores the interrelationships amongst the financial sector constituencies44. He concluded that 
macro-prudential regulation, which the Basel Committee addressed in Basel III, will alleviate 
the systemic risk (Bernanke, 2008). Hellwig (2009) shared the same conclusion that the issue 
of the systemic risk must be dealt with by the regulator or the central bank, and should not be 
left to the banks and their internal models.   
 
However, in order for a regulator to deal efficiently with the issue of systemic risk, there 
should be agreement on the conceptual framework used to quantify systemic risk. A regulator 
would have to know the size of the systemic risk in its financial systems to be able to impose 
regulatory measures on banks (e.g., limits, periodic reporting, etc.). This can be achieved by 
measuring the interconnectedness amongst banks in the banking system. Interconnectedness 
can be measured by monitoring the placements of funds, investments, and financing amongst 
                                                 
43 This is a valid point under Basel II, but the Basel Committee has, in Basel III, addressed the issue of connectivity 
and its materiality in the framework of domestically and globally systemic important banks. 
44 This approach of banking regulation is called “micro-prudential” in the banking literature. 
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the banks by requiring periodic reports from each bank. After that, the regulator should 
identify the banks that serve as the de facto hub or intermediary for the majority of these 
transactions. A stress test should then be performed by the regulator to assess the potential 
repercussions should the identified banks faced any financial difficulties, and to estimate the 
size of the implications of the system. The underlying challenge of quantifying systemic risk 
is the lack of a validated quantitative model that could be designed as a standardized 
regulatory matrix across countries (Schwerter, 2011; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2009).    
 
There is also a deficiency in the literature regarding how Basel regulations do or do not 
reduce systemic risk. Even the studies of Moosa, Goodhart, and Persaud about the pro-
cyclicality of Basel II and how it exacerbates systemic risk are not supported by empirical 
evidence or case studies. No study in the literature has focused on a country that suffered 
from systemic risk merely because it adopted and implemented Basel II, and how it ensured 
that risk. Nor is there a study that examines how regulators approach systemic risk in terms 
of regulation policy (e.g., thresholds) and supervision programs (e.g., reporting 
requirements). In this study, we seek to analyze how a regulator and a supervisor approach 
systemic risk in relation to Basel II implementation.     
 
2.4.2 Enhance Risk Management  
 
The purpose of this subsection is to review the literature that relates Basel II implementation 
to the risk management practices in banks.  In this study when I use “risk management 
practices” we refer to the following: a) a bank’s tendency to assume risks, b) its attitude 
towards risk, and how its appetite is designed and altered, c) the use of risk management in 
making financing and investment decisions, and d) how risk management is congruent with 
setting out the bank’s strategic objectives and plan.  Risks are inherent in banking operations, 
and they are at the core of any financial institution’s activities. The need for robust risk 
management discipline at these institutions emanates from this fact. Risk management does 
not, however, necessarily mean eliminating or reducing risks, rather, the goal of risk 
management “is to optimize risk-reward trade-off.” (Bontas et al., 2009)  
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The Pillar 2 requirements of Basel II45 clearly encourage central banks to assess the overall 
risk exposures assumed by banks in their country to the extent that is wider than what was 
calculated under Pillar 1. Hence, from a regulatory perspective, there is a positive 
relationship between capital and risk, as the higher the risks assumed, the more capital is 
needed as a cushion (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992). With this mind, and in light of the stated 
objective of Basel II that the Basel Accords enhance risk management at banks, this section 
explores  whether or not this claim has been studied in the literature.  
 
Studies in the literature approach the relationship between the Basel Accords and risk 
management from different perspectives. I grouped the studies we found into the following 
facets of risk management: 
• Risk tolerance  
• Lending behavior  
• Portfolio risk and solvency 
 
2.4.2.1 Risk Tolerance  
 
How is a bank’s risk appetite constrained or affected by regulatory capital? While bank 
management observes the impact of regulations on their investment decisions, they also look 
at the incentives they would earn in their risk-taking decisions. Hence, a bank’s behavior 
towards risk taking cannot be just assumed to be impacted by capital regulations.  Shrieves 
and Dahl reached the same conclusion “that risk-taking behavior tends to be constrained by 
bank owners’ and/ or managers’ private incentives.” (1992)  
 
Building on the work of Shrieves and Dahl, Rime (2001) investigated the behavior of banks 
towards risk in relation to Swiss bank’s capital requirements. He concluded that capital 
pressure on Swiss banks that imposed financial or non-financial penalties in case of a breach 
of the minimum capital requirement would have an impact on the bank’s capital-related 
activities. However, he did not find a strong correlation between regulatory pressure and the 
risk appetite of banks.  
 
                                                 
45 Please refer to Chapter 3 for more detail.   
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Similarly, Gonzalez (2003) used data on a panel of 324 banks in 37 different countries to 
examine the relationship between capital regulation and bank risk appetite.  He found that 
banks in countries with tougher capital regulations tend to adopt less conservative credit and 
investment policies (i.e., increasing appetite for risk taking). On the other hand, in countries 
where capital regulations are less strict, banks tend to opt for more conservative credit and 
investment policies. Furthermore, he proposed that a capital requirements threshold should 
be flexible to reflect the level of diversifications in the bank’s loans portfolios, appetite to 
take the risk, and charter value46. Barth et al. (2000, 2002) came to the same conclusion; 
there is an inverse relationship between strict capital regulation and risk-taking tendencies 
amongst banks’ management. 
 
Blum (1999) found that introducing capital regulation into his model would induce banks to 
assume more risk because capital regulation will eventually lead to reduced profitability. 
Lower profitability will decrease the owners’ equity and thus would make the equity 
expensive (i.e., in terms of required return for the existing shareholders). To compensate for 
the resultant reduction in profitability, bank management would be induced towards 
excessive risk taking (e.g., in the form of relaxed loans or collateral requirements) in order to 
increase the size of their loans and investments, which would thus offset the reduction in 
equity. In this case, capital requirements would perversely result in a higher appetite for risk 
instead of curbing it. Furthermore, bank’s executive remuneration and compensation 
packages are linked to the profitability and value that they share with shareholders. If they 
are restrained by the reduction in equity they might act aggressively, not only in credit and in 
investments but also by neglecting other areas in the bank such as internal controls or risk 
management; hence, principle-agent problems ensue.   
 
2.4.2.2 Lending Behavior 
 
Regulatory pressures to meet capital requirements would affect bank management behavior 
in terms of risk management. The viable options to meet this regulatory pressure are either to 
inject more capital or to minimize risk exposures. Reducing risk exposures means a decrease 
                                                 
46 Charter value is the value of the bank’s ability to continue doing business; it is the value of the bank’s going-
concern.  
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in RWA47, which is achieved by either reducing the number and size of the loans extended, 
obtaining sufficient collateral, or being selective in their prospective credit facilities. Berger 
and Udell (1991) found, however, that there is no evidence of a positive correlation between 
reduced credit granting and reduced pressure to maintain the required level of regulatory 
capital. Jackson et al. (1999) reached an identical conclusion in their examination of the 
impact of capital-based regulation on constraining banks’ lending and the bank’s 
competitiveness in the loans business. Jackson et al. used the same approach as Berger and 
Udell, but only used data from the G-10 countries.  Ediz et al. (1998), in their study of the 
impact of capital-based regulation on UK commercial banks’ lending behavior, concluded 
that the CAR ratio does not make banks cautious in their lending decisions.  Instead, it 
encourages them to meet the minimum CAR by continuously shifting categories of 
counterparty risk weights but without changing their credit lending policy.  Since the studies 
of Jackson et al. (1999), Ediz et al. (1998), and Berger and Udell (1991) were all based on 
Basel 1, their conclusions cannot be extended to Basel II environment because Basel II 
drastically changed the risk weight sizes and categories of Basel 1, and it added market and 
operational risks to the CAR. Zicchino (2006) analyzed the relationship between 
macroeconomic conditions, bank capital, and lending when banks are subject to risk-
sensitive capital adequacy requirements as envisaged in Basel II. He found that when Basel II 
is implemented, a bank’s ability to extend more loans would be constrained at the time of 
contraction and reversed during booms. Nachane et al. (2006) reached an identical result in 
their examination of commercial banks in India. They found that a bank’s lending would be 
impacted by the introduction of Basel II as a bank lending ability and behavior correlates to 
the macroeconomic changes during contractions or booms48. In addition, since Basel II is 
cyclical in nature, capital based regulations will tighten bank’s lending choices by forcing 
them to lend to lower risk-weighted clients.  Liebig et al.(2004) investigated the impact of 
Basel II on the lending behavior of German banks to counterparties in the emerging markets.  
 
Panagopoulos and Vlamis (2009) examined the adequacy of Basel II to address the risks of 
lending, particularly to the real estate. Their critique of the accord was that Basel II does not 
                                                 
47 The CAR in all of the Basel Accords is calculated by dividing the capital base of the bank by the total RWA.  
RWA means the level or size of the risk in each item of the balance sheet.  
48 They, however, did not conclude that Basel II is the only driving factor that would constrain a bank’ lending 
behavior during contraction.  
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treat real estate as a stand-alone assets class and the accord does not provide an 
internationally agreed upon definition of real estate market value. I found that Panagopoulos 
and Vlamis (2009) critique was valid for the following reasons. There are several categories 
of real estates each one of them has different risk and return features. Holistically, for a bank, 
there are three main pools of real estates: commercial and residential mortgage, real estate 
investments, and the bank’s own real estate (i.e. premises). Within the commercial mortgage, 
for instance, there are subcategories. As a bank, the risk of financing offices building is 
different from financing a mall building, which is altogether different from financing 
industrial facilities. For the same reason, the risks of investments in real estate depend on the 
types of the projects, locations, market concentration, etc. finally, the bank’s premises also 
pose a great challenge for the Basel II to address. What constitute premises? Shall the bank 
include all the branches buildings as premises or only the headquarters? Basel II does not 
provide a risk sensitive quantitative measurement of the capital requirements for these 
different categories.  
 
2.4.2.3 Portfolio Risk and Solvency  
 
Koehn and Santomero (1980) examined the impact of capital regulations on risk management 
from the perspective of its impact on loan portfolios. A statistical model was used to assess 
the impact of changes in capital requirements on a hypothetical commercial bank loan 
portfolio’s behavior. The result showed identical results to Kahane (1977)’s conclusions, 
namely that an increase in regulator’s capital requirements encourages bank management to 
assume more risks. This is because more risks assumed means increased returns, which 
would, in turn, increase net income and owners’ equity and bank management remuneration. 
A point that could be made against their conclusion is that their definition of risk 
management was very narrow. They focused only on one aspect (i.e., portfolio risk) in one 
kind of risk (i.e., credit risk).  
 
Finally, Jackson et al. (1999) concluded that the results of the two strands of the literature on 
the impact of Basel Accords implementation on bank’s risk tendencies are mixed. There is no 
substantial evidence that capital requirements alter a bank’s risk profile and appetite. 
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Accordingly, a strict minimum regulatory capital requirement might lead to an increase in the 
risks assumed.   
 
2.4.3 Build Resilience: Withstand Crises  
 
The relationship between Basel II and financial crises is studied in this subsection from two 
distinct perspectives, before and during financial crises. In the former, studies examine 
whether or not Basel Accords can prevent or immunize banks against exposures to financial 
crises.  For the latter, studies examine whether or not Basel Accords reduce, contribute to, or 
even exacerbate the negative impact of financial crises. 
 
This section explores the studies that answer the above two questions, with particular 
emphasis on the financial crisis that erupted in 2007. I emphasize this crisis because: a) it is 
the first financial crisis that erupted immediately after the implementation of Basel II49, and 
b) it is the crisis for which banking regulation has been hugely criticized.  This section is 
divided into two subsections, one for each of the two questions above.     
 
Nichols et al. (2011) tried to examine the impact of banking regulation on financial crises. 
The authors focused on the school of thought that the financial crisis was a result of too much 
regulation. In this article, Nichols et al. argued that the financial crisis did not happen 
because of a shortage of banking regulation in the USA, but because of housing policies and 
laws that forced banks to relax their lending strategies and standards, which eventually led to 
their involvement in the subprime crisis. Apart from the housing problems, the authors did 
not provide sufficient arguments and literature review on their hypothesis.  
 
The question that ought to be examined is can Basel II prevent a crisis or immunize banks 
from crises.  
 
The question of whether or not Basel II could prepare banks to withstand a crisis or prevent 
them from being implicated in one would typically be given a dichotomous answer. Scholars 
would either opine that banks might have incurred far greater losses without Basel Accords 
                                                 
49 The final document of Basel II was published by the BCBS in June 2006.  
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than what they actually incurred, while another set of researchers might opine the opposite 
(i.e., that Basel Accords did not help at all).  
 
That is exactly what we found in the literature. One might notice, however, that the studies 
and articles that negate the idea that that Basel Accords help banks withstand a financial 
crisis outweigh those who advocate for its utility in mitigating crises.   
 
I shall start with the articles and studies that believe that Basel Accords can quell a crisis.  
Caruana and Narain (2008) addressed two questions: (a) does Basel II address all of the risk 
management issues faced by banks, and (b) can full implementation of Basel II prevent 
financial crises or financial market disturbances? The argument used in their article is that 
even though Basel II does not address all of the risk management issues faced by banks (i.e., 
it does not address liquidity risk management and leverage), its full implementation could 
prevent the financial crisis from occurring. One problem with this statement is that it was not 
backed by references to numerical cases or examinations of a case study in which Basel II 
was fully implemented in a country, and that country withstood the crisis. The second 
problem with Caruana and Narain’s conclusion is that their statement could be construed as 
speculative; Basel II was announced in June 2006, the crisis erupted in the summer of 2007, 
and their statement that Basel II could prevent a crisis was made in June 2008. A new 
banking regulation with a wide scope such as Basel II needs longer than a 12-month period to 
validate such a claim. What makes their claim particularly speculative is the fact that there is 
no study in the literature that examines the ability of capital requirements regulations (both 
prior to or after Basel I) to enable banks to withstand a crisis, or even to prevent them from 
being implicated in the first place.  
 
Wellink (2008) agreed with Caruana and Narain (2008) that the financial crisis could have 
been prevented or its negative consequences alleviated had the accord been implemented 
earlier than it had been in the impacted countries. However, this article was not based on 
empirical evidence nor was any case studies used. Wellink (2008) argued, “It was a 
misunderstanding to say that Basel II would have allowed the risky practices among banks 
that triggered the crunch.”  However, he agreed, “Basel II adopts the models that failed to 
perform in the recent turmoil.” He further argued that Basel II would provide the impetus for 
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banks to produce “forward-looking approaches to assessing, managing and holding adequate 
capital for risk.” The flaw in Wellink’s argument is that the crux of the matter is not about 
whether or not Basel II allows for “risk practices” amongst banks but about the validity of the 
accord itself and its scope. The discussion is about the design of the requirements within the 
accord and its validity. By validity, we mean whether the requirements in the system measure 
what they are supposed to measure, whether they prevent what they are supposed to prevent, 
etc. In the United States, for instance, all of the internationally active banks that were heavily 
impacted by the crisis of 2007, such as Lehman Brothers, were Basel II compliant. In 
Europe, the scenario is the same; all of the banks were Basel II compliant, yet they were 
impacted by the crisis (by different margins of course). Even countries that were far removed 
from direct exposure to the sub-prime crisis, such as Middle Eastern countries, that were 
compliant with Basel Accords were still considerably impacted by the crisis. Furthermore, in 
some of these Middle Eastern countries, there are Islamic Banks that do not deal with 
interest-based loans, derivatives, or sub-prime banking products; they were also impacted by 
the crisis, even though they are all compliant with Basel Accords. Therefore, this real life 
case studies all negate the claim made by Wellink or Caruana. Wellink (2008) and Caruana 
(2008) provided no evidence of how Basel Accords could have prevented the crisis amongst 
all the impacted countries. Each country has its own national discretion50, methods for 
calculating credit, market, and operational risk, varying complexity, and sophistication of the 
methods used to gauge liquidity, concentration and other risks under Pillar 2 of the accord. In 
light of all these differences, how could Basel II achieve the desired result of preventing a 
crisis? This question is not answered in the literature.  
 
Zamorski (2008) argued, “Financial market turmoil is not an indicator of the failure of Basel 
II norms,” because “the accord itself is not a substitute for risk management.” Opponents of 
Basel II mixed their arguments with the presumption that Basel II is a risk management tool; 
although proper implementation of Basel II Accord could support a risk management culture, 
Basel II does not claim to be a risk management tool.  But if we take the example of the 
Northern Rock crisis and its fall in 2008 as Basel II was implemented in Northern Rock 
                                                 
50National discretion refers to the authority a bank regulator has in any country to apply all or part of the BCBS 
recommendations in its jurisdiction.  
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(including all of the advanced approaches of the accord), why did Basel II fail to prevent the 
bank from shutting down?  Why couldn’t it even alleviate the size of the damages?  
 
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013) studied the relationship between bank capital and the stock 
return of the underlying bank before and during a crisis. In their study, they raised two 
questions: will a crisis affect the stock return of a bank and whether the level of the bank’s 
capital plays a role in that effect. They used three concepts of “bank capital.” These concepts 
were leverage, total assets and risk-based capital a calculated by the Basel accords. They 
used the first two concepts as a proxy of bank’s capital because of the criticism of Basel II of 
relying on rating agencies rating to arrive at the capital adequacy ratio. According to the 
authors, the total asses or leverage are more relevant to the investors than the Basel II 
concept. In their study, they found that before a crisis, the bank’s capital plays no rule in 
determining the stock return irrespective of which concept used. At times of crisis, they 
found that stocks return performance were strongly correlated to the strong capital position 
defined by total assets or leverage rather than the capital defined by Basel accords.    
 
I now move to the studies that criticize Basel II for its shortcomings during financial crises.  
Goodhart and Persaud (2008) critiqued Basel II for its inability to prevent financial crises due 
to its lack of measures to prevent cyclicality. As we explained earlier in the chapter, 
cyclicality relates to the reliance on rating agencies to determine the risk weight for 
exposures to calculate the CRWA under the SA (Moosa, 2010). Basel II gives three 
alternatives to quantify credit risk-weighted assets that should be included in the CAR. One 
method is called the standardized method; as the name indicates, this method uses standard 
risk weights given by the BCBS for each grade of external rating. The other two methods 
rely on a bank’s own internal rating and risk weights instead of using the ratings provided by 
the rating agencies. Moosa (2010) argued against the reliance on the external rating because 
of the relationship between external ratings and pro-cyclicality (as discussed in Section 2.2) 
of this chapter. Although other scholars such as Griffin (2008) and Goldstein (2008) share 
this argument against the reliance on external ratings, Moosa did not support his argument 
with numerical examples or other empirical evidence. 
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Griffin (2008), Wellink (2008), and Goldstien (2008)51 shared Moosa’s stance against the 
reliance on bank’s internal models. They analyzed the use of internal models and attributed 
the credit crisis to the failure of internal models to predict the coming losses. However, they 
did not substantively explain how the internal models failed to predict the future losses, nor 
do they provide much detail on the basis of which such models could have predicted the 
losses. Internal models such as VaR existed long before the issuance and implementation of 
Basel II in developed and developing countries. It has mostly been supported by stress testing 
and back testing to enhance its predictability. If the models failed to reasonably predict the 
negative outcomes, it does not necessary mean that this is a drawback of the accord.  It may 
indicate instead a failure of a bank to a) support the models with stress testing and back 
testing, b) ensure the validity and relativeness of the data, and c) validate the model 
parameters by an independent party (Jurion, 2001). The regulator should also share the blame 
for the deficiency of the bank’s internal models to predict losses, as it is responsible for 
validating the model in the context of the bank’s business model. The literature that discusses 
the internal models in the context of Basel II does not give real examples of a bank that 
incurred losses in a crisis because of Basel-based internal models, ceteris paribus. Lehman 
Brothers failed during the crisis of 2007; yet, was Basel II compliant and had adopted the 
advanced internal models of Basel II (i.e., the AMA, AIRB, and IM).  Instead, the bank was 
found to have failed because of unethical management and board conduct, weak investments 
standards, unfavorable market moves, and misrepresentation of its financial statements 
(Azadinamin, 2013).         
 
Another argument that may be made against Moosa, Griffin, and Wellink and Goldstein’s 
attack on Basel II is that the banking literature tells us that prior to the 2007 crisis there were 
more than 80 financial crises, all of which occurred prior to Basel II and its standardized 
method for handling external ratings (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008).  Thus, the repetitive 
occurrence of crises tells us that there should be something more important than the methods 
of calculation that is to blame. (Persaud, 2009). 
 
                                                 
51 Goldstein (2008) also critiqued Basel II Accords for causing the crisis, as Basel II allowed banks to rely heavily 
on credit ratings by rating agencies, who themselves lack proper regulation and supervision.  
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Another weakness of Basel II that was exposed during the crisis of 2007 is its lack of 
regulation for liquidity and leverage.  Basel II does not have any regulations that help banks 
withstand liquidity and leverage issues in the normal course of business, let alone during a 
financial crisis (Moosa, 2010; Goldstein, 2008). This argument has many merits, as the crisis 
reveals that the issues were not only with credit but also with liquidity and leverage (i.e., off 
balance sheet excessive exposures).  However, Moosa and Goldstein’s conclusions are not 
backed by empirical analysis of real or hypothetical examples that examine how Basel II 
would have prevented the crisis if the existing accord were augmented with liquidity and 
leverage requirements.   
 
Griffin (2008) explained the reasons behind the credit crisis. He attributed the causes of the 
credit crisis to poor risk management practices, especially in the area of reputation risk, 
concentration risks, and liquidity risks. It is worth noting that none of these risks was covered 
in Basel II calculation of capital adequacy, nor did Basel III offer any solutions to Basel II’s 
shortcomings in this respect. Griffin also shed lights on the problems with the credit rating 
agencies, their role in the financial crisis, and the failure of the banking supervision of 
securitization. Griffin’s take on the reliance of Basel II on internal models is that these 
models lead to conflicts of interest. However, Griffin does not elaborate how reliance on 
models would cause conflicts of interests. If developed internally, internal models could 
cause conflicts of interest if they are developed without proper validation from regulators. 
Nevertheless, if the model is not developed internally, it is not clear how reliance on them 
would cause conflicts of interest. That is because the risks associated with internally 
developed models occur in the design of the assumptions, choice of stressed scenarios, the 
time horizon and materiality of the data, and the use of appropriate statistical measures to run 
the calculation of risks. In the absence of regulatory monitoring, a bank would naturally tend 
to underestimate the size of the risks that it is exposed to and subsequently underestimate the 
level of capital required for these risks. Developing the models externally could partially 
resolve the issue of conflict of interest; however, the risk still exists that a bank, with an 
ownership of models and their operations hands-on, could manipulate the size of risks. 
Therefore, criticizing Basel II from this angle might not reduce risk to the minimum level 
desired. The only viable mitigant of the risk presented by models is close validation and 
monitoring on the design and implementation of the models by the bank regulator. The 
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criticism should be focused on the role of the banking regulator vis-a-vis the internal models 
and not on the usage of the models per se.  
 
Griffin argued that one of the reasons behind the crisis is the lack or shortage of information. 
The disclosure requirements under Basel II combined with the accounting disclosure required 
by IFRS 7 were so detailed and prescriptive and were all disclosed in the banks’ annual 
reports. Thus, Griffin’s (2008) claim about a lack of information is not warranted. He 
concluded that Basel II implementation would enhance risk management in banks, which 
contradicts his claim that Basel II did not properly address concentration, liquidity, or 
reputation risks.  
 
Rodriquez (2002) criticized Basel II for contributing to a less stable banking system, let alone 
preventing a crisis from occurring, by being so “complex and detailed.” Likewise, Doerig 
(2003), Topping (2008), and Kaufman (2003) agreed with Rodriquez that a one-size-fits-all 
bank regulation does not have the capacity to prevent a crisis. Topping indicated that a bank 
regulator should take the following variables into account when designing its regulation (at a 
minimum): bank size (by assets or equities), risk appetite, strategy, and assets mix. He also 
argued it is only when a bank regulator addresses these variables for each bank and 
customizes its regulation accordingly that a crisis can be prevented (2008).  
 
Hasan and Dridi (2012) examined the impact of the global crisis on the Islamic banks as 
compared to the conventional banks. The parameters of examination were the profitability, 
credit growth, assets growth and external rating. The conclusions derived in their study is that 
Islamic banks business model are nor prone to create bubbles like that at the conventional 
banks and the business of the Islamic banks are more related to real economics which makes 
them less susceptible to financial crisis. I find two problematic issues with this study, one 
with the data and the other with the conclusions derived from the data. the study gathered 
information from Islamic banks in different countries ( Malaysia, Bahrain , Kuwait, etc.) and 
identified indicators for profitability, credit growth, assets growth, etc. and observed the the 
performance of this indicators at the time of crisis as compared to the previous periods 
(2007-2009). This is tricky because it is not practical to consolidate the performance of these 
indicators to form a conclusion. It is not practical because even though these are Islamic 
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banks licensee but there are huge differences between their business models as they are 
operating in different countries. The differences are due to the nature of the local banking 
system, the school of thoughts of the sharia scholars on each bank in each country, the level 
of capital, the nature of the credit focus ( i.e. is real or corporate focus), the level of 
investments abroad ( i.e. risk appetite of the bank to have a trading desk, investments in 
equities of financial and non-financials institutions, etc.). All these differences have to be 
catered for in order to accurately conclude that Islamic banks were impacted or not. For 
instance, we cannot say that an Islamic bank (A) did not suffer directly from financial crisis 
because it operates based on sharia principles. The true story is that the bank did not suffer 
from the crisis because the bank was not allowed either by the local regulator or the board of 
directors or the sharia schools to have investments beyond its border and the local focus is all 
on consumer loans. Thus, the impact of the crisis would not be direct on this, it might be 
indirect by the shortage of the liquidity, but that is another story. There are products that are 
totally banned in some Islamic countries due to different sects interpretation of sharia, but it 
is totally fine in Malaysia, for instance. Until now, there are products that are approved and 
transacted by the Islamic banks in Malaysia that are not acceptable, by sharia, in Bahrain. 
This makes the comparison between the credit growth of the bank in Bahrain and analysis 
tricky and not accurate unless an analysis is made to exclude these anomalies from the data to 
normalize it for comparison. Another issue with the study is should have compared the data 
at least three years before the crisis, say 2004, and then compare the results to the those of 
2010. That would have given an evidence of the direct impact of the crisis on Islamic banks. 
I will cite only one evidence of how the particularities of each Islamic banking market were 
taken into consideration is that in the conclusions it stated that Islamic banks did not suffer a 
lot of loss in the real estate market. That is not true. Islamic banks in Bahrain and Kuwait has 
suffered a tremendous loss because of the real estate as they have heavily invested in the real 
estate before the crisis hits, and liquidity crunch erupted.  Their real estate investments faced 
the same destiny of the subprime loans mortgages houses in the USA. If they keep them will 
continue to shrink in value and if they sell they would incur a discount in value. That is 
precisely why the regulator in Bahrain asked the banks after 2007 to spin off their real 
statement investment through establishing a real estate company to take a form of a 
subsidiary to avoid having the financial statements hit by the real estate movements. In sum, 
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this paper could provide convincing evidence that Islamic banks are less prone to financial 
crisis than conventional banks.   
  
In summary, this section addressed the literature that examined the impact of Basel II on 
financial crises, particularly the one that erupted in 2007. Studies in the literature focused on 
either whether or not Basel II could prevent a crisis from occurring, or whether or not it could 
reduce or exacerbate the negative consequences of a crisis. Even though there are some 
studies that concluded that Basel II could prevent a crisis from occurring and reduce the 
negative results, the overwhelming majority of studies reached the opposite conclusion.  
Points raised by the opposition include Basel II’s reliance on banks’ internal models and 
external rating agencies in the SA, which exacerbated the undesirable results in the crisis. 
The deficiency in the literature is that all of the studies that criticized Basel II for being a 
cause of the crisis (i.e., because of its methodologies and loopholes) are theoretical in nature. 
There is no evidence that all of the banks that failed or were bailed out by the government 
during the crisis suffered financial losses because of Basel II. Specifically, there is no 
evidence that the internal models, such as VaR or any quantitative tool, caused financial 
losses during the crisis  
 
2.4.4 Conclusion 
 
I found the literature does not support the idea that Basel II could reduce systemic risk 
because Basel suffers from pro-cyclicality. It has also been argued that it is difficult to design 
a standardized regulatory matrix for systemic risk across countries due to the lack of a 
validated model to quantify systemic risk. Finally, it should be noted that the literature does 
not have a country-specific real example of how a bank regulator approached systemic risk in 
light of Basel II implementation, which this study seeks to analyze. 
 
In regard to the impact of Basel II on risk management practices, we found that risk 
management was defined differently in different studies. These studies could be grouped into 
three categories, according to the perspective of risk management under study: risk tolerance, 
lending behavior, and portfolio risk and solvency. The dominant conclusion from these 
studies is that capital regulations do not alter bank lending behavior or loan portfolio 
composition. There are two shortcomings in the studies. First, the literature does not address 
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how Basel II can enhance the risk management functions and practices in banks.  It does not 
address how stringent minimum regulatory capital would help establish robust risk 
management frameworks and which of Basel tools could achieve that. Secondly, most of the 
studies either examined the impact of Basel 1 or were conducted prior to Basel 1. I found that 
the studies in the literature do not support the idea that capital regulations help curb a bank’s 
management appetite for risk. Furthermore, there is a shortage of studies on banks in Basel II 
countries that directly discuss the experience of these banks with Basel II implementation 
during the crisis.       
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Chapter 3.  A Conceptual Framework and Research Methodology  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe a theoretical model for banking regulation in 
relation to Basel Accords implementation. This chapter also explains the methods of the 
research project and chapter is divided into three parts. Part 1 describes the philosophical 
underpinnings of the research project. Part 2 describes the conceptual framework of Basel 
Accords regulations and supervision. Finally, part 3 describes the research method used in 
this project and explains the reasons for selecting ethnography as the research method. This 
is followed by a description of the data collection tools and analysis52.  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
As a risk manager at a financial institution who is in charge of Basel implementation in a 
Basel Accords environment of banking regulation, we have been intrigued by the theoretical 
basis of the design of Basel Accords. The objective of this study was to investigate a 
theoretical model in the literature that might shed light on how the accords were designed. I 
juxtapose the actual implementation with a theoretical model that explains the accords 
adoption and implementation by regulators in light of the deficiency of the underlying 
theoretical model. The chapter is split into two parts. Part 1 discusses regulation theories via 
three sections. Section 1 discusses the “positive economics” theories of regulation, which 
addresses why and how banks are regulated. Section 2 addresses the “normative economics” 
theories of regulation, which addresses how and why banks should be regulated. In section 3 
we discuss the neo-institutionalism theory.  In Part 2, we move to a discussion of the research 
project.   Section 4 illuminates the research design, and section 5 discusses the regulatory 
framework adopted in this research.    
 
 
                                                 
52 Part 1 of this chapter has already been published : “Jaffar Mohammed Ahmed , (2016),"A conceptual 
framework for the Basel accords-based regulation", Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 24 
Iss 1 pp. 90 – 103” 
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Part 1: philosophical underpinning and conceptual framework   
3.2 Theories of Banking Regulation   
A researcher creates and maintains a paradigm of the phenomenon or the reality underlying 
his inquiry. This paradigm is defined as a set of perceptions, beliefs, and assumptions that 
determine the approach and tools adopted by the researcher in their process of inquiry.  The 
process of inquiry starts with an examination of the ontological beliefs, i.e. the reality of the 
phenomena, followed by a description of how to go about discovering that reality and then 
with the design of the methods (i.e., epistemological beliefs).  
 
With regards to ontology, there are two positions that a researcher may take: nominalism or 
realism. Nominalism assumes that no real structure of the objects under study exists in the 
world; there is only what the individual perceives them to be. There are no “real” objects or 
phenomenon but only names or tags that social participants perceive them to be. In a society, 
for instance, the nominalist perspective rejects the idea that there is a real solution to a social 
phenomenon; the solution, according to the nominalist, depends merely on the perception of 
the social participants with regards to the problem and how they choose to go about solving 
it.  Realism, on the other hand, asserts that a real structure of the object under study exists 
and that “reality” exists independent from individual cognition (Willison, 2002). This means 
that in a real description of a social phenomenon or problem exists, as does a defined solution 
to it (even if social participants may not yet recognize it).  If we relate these two positions to 
the issue of banking regulation and supervision, we understand that a nominalist would not 
look at it universally; his analysis of the need for regulation and supervision, its design, and 
the methods of implementation would be based on his understanding of the parties or social 
participants involved in the regulation and supervision sphere. Furthermore, the peculiar 
characteristics of the participants (i.e., regulator and the regulated entities) would also play a 
role in the outcome of the assessment of the phenomenon; such characters might include 
gender, the level of education, geographical attributes, and political environment and 
association. A realist, on the other hand, would approach regulation and supervision 
differently, as per the above definition as well. According to the realist, none of the peculiar 
attributes and the participant’s cognition change the fact that such phenomenon may only be 
approached and resolved via certain measures and tools.    
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With regard to epistemology, there are also two positions: positivism and anti-positivism. 
Positivism consists of studying the patterns and causal relationships amongst the constituents 
of social phenomena via scientific methods in order to prove these relationships. A 
positivist’s definition of knowledge is that it can only be verified using scientific, quantitative 
methods. Anti-positivists, however, reject the notion that knowledge is only recognized if 
validated scientifically. Hence, an anti-positivist rejects the notion of studying patterns and 
causal relationships between the elements of social phenomenon in order to understand a 
social world.  Anti-positivists accept the notion that an understanding of a social world is 
only feasible if the researcher does not take an “observer” position but instead works from 
within the world to understand the perceptions, beliefs, and concerns of this world’s 
constituents. To relate these positions to the phenomenon of banking regulation and 
supervision, we may understand from these definitions that a positivist maintains the position 
of the observer; quantitatively studying the phenomenon and analyzing it through assessment 
of the variables and their interrelationship(s) in order to form a conclusion about the best 
course of action. An anti-positivist, on the other hand, would participate and comingle with 
the parties involved in banking regulation, either through direct work or through immense 
immersion into the constituents of the banking regulation and supervision phenomenon; for 
instance, an anti-positivist might work in a bank or at the central bank, or direct soliciting 
their views and feedback.        
 
Before we illuminate which ontological and epistemological position we adopted in this 
study, we need to describe firstly how we conceptualize banking regulation and supervision. 
The nature of banking regulation can only be well understood by understanding the nature 
and role of banking in society.  The public entrusts their money, and financial transactions 
with banks and banks use this money, along with its own money that has been funded by 
shareholders, to invest and make loans.  Banks profit on the spread between the money lent 
and the money received.  Failure on either part, the public or the banks to honor its 
obligations toward the other results in disruption of the system. Each of these parties has their 
own objectives and motivations, and if they are not properly aligned, then conflict and 
disruption ensue in the economic system and society as a whole.  Therefore, we envision 
banking regulation and supervision as a social context. Social context is defined as: 
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Human social environments encompass the immediate physical surroundings, social 
relationships, and cultural milieus within which defined groups of people function and 
interact. Components of the social environment include built infrastructure; industrial and 
occupational structure; labor markets; social and economic processes; wealth; social, human, 
and health services; power relations; government; race relations; social inequality; cultural 
practices; the arts; religious institutions and practices; and beliefs about place and 
community.(Barnet and Casper, 2001, p.465) 
 
From this definition, we envision banking regulation and supervision as a social context 
constructed by the interactions, negotiations, and production of meanings of the constituent 
elements (Willison, 2002). It is a social context comprised of the regulated (i.e., banks), the 
regulator, shareholders, depositors and debtors, and the public. The behavior and action of 
each of these elements are influenced by banking regulation and supervision. For example, 
when the regulator designs the regulations they will be influenced by the technological 
infrastructure at their site, the technological infrastructure at banks, the competence of the 
bankers, the political climate of the country, their own strategic economic objectives, etc.  
These are, in turn, influenced by the power culture of the country. Furthermore, failure of one 
or more of these elements to reach its own objectives could potentially lead to a negative 
impact on another element, for example, if a bank failed to remain solvent and liquid then its 
depositors would be negatively impacted.  
 
Banks and regulators view regulation and supervision differently. Banks view and react to 
regulations from a perspective of maximizing profit, growing lending and investment 
portfolios, increasing their market share, outperforming their rivals, attracting more deposits, 
etc. The priority of these perspectives varies across banks and depends on the cultural 
attributes of its board of directors and management, even as they may generally be common 
attributes among all banks in the same country. Regulators, on another hand, view and design 
regulations from the perspective of the macroeconomic and political climate, the impact of 
policies on the general public, and the charge to avoid panic and distrust in the system. If the 
different perspectives of the regulator and the regulated are not properly aligned, 
communicated, and understood by one another, then the regulation and supervision program 
might be ineffective.  I can align them by understanding and explaining the “individual 
conciseness and subjectivity within the frame of reference of the participant as opposed to the 
observer of the action” (Burrel and Morgan, 1979, p. 28). Thus, insights from the social 
81 
 
reality of this context and its elements can only be gathered by appreciating the perceptions, 
views, concerns, objectives, constraints, and meanings that both parties ascribe to a 
negotiated phenomenon. 
 
Banking regulation and supervision should not be studied independently of the cultural 
attributes and environment of banking in a country.  Thus, I should not confine my study of 
banking regulation to a set of quantitative thresholds and rules.  Nor will we have the full 
picture if we merely expand the lens of inquiry to the relationships between these variables or 
the effectiveness of these thresholds and rules in achieving the set of objectives that the 
regulators outline.  To account adequately for the cultural and political context of banking 
regulation, a broader set of perspectives is needed. 
 
In light of the above philosophical underpinning, we adopted a nominalist ontological and 
anti-positivist epistemological position in this research project. I was persuaded to adopt 
these positions by my practical experience in a bank handling risk management and Basel 
Accords implementation in more than 10 countries. I found tremendous variations amongst 
these countries in their conceptions of regulations, objectives of regulations, and various 
definitions of regulatory and banking failure. For the same reason, how each country 
designed its supervisory activities differed. With such international divergence, we deemed 
difficult to philosophically study Basel II regulation and supervision as an abstract and 
isolated from my involvement and experience in Basel regulations context.    
 
I found that a major part of the banking regulation literature follows the positive economic 
theory’s views towards regulation53. Economic phenomena are explained in relation to a 
dichotomy between positive and normative economics. Positive economics is a branch of 
economics that studies the causal relationships between behavioral and economic variables. 
In this literature, theories of banking are discussed within the scope of general economic 
regulation theories. For instance, theories that explain the rationale for regulation are an 
extension or application of a theory that explains the need to regulate a merchandising firm 
(Freixas and Rochet, 2008). Banks share some attributes with agents or players in the 
                                                 
53 We will refer to it as “positive regulation” throughout the text as opposed to “normative regulation,” which 
follows the normative economic views of regulation.  
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economy on which the general economic regulation theories are applied, but banks also differ 
in many respects. For example, banks accept deposits, make loans, act as intermediaries in 
financial deals, etc. These are functions that are not necessarily entrusted to other agents. 
These differences should be addressed to formulate one or theories that positively and 
normatively explain banking regulation. Theories of economic regulation are defined as 
“explicit legislative and administration control over…..any facet of economy” (Posner, 
1974). In the following sections, we discuss public interest theory, cultural theory, 
administrative theory, and neo-institutionalism theory. In discussing these theories, we will 
indicate the applicability of each to banking regulation in general, and to Basel-based 
regulation in particular.  
 
3.2.1 Positive Economic Theories of Regulation   
 
Theories of positive economics explain an economic phenomenon by focusing on its nature, 
its reason for being, and its functions. In discussing banking regulation as an economic 
phenomenon, a positive economist addresses questions of how banking regulations are 
designed: Why do we need to regulate banks? Why are banks regulated in their current form? 
This section discusses three subsets of positive economics including public interest theory, 
administration theory, and cultural theory. 
 
3.2.1.1Public Interest Theory 
 
The public interest theory of regulation is a theory that views regulation and supervision from 
the perspective of public interest only. It focuses on general public interest as opposed to the 
interest of lobbies, political parties, self-interested investors, etc. This theory views 
regulation as a benevolent hand that helps the public survive amongst self-interested groups 
of individuals or firms (Baldwin et al., 2012).   
 
Public interest theory holds that economic regulation is supplied in the marketplace in 
response to a demand by the public to protect their interest from malpractice and misconduct 
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from market power, externalities,54 and information asymmetry55. (Freixas and Rochet, 
2008).  It is spurred on by the behavior of free market players in the form of agency problems 
in which market players pursue objectives that are detrimental to the shareholders and the 
public interest (Moran, 1986). A government is expected to intervene via structured 
regulation to ensure that the pursuit of self-interest by the regulated entities does not 
encroach on the interests of the public. According to this theory, regulation should be 
designed to ensure that public interest is hedged against imperfect competition, unbalanced 
market operation, missing markets, and undesirable market results. 
 
The principles of the public interest theory of regulation have been applied to a wide range of 
economic issues, including anti-monopoly legislation (Baumol, 1977; Braeutigam, 1989), 
maintaining market equilibrium and anti-excessive competition legislation (Kahn, 1988, pp. 
172-178; Hertog, 1999), and information asymmetry (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1979; Nelson, 
1970; Darby and Karni, 1973; Akerlof, 1970).  
 
Public interest theory has been applied to financial regulations and has been used to justify 
the imposition of capital-based regulations. Regulators justify their intervention in the 
banking sector through capital-based regulations to protect depositors’ money in the banks. 
Loss of deposits is an important externality that bank regulators seek to reduce because of the 
significance of its consequences (Santos, 2001).  I have not come across a theoretical model 
that explains how capital-based banking regulation is designed in light of public interest 
theory. Safe banking implies that banking regulations would reduce the possibility of the 
eruption of a financial crisis and reduce the information asymmetry between banks and 
shareholders. This would eventually reduce systemic risk. In addition to the reduction of 
systemic risk, individual banks and the entire banking system are expected to be “safer” 
within this regulation.  
 
 
                                                 
54 Externality:  a cost or benefit that occurs to an individual or a firm who did not choose to incur such a cost or 
benefit.  In economics, there are two types of externalities: positive and negative. Negative externality is the 
loss a depositor incurs because of a bank’s bankruptcies, for instance. 
55 Information asymmetry: in decision-making, one party has more or better information than the other. In an 
economics setting, information asymmetry occurs when the buyer and the seller do not have access to the same 
level of information.  
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3.2.1.2. Administrative Theory 
 
Administrative theory deals with regulations from the position of a government’s inherent 
control on economic activities and on the conduct of firms. There are three strands of the 
theory: a) tools for administration, b) data for administration, and c) implementation of the 
tools. First, regulation as an administrative tool requires having various classes of tools that 
are specifically customized to each economic phenomena or problem. Applying the wrong 
tool to the wrong economic problem results in a regulatory failure. For example, a 
government that seeks to control a monopoly problem in its country via a “price control” tool 
would aggregate solid empirical evidence on the suitability of this tool to circumvent the 
monopoly problem.  Breyer (1982) and Hood (1984) attributed the failure of economic 
regulation to an administrative failure to match a control tool to an economic problem or 
phenomena.  In this context, we can translate this thinking to Basel-based banking accords, 
where the Basil Accords are a tool adopted by regulators to control the capital adequacy 
problem facing banks.  
 
Second, aspects of this theory relate to the type, volume, detail, and periodicity of 
information gathered by the regulator from the regulated entities. It views regulation from the 
angle of the administrative power needed to learn from and react to the intelligence. The 
regulator uses this bank information to recommend or devise a plan to rectify malpractices in 
the regulated entities. This aspect has been applied and studied in the field of organizational 
behavior, and information gathering by the regulator turns out to be a monotonous, symbolic, 
box-ticking exercise that is sometimes unnecessarily strict (Wilensky, 1967; Feldman and 
March, 1981). It has also been found that the regulated entities tend to report information that 
is too arcane and complex to enable the regulator to take action. There is a deficiency in the 
application of this aspect of administrative theory to banking regulation and the intelligence 
gathered by the banking regulator. This theory does not address how useful the regulator 
finds the periodic reporting submissions in making effective and swift decisions about 
regulation and supervision, nor does it consider the value that regulatees find from the 
reporting requirements. Finally, the theory does not address the economic benefits of 
adhering to the imposed questions or how the regulator utilizes the gathered intelligence.      
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The third aspect of this theory examines the issues that regulatory bodies face in 
implementing regulations. It demonstrates that regulation is an administrative tool in the 
hands of the government and that regulatory implementation failure might be due to lack of 
expertise and specialization in the regulatory staff. Possible reasons for why the regulator 
may fail to act swiftly and effectively in light of the submitted information from the regulated 
entities include lack of proper coordination, lack of communication, or the lack of 
comprehension of the submitted information due to a lack of specialization or appropriate 
training. A lack of expertise would render the regulation redundant and dangerous (Pressman 
and Wildavsky, 1973). It could be dangerous for the regulator if the regulated entities submit 
all of the required information (i.e., information intelligence) to the regulator and the 
regulator failed to fathom the indications in the reports (e.g., due to lack of specialization or 
competence) and thus fails to act swiftly. The regulator would then need to justify and 
explain the eventual crisis in light of the submitted information.  
 
As in the case of the first and second strands of this theory, a theoretical model does not yet 
exist that applies this strand to the theory of banking regulation. There is a lack of conceptual 
frameworks for studying the alignment between the level of expertise at banks and that of the 
regulator, concerning the complexities of the banking system. These gaps are important to be 
studied and theoretically conceptualized. Let us consider an example that uses administrative 
theory to justify banking regulation and supervision, for example by gathering intelligence 
and imposing a tool such as the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) to control the capital at risk. 
If there is a gap in expertise between the administrator (i.e., the regulator) and the banks, then 
the regulator might not appreciate the severity of the implications of what the detailed CAR 
calculations reveal. The regulator might also fail to recognize potential manipulations in the 
calculation. This manipulation of the CAR reports and the subsequent oversight failure could 
lead to a disruption in the banking system if the regulator is not cognizant, and this would 
render the regulations useless.   
 
3.2.1.3 Cultural Theory 
 
Cultural theory is a theory that focuses on the impact of the cultural features of each nation 
on its regulatory and supervisory style. National peculiar attributes such as (inter alia) 
traditions, values, political systems, and demographics play major roles in designing and 
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implementing regulations on any social or economic activity. According to this theory, it is 
difficult to standardize regulations across countries. Cultural attributes influence the design 
and implementation of regulations. The impact of national culture extends to all regulations 
in a country. Some nations regulate their financial systems in a conceptual framework similar 
to the way that they regulate trafficking, educational system, etc. (Moran, 1986).  
 
For example, Ogus (1994) and Williamson (1985) found that the culture in the United 
Kingdom is based on mutual trust between the regulator and the regulated, which leads to the 
design of regulation policy with minimal “checks and balances” and is thus focused on self-
regulation. In the United States, however, there is an adversarial and distrustful attitude 
between the regulator and regulates, which results in a large number of checks and balances 
including prescriptive rules and pluralized perspectives (Jing and Graham, 2007; Hofstede 
and Vogel, 2001).  
 
The principles of the cultural theory have been applied to health, work safety, (Kelman, 
1981), and environmental protection (Vogel, 1978, 1983a, 1983b), but we could not find an 
account of the application of cultural theory to banking regulations, particularly with regards 
to capital regulation and Basel Accords. The Basel Accords, as well as other papers issued by 
Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) such as those related to corporate 
governance and board and executive remuneration, have been adopted by many developing 
and developed countries. In the implementation of the requirements in these documents, 
countries would inevitably encounter requirements that conflict with the cultural sphere of 
their country. For instance, BCBS issued a guidance paper on requirements for a bank’s 
executive management and board remuneration. One requirement is that a bank must disclose 
the breakdown of the monthly and annual remuneration package of each executive. This 
requirement has been viewed in the Gulf region as a breach of the executive’s personal life 
and information. While it might be acceptable in the West for such information to be 
disclosed, it is considered very sensitive to do so in the Gulf. Banks in this region heavily 
protested this requirement when their central banks announced it, and they successfully 
lobbied against its implementation. To quell the resistance and to comply with the BCBS 
papers in spirit, regulators compromised and asked for the monthly and annual remuneration 
packages to be disclosed as aggregate figures without mentioning specific names. This small 
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example gives us insight into the importance of observing the country’s culture while 
designing regulation and supervision.    
 
3.2.2 Normative Economic Theories of Regulation 
 
The focus of normative economics is on values or what the outcomes and goals of economic 
phenomena should be. In discussing banking regulations as an economic phenomenon, 
positive economists focus on explaining the ways that banking regulations are carried out and 
expounding upon the reasons why they are carried out in their current form. Normative 
economists focus on how banking regulations should be designed and implemented to 
achieve the regulator’s objective (e.g., increasing competition and reducing the information 
asymmetry cost). From this definition and in the context of banking regulation, normative 
economics should focus on what regulations and supervision would achieve, the banking 
regulator’s objectives such as reducing systemic risk, enhancing risk management at banks, 
and protecting depositors’ money.  
 
In the professional and academic literature, discussion of Basel II includes a heavy focus on 
the positive economics view of regulation. Basel II is merely a concordat amongst developed 
countries that describe recommendations perceived to be the “cure” for the banking crises 
that have hit banks in these countries since the 1970s. The focus in the literature is 
dichotomous: researchers are either proponents or opponents of Basel II. Researchers who 
oppose Basel II and its capital-based regulation have numerically studied how the accords in 
their existing form cannot achieve the regulator’s objectives within a certain context. 
However, they do not provide an alternative theory for how banks should be regulated if 
Basel II regulations cannot achieve their objectives. 
 
3.2.3 New Institutionalism Theory of Regulation    
  
Thus far, we have discussed theories of banking regulation to understand why banks are 
regulated, but we could not find theories that help us understand how banks should be 
regulated. I next discuss a theory that might help us understand the institutional forces that 
influence how a regulator chooses a particular policy or regulatory tool. In this section, we 
use the concepts of neo-institutionalism theory to understand the effect of institutional forces 
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on banking regulation in Bahrain. By institutional forces, we mean both the influence of the 
regulator on the regulated entities (i.e., banks) and the influence of these entities on the 
regulator itself.   
 
New institutionalism theory (also referred to as neo-institutionalism theory in the literature) 
uses a sociological lens to explain the relationship between institutions in a given context. 
There are various strands of neo-institutionalism theory such as sociological, normative, 
historical, etc. The normative strand of this theory is of most relevance to this study.  
This theory describes how institutions behave, react to regulatory rules, and interact with 
each other beyond economic norms or rules. For example, in an economic setting such as a 
price regulation, the institutions involved in this setting are the firms that offer the goods or 
services, the customers of these firms, and the regulator. The regulators of these firms impose 
rules and constraints such as the maximum price that a firm can ask for its products or 
services. New institutionalism theory studies many elements, such as how do these firms 
react to the price limit? Will the firms collaborate or compete as they react to the price limit? 
Will the regulator consider non-economic factors when designing and implementing the price 
limit? How will the regulator interact with the firms as they consider their reaction? These 
multilateral interactions are also called the “rules of the game” (North, 1995).   
 
These multilateral interactions can similarly describe banking regulation. The new 
institutionalism theory studies whether the banks’ regulators consider the sociological 
reasons behind designing rules and regulations, how banks respond to these rules, how banks 
interact with each other within these regulations, and how banking regulations are set, 
implemented, altered, or dramatically changed. At this point, there are two major questions. 
First, because new-institutionalism theory’s focus is on the sociology of relationships that 
entail values, beliefs, norms, etc., then what is the difference between it and the cultural 
theory discussed in subsection 3.1.3 above? Second, why would we need to discuss neo-
institutionalism theory in the context of this study?  I answer these questions below.  
 
With regards to the difference between the cultural and new institutional theory, there is 
some common thinking that is found in the two theories (Grendstad and Selle, 1995). These 
commonalities stem from the role a national culture plays in shaping the regulation policy 
89 
 
and behavior of the regulator as a whole. The cultural theory of regulation narrowly 
addresses this role without delving into the differences between the types of industries or 
institutions within the same nation. For instance, a cultural theorist might explain how 
regulation in France is protective and prerogative (Hayward, 1983), while in the USA it is 
adversarial and coercive (Vogel, 1983; Moran, 1986), and in the UK it is based on 
cooperative self-regulation and non-prescriptive regulation (Jing and Graham, 2007; Ogus, 
1995; Williamson, 1985). The theory does not, however, explain the variations between firms 
within the same industry or even across industries; it does not examine whether the influence 
of culture is more or less prevalent in banking regulations versus in health or safety 
regulations.  These variations are addressed by new institutionalism theory. Thus, cultural 
theory is construed as an initial form of new-intuitionalism (Grendstad and Selle, 1995).   
 
The second question asks why a discussion of neo-institutionalism theory is needed in this 
chapter. A partial answer has already been discussed, namely that cultural theory explains 
only the broad influence of culture on regulation.  The Cultural theory does not explain the 
choice of a particular regulatory policy, its implementation and whether the implementation 
achieves the regulator’s objectives. Regulator’s objectives hinge on a myriad of factors 
besides culture including how the regulated entities interpret the appropriateness and logic of 
the given policy. New-institutionalism theory can explain how the understanding of the 
applicability and repercussion of the regulation policy affects the behavior of the regulated 
entities.  The logic of appropriateness of a regulation policy means that actions by the 
regulated entities are “matched to situations by means of rules organized into identities” 
(March, 1994).  This concept of appropriateness in new institutionalism theory has been used 
in the design of this study’s data collection instruments, including the questionnaires and the 
interview questions.  In particular, the concept has been applied to the relationship to the 
appropriateness of Basel approaches and capital-based regulation for each bank, and to 
understand how a bank acts towards any mismatch between the regulation and the real 
situations that it encounters.  
 
As indicated above, each theory has partial applications to banking regulation, and this 
applicability varies. It narrows when we discuss Basel II as in the case of cultural theory and 
extend this to the case of administrative theory. The conclusion that can be drawn from this 
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theoretical discussion thus far is that it is not useful to rely solely on one theory to explain 
capital and Basel regulations.  In light of all the theories discussed above, we developed a 
theoretical model that delineate a conceptual framework for banking regulation based with 
Basel Accords. This is discussed further below.    
 
3.3 Banking Regulation Theoretical Conceptual Framework   
 
The following diagram depicts the concept that we developed from practical experience and 
in light of the theories indicated earlier in the chapter.  
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the application of the theories we discussed in the sections above. As 
indicated, banking regulations in practice cannot be completely explained by one theory. 
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Public interest theory, cultural theory, administrative theory, and new-institutionalization 
theory collectively provide an explanation of the existing banking regulations and 
supervisions.  Banking regulations manifest themselves in three ways: a regulatory approach, 
a supervisory program, and regulatory tools. The regulatory approach can be classified into 
two categories, based on its economic scope: micro-prudential and macro-prudential 
regulations. There are two sets of regulation methods, rule-based regulation, and principle-
based regulations. The economic and methodological scopes are not mutually exclusive. 
These approaches can be applied in parallel, i.e., a regulator might apply a micro-prudential 
rules-based regulation or macro-prudential rules-based regulation. In addition, a combination 
within the same category is also possible, i.e. a regulator could design its regulations by 
addressing the micro and macroeconomic factors but from a principle-based scope or a rules-
based scope.  
 
3.3.1 Rule and principle-based regulation  
 
The rules-based approach to regulation implies that bank regulators dictate prescriptive, 
detailed rules and processes to the regulated. In a rules-based setting, there is little regard 
given to the peculiarities of each bank, such as a given bank’s size and business model. 
Banks are expected to abide by these rules, and any exceptions they have must be justified 
and approved by the regulator. In contrast to rules-based regulation, in principles-based 
regulation, the regulator outlines to the banks the principles governing their conduct and the 
desired outcomes. The regulator would consequently have to ensure whether the banks have 
met these expectations. In this approach, there is greater room for direct communication and 
dialogue between the regulator and the regulated. There is also a shift between this approach 
and the rules-based scheme  that changes the emphasis from the rigorousness of the rules to 
the rigorousness and competencies of the regulator to judge whether the expected outcomes 
have been met, and (most importantly) to devise a plan to work together with the bank to get 
things done correctly.  
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3.3.2 Micro- and Macro-Prudential Regulation 
 
At the beginning of the discussion about standardized financial regulation that emerged in 
light of the 1970s and 1980s financial crises, the focus was on micro-prudential supervision 
(Kapstein, 1991). At that time, the term “micro-prudential” was not popular in the banking 
literature. This concept was only established after the financial crises of the 2000s and 1990s. 
The micro-prudential approach can be defined as a model of supervision designed on the 
premises that the entire banking system can be sound if the individual banks are safe and 
sound, as assessed through a capital adequacy ratio. It has been argued that this approach 
caused and escalated systemic risk in the banking system because it disregarded the 
correlation between the decisions taken by banks and their impact on the price and interest 
rate levels within the system and endogenous aggregated risks of this correlation (Persaud, 
2009).  
 
This argument has a lot of merits.  Indeed, when BCBS analyzed the 2007 crisis, it concluded 
something similar and included two new measures in its Basel III suggestions: 
Countercyclical Buffer and Systemically Important Bank Buffer Macro-prudential 
regulation, on the other hand, is defined as: 
 
The assessment and monitoring of the strengths and vulnerabilities of financial systems in 
terms of macro-prudential indicators comprising both financial soundness indicators and other 
macroeconomic indicators such as GDP growth and inflation along with information on the 
structure of the financial system, qualitative information on the institutional and regulatory 
framework, particularly through assessments of compliance with international financial sector 
standards and codes, and the outcome of stress tests.  (Sundararajan et al., 2002) 
 
The difference between micro-prudential regulation and macro-prudential regulation is that 
the former primarily focuses on the safety of the banks and implicitly presumes that the 
safety of the parts will guarantee the safety of the whole. Macro-prudential regulation 
assesses the soundness and safety of the banking system by examining the economic 
indicators of the financial sector (e.g., implications of GDP, employment, interest rate, etc.). 
The difference between the two approaches is that macro-prudential regulation is intended to 
reduce systemic risk while micro-prudential regulation is intended to limit the idiosyncratic 
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risk of banks (Crockett, 2000; Chul, 2006; Borio, 2003). It might be optimal to marry both 
regulations to enhance the financial stability of banks, according to Crockett (2000).   
 
Upon examination of the definition of each approach and having enumerated their 
shortcomings, it seems intuitive and optimal to marry the four approaches. There is a 
consensus in the literature that rules-based regulation and the micro-prudential approaches 
cannot create sound financial and banking systems; the recent banking crises revealed their 
inability to do so. To the best of my knowledge, there is no research paper that has discussed 
the viability of marrying the four approaches.  
   
3.3.3 Supervisory Program  
 
The oversight activities of the regulator are meant to ensure that banks adhere to all of the 
issued rules and regulations. The regulator also has to assess their performance, governance, 
and risks. These activities include: 
 
Reporting requirements: periodic financial and non-financial reports submitted by banks to 
the regulator.  
 
Inspection visit: on-site periodic visits by the regulator to conduct substantive assessments of 
the performance and risks management of the bank. It includes an assessment of controls, 
systems, and records.  
 
Periodic meetings: prudential meetings held between the central bank and the bank 
management or board of directors.  
 
Off-site examination: off-site oversight activities to identify, assess, and monitor regulatory 
returns, audited financial statements, compliance matters, and provide an overall assessment 
of the risk management and financial performance of banks.  
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3.3.4 Regulatory tool 
 
Banking regulation includes several areas such as capital regulation, corporate governance, 
anti-money laundering, etc. I use regulatory tools to refer to capital regulation only. The 
Basel Accords are regulatory tools adopted by countries to curtail the risk that might impinge 
upon bank capital. I say that Basel II is merely a tool because CAR is not an end in itself. It is 
a threshold that guides the regulator to the areas of weakness in the bank’s capital or 
excessive risks in its credit or market portfolios. Similarly, ICAAP in Pillar 2 is not an end in 
itself either. It shows the regulator how a bank quantifies its risks and how its systemic risk, 
risk management, internal controls, and policies restrain these risks. The “unknown” in figure 
3.1 refers to the fact that Basel Accords are merely a tool that is adopted by tens of countries; 
however, this does not mean that Basel Accords define how banking regulations should 
operate. There is voluminous literature on how Basel Accords failed to achieve its own 
objectives in the 2007 crisis. Thus, in my opinion, research is needed to devise another tool 
for banking regulation. This new tool should be conceptually theorized while also 
considering the cultural attributes, institutional features, and the political and economic 
sphere of a country.   
 
In conclusion, banking regulation and supervision cannot be explained by one or even a 
couple of theories. It cannot be justified on the ground of one discipline only, such as the 
economic characteristics of the operating environment. Banking regulations and supervision 
should be designed to protect the financial system from the crisis (i.e., an economic 
motivation). It should also be deliberated based on the unique cultural attributes of the banks’ 
operating environment. Furthermore, a banking regulator should diligently study the 
institutional characteristics within each country prior to the imposition of the particularities 
of the rules and regulation.  
 
I found that Basel II regulations were not theoretically conceptualized or explained in the 
literature by more than limited economic backgrounds such as reducing systemic risk and 
protecting depositors’ money.  
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Here, we provide a theoretical framework for banking regulation and supervision that caters 
to differences in political, cultural, economic, and institutional national attributes. This 
framework could be envisioned as a blueprint for the design of rules and a supervision 
program that are not confined to Basel II requirements.  
 
Part 2: Research Methodology 
3.4 Research Approach   
 
This research adopts a qualitative approach to achieve its research objectives. The qualitative 
approach is adopted because the aim of this research is to examine Basel II regulation and 
supervision from the perspectives of the regulated parties, i.e. the bankers. To examine the 
impact of Basel II regulation through analysis of the financial information of the banks is 
theoretically possible but impossible in reality.  This type of financial information is neither 
disclosed in the banks’ annual reports nor accessible through interviews or surveys with a 
staff of the banks or the CBB itself due to confidentiality reasons. Also, if the information 
becomes available, then the analysis would be passive; it would not study and listen to the 
issues faced by the banks while implementing Basel II regulation beyond what the financial 
information conveys.    I would only have an understanding of the bank’s financial situation, 
whereas we are interested in understanding the experiences of banks, the values they ascribe 
to Basel regulation, the values they attribute to the CBB role in supervision and regulation, 
their frustrations and recommendations. This ultimate objective can only be optimally 
achieved through a non-parametric approach that includes interviews, questionnaire surveys, 
and case studies. 
In this body of research, an interpretive qualitative approach is adopted. It turns to 
ethnography as a suitable qualitative method.  This method was chosen “because of a need to 
study a group or population, identify variables that cannot be easily measured, or hear silence voices,” which is 
better than using “predetermined information from the literature or rely on results from other research studies.” 
( Creswell, 2013) 
The regulation and supervision relationship between the regulator and the banks is a 
negotiation process.  Evidence of that lies in the international implementation of Basel 
Accords. Prior to issuing its documents of standards and guidance in their final form, the 
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Basel Committee gave practitioners and academics a chance to study the documents and 
provide feedback. The Committee yielded, in some cases56, to the pressure exerted by banks 
on some of the requirements, they deemed unreasonable requirements, and typically they 
would not have succumbed to these pressures. International implementation of these accords 
has seldom been identical across countries. Each country takes from Basel Accords what 
“works best” for its banking and financial system. Countries may adopt Basel Accords in 
their entirety and impose additional rules, and we refer to these countries as “Basel Plus” 
countries. On the other hand, there are countries that can be categorized as “Basel Minus,” as 
these countries slice and dice the accords and take only the elements that they think are most 
feasible for their regulators and the banks they supervise. For example, such countries may 
adopt only the credit risk methodologies of calculating the capital required for such a risk, 
but choose not to adopt or to defer the adoption of the operational risk methodology.  Lastly, 
there are “Copy-Paste Basel” countries that take Basel Accords exactly as they are and strive 
to implement them to satisfy the regulator in what is normally called a “box-ticking” 
exercise. As indicated above, before adopting any of these positions, a banking regulator in a 
country would take into consideration the size of the financial system, the banking system, 
the sophistication of the banks, the complexities of the banks’ activities on its soil, etc. 
The negotiation process is inevitably influenced by the impacted parties’ different judgments, 
perceptions of values and benefits of the banking regulation and supervision and motivations. 
A regulator might be motivated to prevent panic in the system (Santos, 2001) whereas banks 
may be motivated to have more flexibility in extending credit and venturing into investments 
projects. These differences may be studied and examined by soliciting the perceptions and 
views of the regulator and the regulated, then analyzing the perceptions and values that both 
parties ascribe to banking regulations vis-a-vis Basel Accords. The purpose of adopting a 
qualitative approach is illuminated succinctly by Creswell (2013):  
We conduct qualitative research because we need a complex, detailed understanding of the issue. The detail can 
only be established by talking directly with people, going to their homes or places of work, and allowing them 
to tell the stories unencumbered by what we expect to find or what we have read in the literature. (Creswell, 
2013) 
 
                                                 
56 A recent relevant example is when the BCBS issued its paper on liquidity measures (later known as Basel 
III), and the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) was initially set at a minimum threshold level of 100%. Later on, 
the BCBS relaxed the ratio to be 70% with gradual increases to 100% by 2019.   
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3.5 Research Strategy 
 
To be in a position to develop a “theory” about a group, an ethnographer has several 
methodological options for collecting the data needed, such as through active and close 
participation and observation of the group (Creswell, 1997; Fetterman 1998). This means that 
the researcher has to go to the field (namely the bank and central bank offices), and 
“observe” their actions, words, perceptions, etc. This option is not feasible for two reasons. 
First, due to the confidentiality and sensitivity of the information and documents exchanged 
in their workplace the central bank and/ or the banks do not allow researchers to sit in their 
offices and observe them. Second, for the purpose of this body of research, perceptions, 
values, and concerns cannot be solicited through mere observations and note taking but 
instead through discussions and questioning of the elements of the group. 
Within ethnography, the second option for data gathering interviews.  As previously indicated, 
due to the confidentiality and sensitivity of the information, interviews with bankers and 
regulators have to be formal in nature, conducted in a place where they feel sufficiently 
comfortable that they will reveal their concerns and perceptions, and should use pre-set 
questions.  Regardless of the design of the pre-set questions, issues and topics raised in an 
interview may vary from one interview to another. The same questions might be phrased 
differently to be suitable to  the interviewee’s education level and experience;  the scope of the 
subjects to be covered during an interview and the level of elaboration sought could also be 
customized based on the time allowed from the interviewee and his/her subject matter 
knowledge and competence. This aligns to testify to what Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) 
have stated:  
Ethnographers do not usually decide beforehand the exact questions they want to ask, and do 
not ask each interviewee exactly the same question, though they will usually enter the interview 
with a list of issues to be covered. (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 151-152) 
Data analysis is carried out inductively and deductively. Inductive data analysis occurs by 
moving from a particular point of view or stance to a general perspective, in an attempt to 
explore a theme in the data.  Data analysis also occurs deductively, by attempting to link the 
explored theme to evidence in real life or in the literature, thereby validating the theme. The 
findings from these two phases are then discussed, based on the researcher’s experience and 
on the literature. 
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Researchers in the business discipline adopt a positivist approach to developing models and 
studying the impact of regulations, such as the minimum CAR, on the financial 
performance57 of banks as reported in their financial statements. For example, Barth et al. 
(2004) assessed the validity of banking supervision and its relationship to banking stability, 
and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) assessed the relationship between the banking 
supervision and a “sounder bank.” They used the adherence to “Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision” as an indicator for a sound bank.  Klomp and Haan (2012) used the 
database of Barth et al. (2004) to assess the relationship between banking regulation and 
bank risk. They developed a model of 25 indicators of risk and found that banking regulation 
only affects big banks.  Berger and Avary (1991) studied the association between risk-based 
regulation and bank performance through a US bank-level data and their own model. 
Studies on banking regulation and the analysis of Basel Accords have generally adopted a 
quantitative, positivist approach. Researchers who studied banking regulation and 
supervision have not adequately approached the topic from an ethnographic point of view. 
The perceptions and thoughts of the bankers on what they think of the regulation and 
supervision program have not yet been explored in depth, including whether or not they 
perceive the supervision program to be practical and beneficial for their activities, or whether 
they have reaped the benefits claimed by the regulator. 
For this reason, an ethnographic method has been chosen for this body of research.   In this 
regard, we adopt the definition of ethnography proposed by Goodenough (1976):  
The culture of any society is made up of the concepts, beliefs, and principles of action and organization 
that an ethnographer has found could be attributed successfully to the members of that society in the 
context of his dealings with them. (Goodenough, 1976, p.5)   
Creswell (2013) also echoes this definition, for whom:  
Ethnography is a qualitative design in which the researcher describes and interprets the shared 
and learned patterns of values, behaviors, beliefs and languages of a culture-sharing group.  
(Creswell, 2013)  
                                                 
57 As measured by certain indicators or ratios such as Return on Equity (ROE), Retain on Assets (ROA), ratio 
on non-performing loans (NPL) to total credit portfolio.  
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By examining the above definitions, it becomes clear that the ethnographer could only 
formulate a “theory” about a certain group by examining the actions, opinions, perceptions, 
preferences, beliefs, and attitudes of its members.  
The methods utilized in this research study are questionnaire surveys and one-on-one 
interviews. One-on-one interviews are confined to the senior staff of the banks in Bahrain 
who are directly involved in Basel regulation implementation. Questionnaire surveys are 
shared with the banks, and the CBB Interviews are used to gather information from the 
respondent bankers about real case studies, specific issues, and malpractice issues they faced 
in relation to Basel regulation implementation and supervision. Questionnaires are used to 
provide specific responses to specific questions.   The data collected from both methods (the 
questionnaire and the interviews) are analyzed and presented through descriptive statistics.  
The information is presented in tabular and graphical forms. The descriptive statistics are 
meant to highlight potential areas of the regulation and the supervisory practices that could 
require reassessment or re-design.  
3.5.1 Questionnaire Structure  
 
A set of questionnaire was designed and distributed to the banks. The questionnaire contains 
32 questions, including five demographic questions. The remaining 27 questions were 
categorized and ordered as follows:   
• Objectives of Basel: what Basel Accords implementation is expected to achieve. For 
instance, does not improve risk management at banks; reduce systemic risk in the 
banking system, etc.    
• Assessment of Basel regulation: whether the quantitative requirements in Basel 
Accords are applicable and valid; i.e. do they correctly measure what they are 
designed to measure.   
• The CBB’s supervisory conduct: the perceived effectiveness of the CBB’s Basel II 
regulatory and supervisory program. 
• The perceived benefits of Basel regulation and CBB supervision. 
The questionnaire is a multiple –choice survey, and all questions are scored on a 5-point 
Likert Scale. In designing the questions, we used a closed-ended format but included a short 
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explanation to ensure that the respondent understands the purpose of the question. For 
example, the question about the impact of Basel regulation on risk management is structured 
in this way, “Do you think that Basel II implementation, in the context of the CBB 
Rulebooks, helped to improve your bank’s risk management function and practices?” Answer 
choices used a Likert scale design and were tailored to each question rather merely using 
generic responses such as “strongly agree” or “strongly disagree.” For example, instead of 
“strongly agree” we suggested, “Yes, we find a strong positive correlation between Basel II 
implementation and risk management practices at our bank.”  
3.5.2. Interview Structure  
 
With regards to the interviews, 26 one-on-one semi-structured interviews were held with 
banks and one interview was held with the CBB. Requests for interviews were arranged 
directly between the researchers and the interviewees. There were questions outlined prior to 
the interviews while other questions were asked in light of the answers provided by the 
interviewee.   
The pre-defined questions were shared with the interviewees prior to the interviews, at their 
request. Each interview lasted between one and a half hours and two hours. Notes were taken 
off the answers then transcribed. The transcribed interviews were sent to the interviewees to 
ensure that no statements were left out or incorrectly understood. The outcomes of the 
interviews were analyzed horizontally and vertically.  In the horizontal analysis, the 
outcomes collected from each interview for each question were aggregated.  For instance, 
answers from all of the interviews on the question “in what ways have Basel Accords 
implementation helped improve your bank’s risk management?” were consolidated into one 
file. The same procedure was applied to the rest of the questions.  In the vertical analysis, the 
outcomes from the interviews with each bank were noted in a separate file.  
In the interviews, open-ended questions were asked in order to get more in-depth responses 
that highlighted the interviewee’s views and concerns. For instance, instead of asking “did 
Basel II implementation help your bank’s risk management” I instead asked, “how, if at all, 
did Basel II implementation help your bank’s risk management?”  Questions were asked 
without giving an appearance of having a pre-determined stance of the issues under discussion.  
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The interviews were exclusively confined to the employees in positions of “Head of Risk” or 
“Chief Risk Officer,” “Head of Financial Control,” “Head of Internal Audit,” “Head of 
Compliance,” and Chief Executive Officers.  This is because these are the positions that are 
ultimately responsible for the implementation of the regulation and supervision 
implementation.    
Likewise, the interviews with the CBB were with decision makers or designers of the rules 
and regulations, such as Executive Directors, Directors, and Advisors.   
3.5.3 Questionnaire Administration  
 
The 120 questionnaires were distributed via email to the banks in Bahrain. The 
questionnaires were hosted on a website. The emails included a link through which a 
respondent accessed the questionnaire and fill it out electronically. The emails were 
distributed directed by the researchers to the banks and through an “email campaign” that 
was disseminated by the Bahrain Bankers Association (BBA) to all the banks.  The help of 
the BBA was sought to increase the responses rate. Responses were anonymously stored on 
the website.  
The responses were exported from the website to an Excel file, which was in turn exported to 
the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) for analysis.  Collecting responses through 
a website is more appropriate than collecting them during a one-on-one meeting, through a 
phone interview, or by asking the respondent to save or scan and send the file via emails. 
Web-based questionnaires are easy to administer and affordable (Oppenheim, 2003).  There 
are, however, a few drawbacks such as the inability to clarify or explain the questions or 
terms mentioned in the question, and a lack of control over the respondents to ensure that all 
of the questions are answered. 
 
3.6 Ethical Issues and Assurance  
 
Due to the reasons expounded upon in Section 1.6 of Chapter 1, the names and positions of 
the respondents to the pilot questionnaire will not be revealed. The approval of their banks 
was sought and confirmed prior to the interviews.  
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Voluntary participation in the online questionnaire was pledged. The emails that included the 
link to the online survey also included a pledge that due consideration for anonymity and 
confidentiality would be taken. 
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Chapter 4. Results and Analysis 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
4.1.1 Chapter structure  
 
This chapter analyzes and discusses the results from the surveyed and interviewed bankers. I 
start by recalling, briefly, the assumptions, and methodology of the study. I then discuss and 
analyze the data gathered from the questionnaires and the interviews. The chapter then ends 
with conclusions drawn from the results.  
   
I organize the discussions and the analysis along the following themes; the questionnaire and 
the interviews were designed based on these themes as well:  
• Demographics and descriptive statistics 
• The role and impact of Base II. I raised questions in the interviews soliciting views of 
the interviewees about whether or not Basel II regulations are suitable for banks and 
for the whole banking system and we asked them to justify their stance.  
• The appropriateness of the techniques and methods of Basel II (e.g., risk measures, 
ratios). This theme includes the interviewees’ responses to questions on the technical 
quantitative and qualitative requirements in Basel II regulations.  Specifically, we 
asked whether the requirements are reflective of and commensurate with a bank’s 
assets size and complexity. 
• The competence and the role of the CBB (regulations, supervision, inspection and 
reporting). This theme includes the interviewees’ descriptions of the regulatory 
environment in Bahrain. How, from the bankers’ perspective, are regulations 
designed and implemented? Are banking regulations fragmented or integrated within 
the whole economic system? What are the ‘rules of the game’? This theme includes 
the interviewees’ responses on how the CBB supervises the implementation of Basel 
II regulations. The supervision specifically includes inspection visits, off-site 
examination, and reporting requirements 
• The banks’ management practices and familiarities with Basel II concepts, 
requirements and implications. To appreciate the interviewees’ stances, complaints, 
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and reservations about the regulation and supervision, we believe that it is necessary 
to understand the environment in which the interviewees work. What are the 
governance culture and attitude towards risk management and regulation in the 
interviewees’ work environment? What are the board’s and executive management’s 
attitudes towards regulation? This theme includes details provided by the 
interviewees that would help us interpret their responses to the other questions. 
 
It is very important for the reader to provide a description of the institution's set up of the 
financial system in the country prior to delving into the findings of the questionnaires and 
interviews. This description would help the reader better understand the interviews’ 
quotations and appreciate the interviewees’ stances as well as interrelate to the theoretical 
framework outlined in Chapter 3 about institutionalism. Conventional retail banks in Bahrain 
by the end of 2007 witnessed an expansion. December 2007, total retail bank deposits stood 
at BD 13 billion, up from BD4.9 billion in March 2007. Nonetheless, Bahraini retail banks 
continue to have relatively easy access to retail deposits, given the high levels of liquidity 
currently available in the country (and in the Gulf region as a whole).  Historically, locally‐
incorporated retail banks have exhibited high capital adequacy ratios. As at end‐September 
2007, the aggregate capital adequacy ratio stood at 16.7%. Similarly, the core capital ratio 
(ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk‐weighted assets) declined from 14.8% in March 2007 to 9.6% 
in September 2007. Retail banks experienced a 78% growth in net profits. As at September 
2007, the net interest margin for locally incorporated retail banks was 2%. Return on average 
assets (ROAA) also increased from 1.6% to 1.9% over the period.  
 
Locally‐incorporated retail banks had over 40% of their loan book in two sectors: “consumer 
and personal” and “financial.” As at end‐September 2007, aggregate non‐performing loans 
(NPLs) in all retail banks stood at 2.5%, down from 5.1% as at end‐March 2007.  
PTPT  
If we compare the above results with the performance of the banks in 2008, we will find that 
as at end‐September 2008, the aggregate capital adequacy ratio for locally‐incorporated retail 
banks stood at 15.5%, compared to the 24% level attained in December 2007. The core 
capital ratio (ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk‐weighted assets) also fell to 10.9% (from 17% in 
December 
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2007). Also, as at end‐September 2008, return‐on‐assets (ROA) was 1.1% for local retail 
banks, down from 1.7% last December.  Return‐on‐equity (ROE) amounted to 9% for local 
retail banks, down from 12% in December 2007. Although slightly down, the capital buffers 
of Islamic retail banks was robust. As at end‐September 2008, the regulatory capital 
adequacy ratio for Islamic retail banks was 28%, lower than the 34% recorded for end‐ 
December 2007. The core capital ratio was 24.4%, compared to 29% in December 2007. 
Asset quality for Islamic retail banks remained healthy. As at end‐ September 2008, 
aggregate non‐performing financing facilities (NPF) were 3.8% of total facilities, only 
slightly higher than the 3.5% recorded at the end of December 2007.  The volume of liquid 
assets available to Islamic retail banks has fallen from 25% of total assets in December 2007 
to 18% by end‐September 2008. In regard to the Capital Ratio, as at end‐September 2008, 
capital the regulatory capital adequacy ratio (CAR) stood at 24.6%, compared to 40% in 
December 2007. Regarding the non-performing loans, at end‐September 2008, aggregate 
non‐performing financing facilities (NPF) in Islamic wholesale banks stood at 7%, up from 
the 4.2% recorded in December 2007. In terms of merger or bankruptcies, the impact of the 
crisis was not witnessed until after 2000. After 2000, several banks could not survive, and the 
CBB encouraged them to merge to avoid the calamity of individual banks bankruptcies. In 
sum, banks in Bahrain, Islamic and conventional, suffered from a reduction in their capital 
adequacy ratio, profitability, liquidity and non-performing loans in 2008, compared to their 
performance in 2007.  
 
The Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) is the sole regulator of the financial sector in Bahrain. 
Table 4.1 lists the categories of the financial firms in the financial sector. The sector 
contributes 27% to the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). (CBB, 2016). The CBB is 
also responsible for monetary policy of the country, the financial stability, issuing the 
currency, and issuing the government debts. 
 
In Bahrain, there are about 400 financial institutions employing a workforce of 13,887, 65% 
of them Bahraini nationals and 35% foreign nationals. (CBB, 2016). The following table 
illustrates the categories and number of these institutions.  
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Attribute Description 
Banking sector  113 banks   
Insurance sector  152 companies  
Investment firms  60 firms  
Funds industry  2,647 authorized funds  
Specialized firms  60 firms- money changers, microfinance 
institution, trust services, etc.  
Table 4.1 Financial Sector in Bahrain  
Source: www.cbb.gov.bh 
In Banking Sector, there are about 113 banking institutions. There are two categories of 
banks in Bahrain, Retail and Wholesale banks. Retail banks are those banks, which accepts 
deposits from individuals and make loans to individuals and commercial entities. Wholesale 
banks, on the other hand, are those banks, which do not accept deposits from the public and 
conduct investment banking activities such as private equity, projects finance, wealth 
management, and underwriting services. Within each category of these two categories, there 
are two sub-categories, Islamic and Conventional Banks. Therefore, overall, in Bahraini 
banking system, there are Islamic retail and wholesale banks as well as conventional retail 
and wholesale banks.    
 
Attribute Description 
Total Assets  USD 192.7 
Retail Banks  28 banks, 13 of them locally incorporated 
and 15 branches of foreign banks.  
Wholesale banks  76 banks  
Islamic Banks ( included in above) 25 banks  
Representative office  8 
Table…Banking Sector in Bahrain.  
Source: www.cbb.gov.bh 
In the banking part of the financial sector, which is the focus of this study, the CBB 
intervenes through setting out detailed rules and regulations, approval of the appointment of 
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the Board of Directors and the executive positions. Each bank, prior to appointing, for 
instance, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Risk officer, or Chief Internal Auditor, should seek 
a prior written approval for such appointment and the CBB interviews the candidates as well.  
 
The CBB is a quasi-government entity. Although it is officially a public entity, it has some of 
the features of the private sector58. Article 5 of the CBB Law requires that the CBB shall 
have a Board of directors but these directors are appointed by royal decree. The day-to-day 
management of the CBB is entrusted to a Governor, with ministerial rank, and who is 
directly accountable to the Board. The Governor is also appointed by Royal Decree. In regard 
to banking regulation, only one Executive Director is assuming the responsibilities of 
banking supervision in the country. The Executive Director is appointed by a decree of the 
Prime Minister.  There are five directorates reporting to the Executive Director, the 
Inspection Directorate, the Retail Conventional Banking off-site Supervision Directorate, the 
Wholesale Conventional Banking Offsite Supervision Directorate, the Islamic Banking 
Directorate, and the Licensing Directorate. The Directorates are headed by Directors who are 
also appointed by the Prime Minister by undisclosed criteria. There is no transparency and no 
disclosure of any sort of information about the nomination and appointment of the Executive 
Director or the Directors reporting to him.  In terms of career path and staff compensation 
and benefits, the CBB pays its staff lower than those in the banking sector. That is why CBB 
staff are inclined to leave their jobs to join banks. It is rare that bankers leave banks to join 
the CBB.  
 
When the CBB plans to impose a new set of regulations, it follows two options, either 
consult with the industry or impose it directly without consultation. From practitioner’s view, 
the CBB follows the consultation route for a proposed set of regulations for the 
implementation of these regulations that would significantly affect the bank’s business and 
financial statements. One would expect, given that view, that the CBB has followed that 
route when introducing Basel II and Basel III. The CBB followed, however, the direct 
imposition of the Basel II and Basel III regulations. The reason is explained in the 
Interviewee 1-CBB’s statement 
                                                 
58 The CBB defines itself on its website as “public corporate entity”.(CBB,2016) 
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Interviewer: when the CBB wanted to implement a new regulation for the General Reserve, you 
implemented it through consultation with the practitioners, and arranged workshops. I am wondering, 
why did not you follow the same approach when you started implementing Basel III in 2010 and back 
in 2007 for Basel II?  
 
Interviewee1-CBB: the answer is simply if we followed that approach that would mean we have a 
choice to implement or not to implement Basel II or III based on our result of our consultations with 
the industry.  
 
Interviewer: what is wrong with that?  
 
Interviewee1-CBB: there is nothing particularly wrong in that, but we do not have the choice. We have 
to implement them. There are so many institutions supervising us as a country as issuing reports on us. 
Examples of these institutions are the rating agencies, World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. Representatives of the World Bank and the IMF visits us periodically and issue an assessment 
report on the whole banking and financial system infrastructure in the country. In this report, they 
particularly address the point of whether we are implementing the international best practices or not. 
Undoubtedly Basel II and III are international best practices. Similarly, the rating agencies include the 
same criteria when issuing the country report. Now, if we do not implement these regulations [Basel II 
and Basel III], that would impact the country rating which would in turn negatively impact the rating 
of the banks operating in the country.  
 
The CBB follows the second approach, direction imposition for the regulations that are non-
financial, i.e. does not directly affect the calculation of the CAR, Income Statement or 
Balance Sheet of the banks. Examples of such regulations are corporate governance, internal 
control, compliance, money laundering, cyber security, business conduct and financial 
crimes. 
 
The regulations, once outlined by the CBB, sent to the banks for implementation. If they 
were finally issued (i.e. without consultation), banks have no option but compliance. Banks 
have no official means through which they can voice their concern. Banks are not allowed to 
send their objections to the CBB for any kind of regulations once finalized. Requests for 
deferral of implementation is negotiated with the CBB on a case-by-case basis. The decisions 
at the CBB is taken by a couple of senior officials only. There is no union or an association 
that could be construed as a “lobby” of banks against any unfavorable set of regulations. 
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Pressure may be exercised by some banks, through their board of directors, which include 
high net worth individuals or politically influential person. The influence is exerted by direct 
contact with the CBB to express dissatisfaction of the regulations. Once these influence 
efforts are successful, the CBB does address these influenced changes into its Rulebook 
through periodic updates. Banks do not interact, officially with each other or form a pressure 
group or anything of its like to voice their concern or discontent. Every bank negotiates, if it 
has influential powers, on its own.  
 
The relationship between banks is competitive in nature rather than collaborative. When 
faced with an imposed regulations that are not in their best interest, banks do not collaborate 
to voice their dissatisfaction to the CBB or join forces to quell the regulatory pressure on 
themselves. Instead, banks, when there is more advantage under those very regulations, will 
exploit the opportunity to gain more than the disadvantaged.  
 
There is a question always raised amongst practitioners “what does the CBB consider or 
think about before imposing or drafting any regulations?” Does it take into consideration the 
social factors, economic factors, the political factors, the regional factors? Does the CBB 
think of the social or cultural attributes of the society? The interviewed CBB officials have 
always highlighted the pressure of meeting the international best practice. In addition, that 
refer to the IMF the rating agencies. We should also not forget the political pressures which 
the competitions amongst the countries in the region on which country would be the financial 
hub for Islamic banks or which country would be the financial center of the middle east for 
insurance, etc. in particular, there is a competition amongst Bahrain and Dubai in that aspect. 
So, going back to answer the question of whether the CBB looks into the social factors when 
drafting regulations and supervisions.   
 
The political setup of the country over the years created cultural attributes that determined 
the regulations’ culture in the country. The impact of this culture is not confined to a specific 
industry; it became the way the government regulates everything, from the banking industry 
to hotels, private universities and other educational institutes, insurance companies, etc. One 
of these attributes is the absence of trust. Regulations are planned, developed and 
implemented under the influence that the regulated individuals/ entities are not trusted and 
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would tend to destroy, violate and breach all norms and conditions unless we firmly advise 
and monitor them on the correct manner. As we will see in the findings later on in the chapter 
that this culture is manifested in how the CBB’s inspectors carried themselves and deal with 
the bankers during their routine visits to the banks, as one interviewer described them as “ 
police which looks so jaded to prove the presumption that we did something wrong”.  
Naturally, if a regulator’s culture that the regulated individuals and entities are not trusted 
worthy, the regulator would follow a rule-based approach to regulation. In this approach, the 
regulator prescribes in detail the requirements leaving minimum or no room for the regulated 
to interpret their own understanding of the requirements.  
 
4.1.2 Scope of data and the research questions 
 
In Chapter 1, I indicated that to understand the framework of banking regulations for the 
purpose of this study, we needed to pose several fundamental questions about banking 
regulations and the role of government in their design and implementation. I also mentioned 
that answering these questions would be important to conceptualizing the motivation of the 
study, the structure of each chapter, and the research design. The questions we posed 
included the following:  First, what are regulation and supervision? Second, why do we need 
banking regulations (i.e., what are the government justifications for intervening in the 
banking industry)? Third, how do governments intervene? Fourth, how can we evaluate 
whether the adopted regulations meet the specified objectives? Finally, if the regulations do 
not meet the objectives, how should regulations be redesigned and implemented?   
 
In this chapter, we will discuss the data that address the following research questions: 
 
1. How has Basel II implementation, in the context of the CBB Rulebooks, helped banks 
with risk management functions and practices? This is covered in the “role and impact of 
Basel II” theme.  
 
2. How has Basel II implementation, in the context of the CBB Rulebooks, helped banks 
improve competitive advantage and reputation? This is covered in the “role and impact of 
Basel II” theme. 
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3. How has Basel II implementation, in the context of the CBB Rulebooks, helped 
reduce systemic risk at the local level? This is covered in the “role and impact of Basel II” 
theme. 
 
Regarding the questions “How can we evaluate whether the adopted regulations meet the 
specified objectives?” and “If the regulations do not meet the objectives, how should 
regulations be redesigned and implemented?”,  we have found that the CBB intervenes in 
banking regulation through restricted entry requirements and the adoption of an international 
tool, Basel II. I will discuss how the CBB carried out the regulation and supervision of these 
accords, and how the surveyed and interviewed bankers viewed the effectiveness of its 
regulatory and supervisory activities.  In particular, in this chapter we will discuss the 
following additional three questions:  
 
1. How effective is the CBB in implementing Basel II in its banking system about the 
design of its regulation policies and supervisory program? This is covered in the 
“competence and role of the CBB” theme. 
 
2. Is the current CBB implementation of Basel II the optimal regulation system for the 
Bahraini banking system? This is covered in the “competence and role of the CBB” theme. 
 
3. Has the CBB achieved its objectives in implementing Basel II, and did the banks 
approve these objectives? This is covered in the “competence and role of the CBB” and the 
“banks’ management practices and familiarities” themes. 
 
4.1.3 Data and methodology  
 
To gather data, I distributed a questionnaire to bankers and held 26 interviews. I adopted the 
semi-structured interviews for this research because semi-structured interviews as defined by  
Burgess (1982) is are “an opportunity for the researcher to probe deeply to uncover new 
clues, open up new dimensions of a problem and to secure vivid, accurate, inclusive accounts 
that are based on personal experience.” This technique allowed maximum flexibility in 
pursuing issues that came up during the discussions and allowed the respondents to clarify 
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some of the concepts underlying the concept whenever they will be unclear. The interviews’ 
length varied depending on the interviewees’ interest, time availability, and knowledge of the 
subject. Table 4.1 illustrates the time spent in each interview and the statistics of this time. 
   
Table 4.1 Time Spent in Each Interview with Statistics  
 
I commenced the interviews by explaining my background and reasons for pursuing the topic 
and then moved on to the questions. Open-ended questions were used to expand on the 
concepts already generated from the literature and to specifically answer the research 
questions.  I adopted an open-ended technique because it ‘allows interviewees to respond 
freely and to build on their ideas’ (Churchill, 2000: 83). I transcribed each of the 26 
interviews for further analysis. As part of Munhall’s (2007) phenomenological method, I read 
the interviews repeatedly to extract particular themes from the narrative.  
 
The minimum duration of the interviews was 45 minutes and the maximum time was about 2 
hours. The 45 minutes interviews were with four risk managers of the 26 interviewees; the 
meeting with them, independent of each other, were much shorter than the rest because the 
discussions with them were futile; they seemed to be not aware of any particular details about 
Basel II regulations and its implications. This is based on my evaluation as a market 
practitioner. This is an interesting finding; these people are Heads of Risk Management 
Departments, and each one of them holds a Chartered Accountant (CA), which is a renowned 
accounting designation, yet they were unable to comment or differentiate between methods 
in Basel II, and they were not aware of concepts such as systemic risk or risk profile. Three 
Interviewee Time ( Minutes) Interviewee Time (Minutes) Statistics 
Interviewee 1  100 Interviewee 14 125 
Mean = 85 minutes 
Standard Deviation = 23 minutes 
Range = 80 minutes  
Interviewee 2 45 Interviewee 15 115 
Interviewee 3 90 Interviewee 16 90 
Interviewee 4 95 Interviewee 17 75 
Interviewee 5 115 Interviewee 18 45 
Interviewee 6 105 Interviewee 19 90 
Interviewee 7 85 Interviewee 20 95 
Interviewee 8 45 Interviewee 21 120 
Interviewee 9 70 Interviewee 22 95 
Interviewee 10 85 Interviewee 23 45 
Interviewee 11 120 Interviewee 24 70 
Interviewee 12 80 Interviewee 25 65 
Interviewee 13 60 Interviewee 26 85 
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of these four Heads are from conventional banks, and the fourth is from an Islamic Bank and 
all of them are expatriates.  The four were extremely self-conscious; they were too afraid to 
discuss CBB [the regulator], and even without context praised the CBB unabashedly. There 
are four possible explanations to their self-consciousness. First, lack of trust. It is possible 
that although I confirmed to them that none of our discussion and personal identity of the 
interviewee would be shared with any party, particularly the CBB; they still could not trust 
that I would honor this confirmation. Second, insecurity from lack of subject matter 
knowledge. It is probable that they were not fully adept of the subject matter of the 
discussions to the extent that enable them to critique or have another perspective of the Basel 
II regulations and the issues of implementation, they tended to praise anything that the CBB 
does. Third, the anxiety of the CBB. This might be related also to the first explanation, the 
trust. The concern here is that when the Executive Director and the Directors of the banking 
supervisor at the CBB knew that they were criticized, from the perspective of the 
interviewees that might affect their employment at the bank because I explained above that 
appointment of Heads of Risk Management departments are subject to the CBB’s approval. 
This has become very important characteristic of the corporate politics in the country that left 
its impact on the economy as well as other gulf countries as a whole. Banks and other 
corporates in the country prefer expatriates in key positions for the very conduct or attitude 
displayed by these four interviewees.  The preference is because some expatriates focus is on 
job security and maintaining the relatively higher fringe benefits compared to local people in 
the same posts. Some of these expatriates are and in order to maintain their status do not tend 
to negate, criticism of voice their opinion, especially if it contradicts with the decisions 
makers such as members of the boards or the senior executives such as the Chief Executive 
officers. They do not criticize or offer unsolicited recommendations or suggestion. Some of 
the Local people, on the other hand, are being looked at as “opinionated” who may argue and 
or challenge instructions; they give suggestions, probe into irregularities and have curiosity. 
These characteristics are not welcome in the political and economic setup in Bahrain or 
countries in the GCC. Fourth, do not want to share knowledge. This also is not an odd 
phenomenon in the industry. I interpret it to be a sign of competence insecurity and lack of 
trust in an industry where the competition is fierce among expatriates themselves and 
between the expatriates and the locals.  Apart from these four, the rest of the interviewees 
were all forthcoming, and elaborate; they discussed with ease about their wish to send many 
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messages to the CBB. These four interviews, however, were not excluded from the data and 
analysis because they help us see another aspect of bankers in the country who have different 
views based on different grounds. Table 4.2 gives a brief background of these four 
interviewees.  
 
Interviewee Age Experience Qualifications Nationality Sex 
Interviewee 2 40-50 years 15 years Baccalaureate  and Chartered Accountant  Indian Male 
Interviewee 8 45-55 years 20 years Baccalaureate  and Chartered Accountant  Indian  Male 
Interviewee 18 45-55 years 18 years Baccalaureate  and Chartered Accountant  Pakistani Male 
Interviewee 23  45-55 years  25 years Baccalaureate  and Chartered Accountant  Indian Male 
Table 4.2 Background of interviewees who were not useful  
Table 4.2 shows that the four risk managers have a lot of experience and an adequate level of 
education. The observed lack of sufficient knowledge, from my assessment, indicates that 
there was no enough diligence of hiring at some banks, as well as at the CBB, for such 
important posts such as the CRO. The CBB interviews every CRO before he/she is hired or 
accepted by the bank. The CBB does not disclose their criteria for approving such posts to 
the bank neither do the banks disclose such criteria in their annual reports.  
 
I sought to meet Risk Managers, Compliance Officers, and Finance Controllers. Except for 
two banks, every bank in Bahrain has an expatriate Risk Manager and Finance Controller. 
The work experience of these people are, as mentioned in their resume, above ten years, and 
they all held similar positions in the past. All of them have Baccalaureate degrees, and all of 
them hold at least one professional qualification (e.g., Chartered Accountant [CA], 
Professional Risk Manager [PRM], and Certified Public Accountant [CPA]).  They come 
from different nationalities but mostly from India, Pakistan and European countries. 
Interviewees from the CBB were very challenging. I met with five people, and they all had 
Baccalaureate degrees while some of them had professional qualification designations such 
as CPA, PRM, CA, etc. They reluctantly accepted to meet for the interviews and to discuss 
anything related to their work; they were very much obsessed with the confidentiality issues 
even if it means discussing their own views without disclosing anything related to their work.  
None of the interviewees accepted video and audio recording. From the beginning of the 
meetings, all interviewees asked for a “gentlemen conformation” not to disclose names of 
individuals, names of organizations and they requested that any answer if quoted in the 
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thesis, would not give an indication of the source; i.e. cannot be traced back to anyone. They 
were very cautious. Almost all of them became more comfortable after ten minutes of the 
interviews. I took notes as they spoke. 
 
From both, the bankers and the CBB staff, there was an astonishing sense of fear, mistrust, 
and caution. The bankers were afraid that the CBB knew that they voiced their opinions 
about the CBB and the CBB staff were scared that their senior officials might find out that 
they shared remarks that might contradict with what the officials wanted to be disclosed. This 
sense of fear stems from the culture in the country and its institutions. Despite the fact that 
risk management, finance, internal audit, and compliance are departments dominantly headed 
by expatriates, some from developed countries, one notices that they succumb to the force of 
the culture in the country. The culture is largely characterized by hiding problems from 
outsiders and solving them with minimum or no disclosure. Malfunctions or lack of diligence 
and competence or weakness in processes are hidden and not allowed to be shared with 
external parties. Sharing, highlighting or discussing them resembles direct criticism of those 
officials in charge of these processes. Criticism, in any form, or voicing a concern or point of 
view on how the banking or financial sectors are managed are not tolerated by the CBB’s top 
officials. Even when asking about the immaterial information that might be already disclosed 
in their annual reports, they become very scared or cautious to discuss it or share it in person. 
Expatriate senior officials at banks are handsomely compensated; they are hired because the 
CBB reviewed their resumes and interviewed them. The CBB has this rule of approving any 
person filling the above-mentioned posts. This explains why interviewees are very cautious 
not to be known for their criticism or voicing their opinion. Hamad (2014), a senior CBB’s 
official indicated that expatriates are being hired into the above posts because they are seen 
more experienced and qualified in the field of banking and financial markets since they come 
from developed countries compared to local people.   
 
This attitude toward the expatriate is deeply entrenched in all the country’s institutions, both 
banking and non-banking. I deduced from the interviews with the CBB staff and bankers that 
expatriates, although expensive, are generally being viewed as trustworthy, qualified, 
professional, punctual, and honest compared to locals. All of the interviewees as well as the 
CBB staff, however, shared a common view that these attributes, which make a comparative 
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advantage over the local people, are not scientifically substantiated; yet, it is still an attitude 
amongst practitioners in the market. Except for a couple of risk managers who have shown 
the dazzling wealth of knowledge and insights, we have not found indications of these 
exceptionally preferred traits during my interviews.   
 
4.1.4 Summary of the findings  
 
I observed a dissatisfaction amongst interviewees toward the CBB; every one of the 
interviewees shared the unpleasant experience with the CBB and illuminated a history of 
dissatisfying relationship in various facets such as the inspections visits, CBB’s staff 
competence, and reporting processes. Interviewee 19, for instance, complained about the 
reporting process of the quarterly prudential reports. He stated that he sent an official letter to 
the CBB explaining how the current form of the report that his bank is expected to adhere to 
on a quarterly basis, in the majority of its content, is not applicable to his bank’s business 
model. Yet, the CBB has not responded to his correspondence and has received no indication 
that his remarks have been acknowledged. Interviewee 22 criticized the competence of CBB 
staff:  
“Unfortunately, the CBB staff do not exert an effort to be on par with the banks in terms of knowledge; 
they send young guys who lack experience and the required knowledge in Basel II let alone another 
area. Yet, we find these young people arrogant and act as police, which looks so jaded to find a score 
against us rather than help us. 
I found that some interviewees shared the same remark made by interviewee 22 about adding 
value and helping banks. Interviewee 17, for instance, stated the following: 
 
“The CBB has an objective that all the banks adhere to the requirements of Basel II; we also have the 
same objective. Every banker wishes that his/ her bank applied the international best practices in 
banking. What we all want is a regulator that works with us, adds value to us by sharing with our 
options and alternatives and above all understanding of our conditions of what we can and cannot 
apply the requirements.”  
In summary, the data from the questionnaires and the interviews showed the following:  
 
• There is low recognition of the positive impact of Basel II implementation on banks’ 
risk management and practice, competitive advantage or reputation 
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• There is a very low level of satisfaction of the appropriateness of Basel II methods, as 
imposed by the regulator, of the banks’ business and risk profile.  
• There is a low level of respect amongst bankers of the CBB’s staff competencies and 
the CBB’s role in regulation and supervision.   
• There are considerable variations in the banks’ institutional characteristics in relation 
to familiarities to Basel II role and implications on the institutions as a whole.  
 
4.2 Demographics and descriptive statistics 
 
With regard to the survey, before we present the results, we explain how we determined the 
sample size, present the sample’s statistics, and analyze the response rate. Afterward, we 
show the survey respondents’ demographic attributes. 
 
There are 116 banks in Bahrain (23 retail and 69 wholesale conventional banks; 6 retail and 
18 wholesale Islamic banks). The questionnaire was targeted to the risk manager, internal 
auditor, and finance manager at each bank. Thus, the total population was 348 (116 × 3) 
bankers. The sample size was determined such that there were 183 respondents at a 95% 
confidence interval and with a 5% margin of error according to the following formula: 
 
where:  
N=Population size  
E=margin of error  
Z=Confidence value as in Z-Score  
P= percentage value (0.5)  
 
I distributed 305 questionnaires based on the assumption of a response rate of at least 60% 
and a target sample size of 183. The actual response rate was 65.5% (120 out of the 183 
questionnaires distributed). 
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4.2.1 Respondents years of service  
 
Table 4.3 illustrates the percentage of responses to total responses to the question “how long 
you haven been with the bank?” Table 4.3 indicates that the majority (61%) of the 
respondents have been in their current role for more than five years. The implication of this 
result is that responses shared from these respondents give comfort that they were at their 
current role long enough to give an informed opinion based on reasonable years of 
experience.  
 
Percentage of total responses Respondent years of service in their current role 
13% 1-3 year 
26% 3-5 years 
45% 5-10 years 
14% 10-15 years 
2% More than15 years 
    Table 4.3 Percentage of respondents’ years of service in their current role  
Meanwhile, table 4.4 shows the percentage of responses in relation to the question “What is 
your title or current post?” The compliance department had the fewest number of 
respondents out of all the other departments. This result is understandable owing to the 
structure and size of compliance departments. A compliance department is a separate 
department required by the CBB to be established by every bank, and that has a very limited 
role and does not require large numbers of staff. The main mandate of the department is to 
ensure the compliance with the CBB Rules and regulations of the other departments. The risk 
management and financial control departments in every bank undertake Basel II 
requirements, particularly those related to the quantitative part and the reporting to the CBB 
in addition to the matters related to policies. That explains why these two departments were 
the majority amongst respondents.  
Percentage of total responses Type of Department 
40% Risk Management staff 
34% Financial control staff 
18% Internal Auditor 
8% Compliance staff 
Table 4.4 Response rate by respondents’ departments 
Table 4.5 shows the results related to the question “what is the type of your bank’s license?” 
The results show that there were 10% more respondents from conventional banks than 
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respondents from Islamic banks. In addition, the heads of risk management and finance 
departments in conventional retail banks are the least responsive. 
Percentage of total responses  Type of Bank 
17.5% Islamic Retail Bank 
26.7% Islamic Wholesale Bank 
28.3% Conventional Retail Bank 
27.5% Conventional Wholesale Bank 
      Table 4.5 Response rate by type of banks 
4.2.2 Respondents education  
 
With regard to the qualifications and education levels of the survey respondents, we asked 
respondents “What is your academic background?” Table 4.6 illustrates the level of 
education of the respondents. It indicates that 93% of the respondents are highly educated 
which typically indicates, when combined with the years of experience as illustrated in Table 
4.3, informed and experienced respondents who are well positioned to form an opinion and 
judgment about the subject of regulations and supervision.  
 
 Islamic Banks Conventional banks Percentage of total responses 
Undergraduate 6 2 7% 
Baccalaureate 34 48 68% 
Master /MBA 10 17 23% 
PhD 3 0 3% 
      Table 4.6 Education level of the survey respondents  
The data inform us that respondents are well educated and experienced. This gives us 
comfort that there is no possible lack of knowledge of understanding the subject matter of the 
questions or their implications.   
 
4.3 The role and impact of Basel II 
 
As we discussed in Chapter One, there are three main tools a banking regulator may adopt: 
licensing requirements, activity restrictions, and capital requirements. A banking regulator 
may adopt Basel II, which has capital-based requirements, to help improve risk management, 
reduce systemic risk, and prevent financial crises. In the case of Bahrain, Article 3 of the 
CBB Law defines the objective of the CBB regulatory mandate as follows: 
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1. Set and implement monetary, credit and other financial sector policies in the 
Kingdom of Bahrain; 
2. Provide effective central banking services to the government and financial sector of 
the Kingdom 
3. Develop the financial sector and enhance confidence therein; and 
4. Protect the interests of depositors and customers of financial institutions, and enhance 
the Kingdom’s credibility as an international financial center. (CBB, 2015) 
 
In this section, I discuss Basel II as a regulatory tool from two perspectives: analysis of its 
implementation’s objectives and examination of its quantitative requirements (i.e., its 
methodological calculations). As indicated in Chapter 1, 2, and 3 the objectives of Basel II 
implementation by banking regulators are to: I) enhance risk management, II) reduce 
systemic risk, and III) reduce the possibility of financial crisis.  
 
In rule-based regulations, the regulator prescribes all of the detailed rules that regulate 
behavior in advance. During the process of implementing the regulations and conducting the 
supervision programs to ensure the regulations are adhered to, the regulated bank’s concern 
is solely focused on complying with the rules.  When asked about whether the CBB share 
with banks the objectives of its Basel II implementation plans and how this implementation 
would lead to the enhanced reputation of their institutions, the interviewees unanimously 
asserted that they do not receive such communication from the CBB. I have contacted the 
CBB to enquire about the reasons behind not sharing the objectives of implementation, and 
the Interviewee 1-CBB replied: [with an angry tone]:  
 
“We are the regulator…we work for the best of the financial and banking system of the country. It does 
not work this way… we cannot enlist our objectives for every single initiative, rules or regulations we 
issue and send this list across to the bankers. Everyone does his part in the system. We are entrusted to 
make sure that everything is run well, and the bank's role is to work to make a profit for their 
shareholders and make the system well. In addition, I do not think there is any regulator in the world 
who would send the banks objectives for everything they do. Basel II is an international practice and 
has been implemented by developed countries … so we are not imposing a haphazard regime!” 
While Interviewee 1-CBB’S statement that no country in a world shares its objectives with 
the regulated entities might be correct, in a way, but that is not what the practitioners expect 
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either. Bankers do not expect the CBB to send them a list of the strategic objectives on a 
periodic basis. What they are expecting and complaining about is that they want to be 
intrinsically active part of the system rather passive one. Given the political and 
organizational setup in the country and at the CBB, and as highlighted at the beginning of 
this chapter that the …they are expecting a mechanism, system, and culture through which 
they can be heard and participate in shaping the financial system. 
 
4.3.1 Basel II and Risk Management  
 
This subsection discusses and analyzes the relationship between risk management at banks 
and Basel II implementation. In particular, the aim of this subsection is to answer the 
research question “How has Basel II implementation, in the context of the CBB Rulebooks, 
helped banks with risk management function and practice?” It is useful prior to delving into 
the findings from the questionnaires, and the interviews illuminate the context of the 
particular relationship between the risk management and Basel II.  It is equally useful to 
define briefly the concept of risk management amongst practitioners. The question in the 
questionnaire was “Do you think that Basel II implementation, in the context of the CBB 
Rulebooks, helped to improve your bank risk management function and practices?” 
In the academic literature the discussion is confined to certain parameters of credit risk such 
as the impact of CAR on attitudes towards accepting more risk (Blum, 1998),  the impact of 
minimum threshold and risk taking or the relationship of capital to the tools for measuring 
market risk (McAleer et al., 2013). In addition, there is a general discussion of the status of 
risk management at banks without reference to Basel II (Jassim, 2012).  In the literature, I 
could not find a single study that explained or theorized the relationship between Basel II and 
risk management from the perspective I discuss in this study, in a wider scope. A scope that 
addresses Basel II’s role in risk management set up in the bank as a department, how this 
department is integrated with other departments, and how risk management is installed in a 
bank as a culture and strategic driver.  
 
In the questionnaire, I found that, as illustrated in Table 4.7, approximately 70% of 
respondents asserted that Basel II implementation at their banks did not contribute to any 
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improvements in the risk management function and practices at their bank. Table 4.7 shows 
the responses on the perceived benefits of Basel II implementation with regard to the banks’ 
risk management. The survey asked if the bankers perceived any correlation between Basel II 
implementation at their banks and any improvement in the risk management function and 
practices at their banks. By correlation between Basel II implementation and risk 
management, I meant to understand if there are benefits or costs perceived to occur in a 
bank’s risk management because of Basel II implementation, ceteris paribus. Risk 
management practices, amongst bankers, is known to refer to the existence of a risk 
management department that is well resourced with policies and procedures to govern its 
conduct. Some 50% of the respondents did not perceive such a correlation at their banks, 
while 19.2% found no difference before and after Basel II implementation in how they 
perform their risk management tasks in the loan and investment process.  
 
Assessment 
Islamic 
banks  
Conventional 
banks 
Yes, we find strong positive correlation between Basel II 
implementation and risk management practices at our bank 21% 6% 
Yes, but the improvement in  risk management is not as per our 
expectations 23% 9% 
Indifferent to whether it helped or did not help to improve your 
bank risk management function and practices 4% 3% 
No, we find no differences in risk management practices after or 
before Basel II implementation 17% 21% 
No, we find no correlation between Basel II implementation and 
our bank's risk management practices 36% 61% 
Table 4.7 Basel II implementation and risk management at banks (by business model)  
Table 4.7 raise an important question: why do conventional banks are more than Islamic 
bank in not finding benefits of Basel II implementation. This could be explained by the fact 
that conventional banks were established more than the Islamic banks in terms of processes 
and operations. Therefore, we can say that conventional banks are more mature and the risk 
management set up were gradually built by themselves through the experience of the staff, 
lesson learned from the current practice as well as the Basel I. To augment the finding from 
the survey, we held interviews with bankers, and we posed an open-ended question on the 
association between Basel II implementation and the risk management functions and 
practices at banks in an attempt to get the interviewees to elaborate on their survey responses. 
The question was “How would you explain the role and implication of Basel II 
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implementation at your bank to the improvement in the risk management function and 
practices?” Because I wanted to make sure that the interviewees’ perception of the definition 
of risk management is similar to what I intend to gauge in the interview, and because I 
wanted to understand how risk management operated at their respective institutions, I 
portrayed a risk management taxonomy and showed it to the interviewees. At the beginning 
of our discussions about the correlation between Basel II implementation and the risk 
management at their institutions, I outlined the risk management taxonomy and found that 
risk management at banks has three facets. First, risk management, as a department, operates 
as a fully-fledged entity that is responsible for the ways that various risks the bank is exposed 
to are undertaken, mitigated, and monitored. This entails the staff of the department, 
operational manual of the department, and an IT infrastructure necessary to aggregate, 
monitor and report on these risks.  The second aspect of risk management is organizational 
attitude, namely the risk culture that the board and executive management instill into the 
enterprise or third, how the risk culture and board executive and board attitude toward risk 
leave to improvement in risk management in the whole enterprise. This means identifying all 
of the risks that the bank is exposed to as well as measuring it, managing it, monitoring and 
reporting on it. This includes ensuring that the actions are taken to accept the risk, and the 
measures adopted to mitigate it are within the bank’s risk appetite.  Basel II regulations are 
only one aspect of risk management.  
 
Response 
Islamic 
Banks 
Conventional 
Banks 
Yes, we find strong positive correlation between Basel II 
implementation and risk management practices at our bank 21% 6% 
Yes, but the improvement in  risk management is not as per our 
expectations 23% 9% 
Indifferent 4% 3% 
No, we find no differences in risk management practices after 
or before Basel II implementation 17% 21% 
No, we find no correlation between Basel II implementation 
and our bank's risk management practices 36% 61% 
Table 4.8 Basel II implementation and risk management at banks (by bank type) 
Interviewees’ responses were split into two groups. One group upon listening to my 
description of the question and having been shown the taxonomy strongly refuted the idea 
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that Basel II implementations at their bank helped them improve any facet of the risk 
management taxonomy.  
 
Number of 
interviews 
Basel II implementation improves risks management functions and 
practices at your bank  
3 Yes 
23 No  
Table 4.9 Interviewees’ responses to whether Basel II improves risk management  
They attributed this stance to the CBB’s implementation of Basel II, which have been very 
simplistic and superfluous.  It only focused on Pillar I and totally ignored Pillar 2.  Thus, this 
set of respondents felt that Basel II merely entailed a calculation of a ratio, and as long as 
they were above the minimum threshold, then the CBB would be satisfied. The second group 
of interviewees was cognizant of the fact that the CBB has not addressed risk management 
properly, but they ascribed the improvement in their risk management functions and practices 
to Basel II. That is because they saw that it indirectly helped them realize that risk 
management should not be looked at as merely a cost center or a regulatory “box ticking” 
requirement; Basel II was a driving force to improve rather than a requirement per se.      
Interviewee 3, for instance, indicated the following:  
 
“ maybe it is true that despite all the effort made by the CBB to implement Basel II they still have some 
shortages but I would frankly say that if the CBB did not implement Basel II some banks, especially 
those which are of same size and business model like ours, would not have invested at all in their risk 
management function.  
Interviewer: why do you think they would not have invested in that? 
Interviewee 3: because let us face it, there are many bankers, management, and board of directors, 
they would not do anything if not asked or forced to do. In my opinion, few banks would do something 
[related to regulations] without being forced.  
Interviewer: can you please pinpoint what specific areas you have managed to improve, indirectly, 
because of Basel II implementations? 
Interviewee 3: the most important of all is the risk management systems. We have now invested in 
buying the systems to calculate the capital adequacy for the Pillar 1 of Basel II and hired a firm to 
make gap analysis of our risk management conduct as the gap in our policies and procedures.  
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More than 95% of the respondents asserted that none of the areas of risk management 
practices, functions and frameworks were improved directly by the implementation of Basel 
II in Bahrain. This is attributed to the following reasons: The first reason is that the CBB 
implementation of Basel II is only confined to the Pillar 1, which talks about capital 
adequacy calculation only. Interviewee 4 for instance, stated: 
 
“There are risk management circulars [rules, guidance, and regulation circulated by the central bank 
to the banks for implementation] on risk management that goes into the details of how we should build 
our departments. Yes, there are some “pushes” here and there but not structured,”  
Another reason is that the CBB’s literature (i.e.,  rules, regulations, and guidance) along with 
its practices, even in the confined implementation of Pillar 1, do not contextualize the 
implementation of Basel II as an adding value tool to the banks that would improve their risk 
management function. This means that banks are not motivated to implement Basel II to 
improve their practice but merely to adhere to a regulator’s requirements. The CBB rulebook 
explicitly states that all banks must have a risk manager, and thus banks found themselves 
obliged to have a risk management department in order to satisfy the CBB. The methods that 
are adopted by the country are all standardized, and the CBB did not show any interest in 
moving forward towards advanced approaches. Interviewee 11 describes this point as 
follows:  
 
“As a risk manager, I do not remember that I have participated in any discussions with the CBB that 
involves how I should or could improve my department. Any anytime they come to our department for 
inspection or when we go to their offices for the prudential meeting [a meeting that is held at least 
annually between the CBB and every bank’s management to discuss various matters chief amongst 
them is Basel II adherence] I see the focus is on whether we are doing a good job in the 
implementation of pillar 1. The discussions go to the details of how to implement Pillar 1 but very 
limited on Pillar 2”,  
 
A third reason is that Basel II does not define risk management succinctly to prevent any 
possible disconnect between what is written in the rules and regulations and what the 
practitioners construe as a meaning of risk management at their banks. This might explain the 
reason for why central banks and Basel II accord deems the accord helpful to risk 
management improvement and why bankers in Bahrain do not share the same conclusion. 
Interviewee 3, for instance, when asked about the definition of risk management, focused his 
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main arguments on systems and how well resourced the department is while interviewee 6 
addresses corporate governance and compliance in his discussions of risk management. The 
implications of all these ramifications of the reasons for why Basel II does not, directly, help 
banks improve risk management are the following : a) definitions of the underlying 
objectives of the regulations should be clearly understood by the regulator and the regulated, 
b) regulators imposing Basel II should first seek to understand what was the level of the risk 
management practices of the banks prior to the implementation of Basel II,  by this regulators 
could measure effectively how the implemented rules helped banks and then to assess and 
argue with the bankers if they do not seem to appreciate these regulations or do not consider 
it as value adding to them. c) When CBB inspectors visit banks, they are not focused on risk 
but are instead focused on compliance. Every interviewee agreed to this point that the 
primary focus is compliance more than anything else. Interviewee 12 said, for instance, that:  
 
“I was really surprised to see during the last inspection of our bank that an inspector came to ask 
about line by line adherence to the rules and regulations of the rulebook. When I asserted to him that 
the articles of regulations here are referring to is not applicable to our bank’s business model the 
inspector seemed not care or believe my statement. He did not pay attention to all the positive 
assertions I shared with him about the progress made in terms of policies and procedures of risk 
management and corporate governance we achieved in the previous years. To him, our lack of 
compliance with the rules and regulations, even if not applicable, is his main source of concern!  
d) under Basel II banks are not treated by the regulator based on how successful they are in 
advancing their risk management functions and practices; they are not incentivized or 
penalized based on their proximity to ideal risk management.  Rather, Basel II regulations are 
implemented across the board irrespective of how advanced or backward the existing risk 
management practices are at the banks. I have asked every interviewee: “has the central 
bank conducted any assessment on the banks, prior to implementing Basel II in the year 
2007, to gauge bank’s readiness for the new regulations and whether their risk management 
departments are ready to embark on this project.” The unanimous answers were that the 
CBB did not make such pre- assessment.  Every single bank is required to adhere to the same 
limits and thresholds irrespective of their business model, the sophistication of their risk 
management departments, etc. This means that although risk management is like a mantra 
filling the air of every prudential meeting and inspections visit, the results show that all the 
work carried out are not actually focused or guided by risk management.  
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Lastly, interviewee 1 indicated an interesting for why bankers do not seem to appreciate the 
contribution of Basel II implementation to the improvement of risk management at banks.  
 
He explained the following:  
 
Bank management and staff are well attuned to the developments and changes in the international 
banking system, specifically those related to risk management. This exposure to international practices 
led to a given bank’s adoption of practices that best fit their operations. Banks are in many instances 
in risk management are ahead of the CBB.  For instance, some banks in Bahrain had designed stress-
testing frameworks and generated idiosyncratic scenarios and results before the CBB issued any 
circulars or advised banks to conduct stress-testing exercises. 
 
The conclusion we derive from the above is that the CBB has focused solely on the 
calculation of CAR. The CBB does not have anything on pillar 2 of Basel II. As we 
expounded in previous chapters, the Pillar 2 of Basel II is where risk management is 
primarily addressed. Specifically, Pillar 2 addresses the communication between the bank 
regulator and banks about how they identify, measure, monitor, and report various types of 
risk such as reputation, strategic, liquidity, concentration, etc. Thus, if the CBB confines 
itself to the CAR only (as in Pillar I) and does not address risk management issues in its 
rulebook, inspections, and off-site supervision, then banks would have a very little 
association between Basel implementation and risk management. 
 
4.3.1.2 Basel II, Risk Management and risk-based supervision  
 
There is a mantra that the CBB inspection and the supervision are risk-based (CBB, 2015), 
but how have those been designed and implemented and how to have bankers in Bahrain 
perceived them to be taking place do not seem to be understood or manifested. This is due to 
a misconception between risk-based regulation or supervision and the power and influence of 
regulation in risk management functions. When we interviewed the CBB officials, we asked 
each one of them the following questions, “How do you define risk-based regulation and how 
do you see the current practice of the CBB in that context? Do you find the practice in line 
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with your perception or with is theorized in the CBB’s announcements? Interviewee 1-CBB 
replied:  
 
Interviewee 1-CBB “risk-based regulation is when we put a regulation that drives banks to be careful 
about risk at their banks.”  
Interviewer: do you find the CBB practice is in line with your definition?  
Interviewee 1-CBB: of course. That is what we all do every day. When we talk to the banks, we always 
tell them to focus on risk management and try to benefit from Basel II implementation at their banks. 
we always push banks to be good in risk management.   
Interviewee 2-CBB shared his definition of risk-based regulation as follows:  
 
Interviewee 2-CBB: risk-based regulation is when the CBB puts the regulation lead to the 
improvement of risk management practices and culture at the banks.  
Interviewer: do you find the CBB practice is in line with your definition?  
Interviewee 2-CBB: definitely. If you look at the agenda items of every prudential meeting, we hold 
with the banks you will see that almost all the items are related to how banks manage their risk. In 
addition, in order to make sure that even the board of director are also aware of the risks we made it 
compulsory for every bank to invite at least one member of their Audit Committee to attend the 
prudential meetings   
It is obvious from the above two examples that these two senior officials at the CBB have 
different perceptions about risk-based regulations that are both different from the perceptions 
amongst practitioners.  There is a difference between risk-based regulation and the impact of 
regulation in advancing risk management functions at the regulated entities; risk-based 
regulation means the prioritization of the regulator’s actions towards the regulated entities in 
accordance with a pre-defined parametric analysis of these entities’ peculiar characteristics. 
In banks, these characteristics include the nature of the portfolio of assets, the source of bank 
funding, the availability of contingency funding plans, the size of capital, etc. On the other 
hand, how regulations advance or limit risk management functions as a function or discipline 
within an organization is very rarely discussed in the literature. I have not found any studies 
that addressed the impact of regulation on the risk management function at the regulated 
entities. From a practical perspective, a definition of risk management at financial institutions 
refers to the comprehensive framework of managing credit, market, liquidity, strategy, 
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reputation, compliance, governance, and other risks. This suggested framework is defined by 
the existing policies and procedures (i.e., those currently in place to manage the 
abovementioned risks) as well as the organization’s risk environment, risk appetite, and risk 
culture.  
 
In the interviews, I expounded upon this definition to the interviewees and asked if they were 
in agreement with it or if they find it necessary to be augmented with another aspect or 
processes. I found that the interviewees had the same perception of risk management that we 
did. Interviewee 22 explained that the: 
 
“… Risk management function [at my bank] will only be advanced if the CBB adopts a risk-based 
supervision and inspection of our bank. So far all I see is the CBB worrying about whether or not our 
bank is compliant with the CAR minimum threshold.”  
Interviewee 1 explained the following: 
 “Basel II was not designed to be a risk management tool.  It is merely an attempt to regulate banks that 
may eventually lead to better risk management at banks, but that claim [ the claim that Basel II help to 
advance risk management at banks] by Basel II was never validated neither by BCBS nor by CBB.”  
On the contrary, when we met with the CBB officials who are in charge of supervision and 
regulation, the definition of risk management did not appear to be aligned with the 
practitioners. Interviewee 1-CBB, for instance, defines risk management as:  
 
“Having a good risk management department headed by a qualified and experienced staff reporting to 
the Board Risk Committee.”  
 
While interviewee 3-CBB defines it as: 
 “The independent body that is in charge of checks and balances in the bank; I look at this body as our 
[the regulator] eyes inside the bank.”  
 
I can see from two examples that the perception of risk management is confined to it being a 
department rather than a culture or a function that is integrated within the whole bank’s areas. 
They do not look at risk management as an integrated framework, but rather as a silo of risks 
that should be governed by policies and procedures. I asked the CBB officials “which risks 
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do you consider the most important of all these facing banks in Bahrain and how do you 
envisage that should be handled.” Interviewee 4-CBB considers: 
 
 Interviewee 4-CBB “[actually] credit risk is the most important risk that is worrying every regulatory 
in my opinion. Banking is about loans; if any bank working in our country fails to do a good job in that 
then we have to do something 
Interviewer: what do you mean precisely by “good job” can you please indicate what is considered 
good job from the CBB perspective?  
Interviewee 4-CBB: good job means making proper analysis before giving loans and taking the most 
secure collateral possible from their clients. This is the ABCs of banking in my opinion.  
Interviewer: how do you think that could be handled and out in place  
Interviewee 4-CBB: by having two things, first having very good credit policy and procedures and 
second having very active credit administration department which. 
Some of the CBB interviewees look at risk management from a compliance and credit risk 
perspective, while others perceive it to be primarily an issue of credit management. In 
relation to the risk management but from the angle of risk appetite and risk culture, we have 
asked the CBB officials the following questions about risk appetite and risk culture. “How do 
you define banks’ risk appetite framework,” “how do you assess the banks’ work on the risk 
appetite framework” and “what the CBB is doing in the context of risk appetite.” 
Interviewee1-CBB shared the following response:  
 
Interviewee1-CBB: banks risk appetite is how much risk they can take 
Interviewer: how do you assess the banks’ work on the risk appetite framework?” 
Interviewee1-CBB: we ask the banks if they have prepared the risk appetite for their work and most 
importantly if their board of directors approves it.  
Interviewer:  what the CBB is doing in the context of risk appetite 
Interviewee1-CBB: We follow up to see if the banks have prepared their risk appetite 
Interviewer: but the CBB has no such requirements so far in its rulebook. So according to which 
requirement are you following with the banks in this respect? 
Interviewee 1-CBB: by the international best practice!  
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Interviewee 3-CBB’s response to the same questions above was as follows:  
Interviewee 3-CBB: risk appetite is how big a bank desires its loan portfolio to be. If they want to be a 
market leader in any product, they will have to have a bigger appetite than if they wish to play small!  
Interviewer:  what the CBB is doing in the context of risk appetite? Does the CBB play a role in relation 
to that desire of the size of the credit portfolio?  
Interviewee 3-CBB: definitely! We supervise their credit portfolio through the periodic reporting we 
solicit from the banks on a timely basis. 
This clearly shows that the concepts of risk appetite and risk culture do not seem to be 
adequately contextualized by these officials. The implications of this misconception of risk 
appetite from the regulators are that if the regulators are not certain about the concept of the 
risk appetite or they do not define it as it is defined in the industry’s literature there would be 
miscommunications between the regulators and the bankers on the subject. This 
miscommunication is manifested by the fact that the regulators cannot assess what the banks 
produce in terms of risk management policies in order to determine if these banks are 
operating according to their limits. In addition, in Basel II accord there are stipulations that 
refer to having “an appropriate risk appetite of the institutions” about the type of approach 
used to quantify the capital requirements. Because of this misconception, the regulators 
believe that the CBB is already giving banks the guidance and the requirements needed to 
build an appropriate risk appetite framework as stated in the above two quotations. When we, 
however, asked banks “ how frequently and in which way does the CBB ask for the risk 
profile, appetite and strategy of your bank?65% of the respondents, as illustrated in the table 
below said that the CBB has never asked them about their risk profile, appetite or strategy. 
That is in spite of the fact that 55% of the respondents affirmed that they have an updated 
risk profile, appetite, and strategy, as shown in Table 4.10  
 
Responses  Response Percent 
Annually, in the prudential meeting 28.6% 
Semi-annually, in the prudential meeting 2.5% 
Quarterly 2.5% 
During the Inspection visits only 1.7% 
The CBB never asked us about a risk profile and appetite document 64.7% 
Table 4.10 CBB regulation and banks' risk appetite framework  
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Responses  
Response 
Percent 
Yes, and it is adequately integrated with our strategic planning and 
capital allocation 
20.2% 
Yes, but it is not adequately integrated into our strategic planning and 
capital allocation 
35.3% 
Indifferent 19.3% 
No, we do not have an updated risk appetite and profile 21.0% 
No, we have not yet developed a risk appetite and risk profile for our 
bank 
4.2% 
Table 4.11 Banks’ risk appetite framework.  
 
The above two tables clearly show an evidence of the gap that the regulators assert that they 
have the necessary checks and balances to monitor risk appetite at banks while 65% of the 
banks indicate that the regulators have never asked them about their risk appetite, profile, and 
strategy. I have examined the annual reports of all the banks we interviewed their staff, and 
we found that there is a reference to the risk appetite and profile, albeit in varying degree of 
details, but banks mentioned in these reports that they recognize the importance of risk 
appetite and they are operating according to that.  
 
Lastly, we have asked bankers in the survey if they would have adopted the risk management 
practices, tools, etc. that they are adopting now even if Basel II was not yet implemented in 
the country. The purpose of the question was to discover from another angle how much 
attributions do bankers ascribe to Basel II for the status of their risk management practices at 
their institutions. The response is illustrated in Table 4.12: 
 
Response 
Response 
Percentage 
No, if Basel II was not imposed by the CBB we would not have applied the 
risk management tools we are currently applying 5% 
No, but we might eventually apply to be at par with the international best 
practices 9% 
Indifferent 3% 
Yes, but not in the same level of scale and sophistication 25% 
Yes, we would have implemented all the risk management international 
practices and standards even if Basel II was not imposed by the CBB 58% 
  Table 4.12 Risk Management Practices and the Impact of Basel II 
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83% responded positively that they would have adopted the risk management practices that 
they are currently adopting even if the CBB chose not to impose Basel II in the country’s 
banking system.  
 
To understand why such a big percentage of respondents in the survey do not plainly give a 
regard to the contributions of Basel II to their risk management practices, we asked some 
bankers about their opinion.  
Interviewer 7: I guess this is because risk management practices are an evolving art and science start 
and grow from the practitioners’ experience that is why they are called practices. If they are practices 
and since they evolve from within the banking systems then they are on the constant move for 
improvement. Every party, developed or developing countries, small or big banks domestic or 
internationally active banks they all contribute to the practice by their success and lessons from their 
failures. Take for example Value at Risk (VaR) [the most famous measure of risk in the banking 
system]…VaR is invented by bankers [JP Morgan]; it proves its credibility and the art and science in 
it so that regulators put requirements to ensure proper adherence to such measure. Therefore, the 
practitioners feed the regulators, in my opinion, not the opposite. I am not surprised that you got such 
a response in the survey... it makes sense.   
 
The implications of the above are that if the CBB relies on the influence of Basel II 
implementation in the country to directly or indirectly motivate banks to improve their risk 
management practices, then this influence is not appreciated by the practitioners. This, in 
turn, implies the need to set out dedicated comprehensive rules and regulations for risk 
management. I learned from the above data that risk management at banks is dynamic and 
proactive. Practitioners do not wait for the regulator to motivate them to improve and instill 
the risk management practices that are appropriate for their needs.    
 
4.3.2 Basel II and financial crises  
 
In this subsection, we discuss the results of the survey and the interviews in relations to the 
questions on the impact of Basel II implementation and the financial crises, particularly the 
crisis that erupted in 2007. The aim of this and the following two subsections is to answer the 
research question “Has the CBB achieved its objectives of implementing Basel II and did the 
banks approve of these objectives?” 
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A direct impact of the financial crisis of 2007 may have resulted from direct exposure to 
“toxic assets”59 or to institutions that face problems in their liquidity and capital. Banks in 
Bahrain that suffered directly and significantly from the 2007 financial crisis were limited to 
wholesale conventional banks because they invested in subprime securities. Islamic banks 
did not suffer from direct exposures to toxic assets because Islamic banks are prohibited from 
transacting in such assets, as their structure is considered a breach of Islamic rules (Hidayat 
and Abduh, 2012). The indirect impact of such a crisis, on the other hand, can result from a 
lack of liquidity, lower credit growth, a high amount of non-performing loans, shortage of 
funding sources (e.g., bonds, commercial paper), lower profitability, decreasing prices of 
physical assets and investments (e.g. real estates). These collective factors can affect the 
domestic market as well as international markets. The question that should be raised here is 
whether Basel II implementation helped banks in Bahrain to withstand or survive the crisis. I 
illustrate below the data that show how banks and the CBB responded to the above questions.  
 
Before we address the responses from bankers as to whether or not they believe that Basel II 
implementation helped them survive the crisis, we should first measure whether or not the 
interviewee’s bank was impacted by the crisis.  Then, if we establish that they were impacted 
by the crisis, we proceed to see whether Basel II implementation helped them survive the 
crisis. By “survive the crisis,” we mean whether their loss would have been larger if Basel II 
had not been implemented. This, in turn, triggers a question about the capabilities of Basel II 
to do that. Did Basel II claim that it could achieve that? From the literature, Caruana and 
Narain (2008) predicted that its full implementation could prevent the financial crisis from 
occurring. One problem with this statement is that it was not backed by references to 
statistical analyses or examination of a case study in which Basel II was fully implemented in 
a country where that country withstood a financial crisis. Wellink (2008) agreed with 
Caruana and Narain (2008) that a financial crisis could have been prevented or at least its 
negative consequences alleviated had the accord been implemented earlier in the impacted 
countries. Wellink (2008) argued, “It was a misunderstanding to say that Basel II would have 
allowed the risky practices among banks that triggered the crunch.”  
 
                                                 
59 Toxic assets are assets that have lost a significant amount of value and are considered illiquid (i.e., there is no 
market for them). This term became popular during and after the 2007 crisis. An example of toxic assets from 
the crisis are structured products such as Collateralized Debt Obligations 
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Having provided a context for the discussion of the literature we now turn to discuss the 
results shown in the survey and the interviews with the bankers and regulators. I asked the 
bankers in the survey if their bank has been impacted by the financial crisis in 2007. Table 
4.13 illustrates their responses. 
 
Responses  Response Percent 
Yes, our bank was hugely impacted by the crisis 22.5% 
Yes, our bank was considerably impacted by the crisis 46.7% 
Indifferent 6.7% 
Yes, our bank was insignificantly impacted by the crisis 15.8% 
No, our bank was not impacted by the crisis at all 8.3% 
Table 4.13 Impact of the 2007 crisis on banks  
 
16% of the respondents asserted that their banks were insignificantly impacted; on the other 
hand, 69% said that their banks were impacted, and 23% of whom said the impact was huge. 
 
I asked bankers about their thoughts on why some bankers might have responded 
indifferently and whether or not is it possible that some banks were not impacted by the crisis 
at all.  
 
Interviewer: in your assessment, how do you assess the impact the crisis of 2007 had on the banks in the 
country?  
Interviewee 5: banks were hugely impacted by the liquidity…those who have a shortage of funds, whether 
financial and non-financial institutions were not able to access the funds required for their go on in their 
operations.  
Interviewer: what causes this shortage of liquidity?  
Interviewee 5: mainly due to trust…confidence in the banking system 
Interviewer: has your bank been impacted by the crisis due to the same reason?  
Interviewee 5: our bank was impacted because it had many investments in the real estate…as you know… 
in times of crisis, the prices in the market plummet, and real estates are not an exception to that.  
Interviewer: do you think the fact that your bank is Basel II compliant helped you in the crisis to quell 
the crisis negativities? Can you talk me through the benefits you might ascribe of being Basel II 
compliant in times of crisis?   
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Interviewee 5: prices of real estate plummeted because of huge supply and low demand. Low demand is 
caused by liquidity crunch…everyone is holding his funds dear. Therefore, if we have investments in 
these properties, directly or indirectly, our accounting books should reflect that loss in value… Basel II 
has nothing to offer to help in this case…accounting entries of the impairment of assets value have to be 
passed anyway whether you are following Basel II or not.  
Interviewee 7 shared his response to the above questions as follows:  
Interviewee 7: our bank was considerably impacted by the crisis… the causes of our loss are from 
international markets…we had investments such equities and derivatives products in the United States 
and Europe…at the time of the crisis the prices of these investments went down, and the bottom line [net 
income/loss] of our bank got hit… We had to invest internationally because we have a huge volume of 
liquidity [deposits] that had to be utilized…the Bahrain Market is very narrow [opportunities are 
limited]. If we did not invest in these markets, we would have ended up just giving loans, which is not an 
optimal thing to do.  
Interviewer: how has the fact that your bank is Basel II compliant helped your bank in the crisis?  
Interviewee 7: [with a smirk] Basel II did not help us because there is no relationship at all between 
Basel II and our case… Basel II is about CAR [ Capital Adequacy Ratio] calculation and our case in a 
reduction in value… do not forget the important fact that USA is only implementing Basel II on its big 
banks while the small banks are still in Basel I …also, the crisis hugely driven by the big boys 
implementing Basel II in the United States and Europe…So, if it would have helped me it would have 
helped these guys in the first place [ laughing].   
The above two examples of bankers show that practitioners during the crisis did not see 
benefits of Basel II implementation in their banks to quell the negativities of the crisis or 
reduce the negative impact on their net income/loss. Interviewee 9 made intriguing remarks 
when we asked him how Basel II helped his bank survive or withstand the crisis:  
 
Interviewee 9: I will answer this question only if you tell me exactly which part of Basel II could do that! 
Interview: my question is based on the regulator's literature that capital regulations in general and Basel 
II regulations, in particular, helps banks in times of crisis so that I wanted to see how you could reflect 
on that from your experience back in 2007 and 2008.   
Interviewee 9: Fair enough,…my knowledge and experience say that there is nothing in Basel II, I mean 
in the form of measure or ratio or threshold or any kind of preventive measures that could help banks 
either during or before the crisis. In fact, if Basel Committee or the CBB are claiming so then they are 
contradicting themselves because one of the reasons why they moved from Basel II to Basel III is that 
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Basel II does not have such preventive measures. Therefore, my final advice to you is that any claim that 
Basel II helps us in any way in times of crisis is just marketing statement to sell the concept of Basel II. 
Interviewee 10’s response to these questions was the most comprehensive:  
 
“I think what makes BCBS of the CBB so overly excited on [the relationship between Basel II 
implementation and financial crisis] is the myth that has been perpetuated in the banking sector all over 
the world, which is that of ‘international practices.’ They designed Basel II as solutions to the problems 
faced in the West.  Other countries have followed suit because they did not have one decent regulation 
system in their own countries, for various reasons that might be economic, political, or cultural. Use of 
this accord has eventually been tagged as ‘international best practice,’ and of course, anything that 
carries the name international best practice is expected to have the preventive power to push back the 
negative impact of any crisis.” 
Interviewer: in your opinion, what regulation design is capable of preventing or circumventing a 
financial crisis’s impacts facing a bank?  
Interviewer 10: a regulation that stems from within the banking system and its constituencies, that 
address the cultural aspect when implementing the regulation and above all takes into consideration the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of the constituencies.  
I asked respondents in the questionnaire “do you believe that Basel II implementation at your 
bank, along with the CBB guidance, helped your bank survive the crisis of 2007?” 73% of 
the respondents responded negatively, as is shown in the Table 4.14.   
 
Response  
Response 
Percent 
Yes, but our bank was also impacted by risks not addressed in the CBB 
Basel II implementation 
11.7% 
Indifferent 14.2% 
No, because banks were impacted by risks other than those calculated in 
Basel II Capital Adequacy Ratio(CAR) 
48.3% 
No, because banks in Bahrain were not impacted by this crisis 25.0% 
Table 4.14 Base II implementation and the crisis of 2007 
 
On the other hand, the data shows interesting results. Approximately 14% of the 
questionnaire respondents are indifferent about whether or not banks were impacted by the 
financial crisis. Furthermore, 25% of respondents do not agree that their banks were 
impacted by the financial crisis of 2007. It should be noted that most of these respondents 
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were Islamic bankers. Some Islamic bankers look at the financial crisis more from an 
ideological perspective than a technical, realistic perspective. This means that their 
perception is that since an Islamic bank is not an interest-based bank and by-laws are not 
permitted to deal in derivatives or structured products (which were the milestone causes of 
the crisis in 2007), then they are immune from the crisis.  
 
I asked some interviewees about their opinion of why some Islamic bankers would tend to 
believe that they were immune to the crisis of 2007. Interviewee 16 opined:  
“This stance has a merit of course. An Islamic bank business model with no interest and lending are 
backed by assets in addition to not transacting in the hedging instruments surely immunize them from 
exposure to some risks, but they definitely will not immunize them from market or liquidity risk because 
they are part of the system. For example, if the international interest rate level were rising, Islamic banks 
would inevitably raise eventually their interest rate on the lending portfolio because the borrowing has 
become an expense for them. As you know if you want to be an Islamic bank that does not mean that you 
expect your depositors or funds providers to disregard the higher interest rate paid by other banks.  
This point means that in reality, even though they do not deal with such sharia-prohibited 
products, they are essential players in a market that are surrounded and governed by 
conventional banking (i.e., non-Islamic). The interest rate level in the domestic and 
international markets are benchmarked to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and 
the Prime Rate60, and the capital of the banks are kept with the international banks such as JP 
Morgan. In addition, the placement of their funds are with conventional banks; so, to say that 
they are not impacted is not true. In Bahrain, for instance, some Islamic financial institutions 
had to merge in order to face the stringent market conditions in the market. Otherwise, they 
would not be able to survive.  In order to claim that Basel II helps prevent financial crises, 
one needs to understand at the beginning how any regulation could prevent a crisis or quell 
its repercussions.  
 
I cite interviewee 26’s response, as an example:  
 
Regulations help regulated banks survive a crisis if they are designed to be proactive and take into 
consideration the differences amongst constituents.  For banks, these differences are size of capital, 
size of assets, quality of assets, market niche (i.e., corporate or retail), sector niche (e.g., 
                                                 
60 Prime rate: an interest rate applied by banks to their high credit worthiness customers.  
139 
 
manufacturing, service sector, etc.), and business model (Islamic or non-Islamic license. It is only 
through a clear understanding of the differences in these parameters and a corresponding 
customization of supervisory and regulatory activities for each category of the bank that a regulator 
might claim that certain regulations would help all banks survive a crisis.  A blanket [one size fits all] 
approach of regulation and supervision obviously does not take the peculiar characteristics of each 
bank into consideration, and if such uniqueness is not observed, then a claim would be difficult to 
substantiate.  
 
Interviewee 10’s take on the above question was the following:  
 
“A financial crisis is difficult to be predicted or stopped. During a crisis, there is minimum work that 
banks or their regulator can do to withstand the crisis apart from the traditional procedures like 
slowing down the business, holding dear your liquidity and being selective in your credit lending. 
Thus, if there any regulation to be designed specifically for crises and it must be set out to be 
implemented and monitored on a continuous basis.”   
 
The implication of the above data is that to help banks prepare for or withstand crises; there 
is a need for a congruent dedicated set of regulations for this purpose. This set of regulations 
acknowledge the idiosyncrasies of the banks’ parameters (e.g. capital size, assets 
complexities, and risk profile) and guide the regulator to monitor the performance and 
interconnectedness. In the literature, we could not find a reference to such set of regulations. 
In addition, we have examined the banking regulations of some developed countries such as 
Hong Kong, United Kingdom, USA, Singapore and Australia but we could not find that they 
have addressed this regulation yet.   
 
4.3.3 Basel II and Competitive Advantage  
 
In this sub-section, we seek to examine if there is any benefit of Basel II perceived by 
bankers in relation to their international competitiveness.  
 
In a banking system, banks (both foreign and domestic) compete amongst each other to 
attract depositors’ money, extend credit facilities to retail and corporate clients, and manage 
clients’ wealth and investments. Success and the ability to attract clients and depositors 
depends on factors like the size of the bank’s capital, the strength of its liquidity and 
profitability, the competence of its management, its corporate governance and transparency, 
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etc. Basel II implementation via the CAR indicates the bank’s level of capitalization to 
debtors and investors. The higher the level of capitalization (i.e., the higher the bank’s equity 
capital relative to the size of its risk-weighted assets), the higher the creditworthiness of a 
bank, ceteris paribus. From this aspect, Basel II implementation in a bank may be perceived 
as a comforting sign to debtors and investors. It might also be perceived as a competitive 
advantage in an international and domestic banking system. Table 4.6 informs us that 34% of 
banks in the country do not see that there is a relationship between adherence to Basel II 
requirements and competitive advantage, while 9% felt that Basel II implementation at their 
banks did not enhance their international competitiveness. Interviewee 2 explains the reason 
as follows:  
 
Interviewer: why would you think that bankers do not consider adherence to Basel II is a 
boost to their international competitiveness?  
 
Interviewee 2: all banks in the country are working inside the country. This means that their 
loans and source of funds are all generated either in the countries or from the countries in 
the gulf. The international transactions in these banks are limited to the correspondence 
banking relationship. Thus, the do not realize how Basel II can make them known or string in 
the eyes of banks in the international markets. Other banks, however, such as private equity 
focused banks, which are limited in number in the countries, they might feel it [the adherence 
to Basel II] from the perspective of credit rating only, I guess.  
 
What we get from the survey results and the above example of interviews is that even though 
Basel II might boost or enhance the international competitiveness of some banks that are 
internationally active, it does not help other banks who are locally focused in their business. 
This implies that there is no definite causation relationship between Basel II and international 
competitiveness of banks.  
 
4.3.4 Basel II and Systemic risk  
 
As we explained in Chapter 1, we dedicate a section to systemic risk because BCBS (2011) 
explicitly mentioned that one objective of Basel II is to reduce systemic risk in countries 
implementing the accord.  Thus, we sought to examine the impact of Basel II 
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implementations in Bahrain on systemic risk from the point of view of bankers’ perceptions 
of systemic risk. I asked the questionnaire’s respondent “In your view, could Basel II 
implementation in Bahrain reduce the systemic risk?” 
 
Table 4.15 shows that bankers were divided about whether Basel II could help reduce the 
systemic risk in the country. About 44% of the respondents did not agree Basel II could 
reduce the systemic risk while 37.8% thought it could.  Approximately 31% of questionnaire 
respondents do not see a relationship between systemic risk and Basel II implementation in 
Bahrain. Table 4.8 suggests two interesting points. First, about 14% of the surveyed bankers 
were not sure about the impact of Basel II implementation on the banking system as a whole. 
I asked interviewees about how 14% of the survey respondents could not be sure if there is a 
relationship between Basel II and systemic. I cite two examples of the interviewees’ 
responses below:  
 
“Interviewee 5: there are bankers, I mean on all levels whether board executive or senior 
management, if they do not find the CBB after something they tend to ignore it..or let us say do not pay 
attention to it and since the CBB is silent about systemic risk I guess that is why some banks could not 
see a relationship” 
Since the management of systemic risk is initiated and administered by the banking regulator, 
there is no mention of that risk in the banks’ annual reports. I have examined the CBB’s 
Rulebooks (for the Islamic and the conventional banks), but we did not find any reference to 
that risk in the CBB’s guidance. I also asked the interviewees if the CBB illuminated on this 
risk during the inspection visits or the prudential meetings with the banks. All the 
respondents agreed that the CBB did not illuminate in these platforms. In this regard, there 
are two questions that should be raised having read this data: why would the CBB not 
address systemic risk and how can it be managed? I had answered the first question when we 
cited the responses of the CBB officials who said that the CBB currently does not give 
systemic risk a priority. Now, we will answer the question about how this risk should be 
handled. I found that the five CBB officials were not able to envisage the way this risk could 
be measured and monitored. Therefore, we turned to the banks to solicit their responses.  
Interviewee 15: I guess the only way to measure this risk is through gathering all the relevant 
information from banks about the interconnectedness amongst banks. Once you quantify the 
interconnectedness, you will be able to forecast how financial difficulties faced by one can be 
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transmuted to another. The second point is that the CBB should not allow any bank to growth to reach 
a stage of too big to fail. One proxy [criteria] that the CBB may adopt in this regard is the assets size.  
  
None of the interviewees, however, shared more factors than the ones cited above, i.e., they 
all agree that the assets size is a good proxy to use for systemic risk and the procedure that 
should be followed by the CBB is the aggregation and analysis of the level of 
interconnectedness amongst banks in the banking system. The implications of this are that 
the CBB would need to first design a set of regulations, then develop reporting templates, 
and finally set deadlines for this reporting.  
Second, about 13% of the respondents asserted that the CBB had provided them with memos 
about the association between Basel II and systemic risk, even though the CBB did not have 
information with regard to systemic risk in its Rulebook or ad hoc circulars. 
Response 
Response 
Percentage 
Yes, and the CBB has shared with the banks the relationship between 
Basel II implementation and systemic risk 
5.0% 
Yes, but the CBB did not share with the banks how could Basel II 
implementation reduce systemic risk 
37.8% 
Do not know  13.4% 
No, but the CBB has shared with the banks the relationship between 
Basel II implementation and systemic risk 
12.6% 
No, I do not see a relationship between Basel II implementation and 
systemic risk 
31.1% 
Table 4.15 Basel II implementation and systemic risk (all banks) 
 
I asked interviewees about their explanation for why 31% of the questionnaire respondents 
did not find a relationship between Basel II implementation and the systemic risk. 
Interviewee 19, for instance, stated:  
Interviewee 19: The CBB does not address systemic risk in its rulebooks, and has never issued 
directions to banks in the context of its supervisory role.  The CCB has not attributed the objective of 
the imposition of any rule to reducing systemic risk, nor has it highlighted this risk during its 
inspections visits, prudential meetings, and offsite examinations.  Systemic risk has never been the 
subject of discussion between the CBB and Bahraini banks during the course of its inspections or while 
overseeing Basel II implementation. Even when the CBB announced that it would implement Basel III 
in 2015, the CBB has so far maintained silence about the CCB; thus far, the CBB has shown interest in 
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the parts of Basel III that do not pertain to systemic risk. This explains why bankers do not associate 
Basel II implementation with a reduction in systemic risk.  
Interviewee 8 summarized this stance by stating that  
“One will never find systemic risk in any of the CBB internal checklists or to-do lists.”  
This leads us to question why the CBB chose to ignore the subject of systemic risk, which 
might lead to a second important question that if the CBB chose to ignore systemic risk, then 
how can they claim that Basel II implementation in the country reduces systemic risk? 
I met Interviewee –CBB 3, to examine why The CBB had not given its attention to the 
systemic risk.  
Interviewee –CBB 3: The CBB does not consider handling systemic risk a priority for the time being… 
because we  are of a view that we should focus on the financial resilience of each bank, i.e. working on 
micro-prudential kind of a plan then eventually we might move on to think on macro-level. 
Interviewer: any explanation of why would the CBB take that stance even though Basel II highlights 
the importance of addressing the systemic risk and Bahrain is Basel II-compliant country.   
Interviewee-CBB 3: I see your point, but both of the banks and us are not ready to move on to the 
Macro-prudential regulation. After almost seven years of implementing Basel II in the country, we still 
have some pending issues with some financial institutions about capital adequacy, credit exposures, 
etc. I believe the banks are not yet mature enough for Basel II Pillar 1 requirements yet.  
Interviewer: that is an interesting remark because if the CBB does not find banks mature enough on 
Basel II then why are you imposing Basel III 
Interviewee-CBB 3: we have to embrace Basel III for the sake of rating of the country. 
Interviewee 13, on the other hand, attributed the CBB’s stance to a lack of competence at the 
CBB to handle the intricacies of systemic risk. He explains the following:  
“Handling systemic risk requires quantitative analysis; analysis of data and processing it 
mathematically and statistically to either: 1) design and measure for domestic purposes, or 2) design 
and benchmark for the measure called for in Basel III.  The CBB does not have the competencies to get 
that done. The CBB has so far shown us that it will shy away from any intricate or quantitative 
regulations…”    
I learned from the literature that systemic risk is peculiar when compared to other risks. For 
other risks (such as market risk), if regulators do not give guidance or requirements for a tool 
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to quantify that particular form of risk, then practitioners tend to innovate and take initiatives 
to devise measures that help them manage their business and mitigate or speculate their 
activities. Nevertheless, systemic risk is unique because no individual bank can take the lead 
to assess systemic risk, and no bank can eventually impose measures to reduce or accelerate 
the bank’s growth or to alter their conduct to protect the whole system from potential risks. 
This explains why some interviewees, such as interviewee 25 and interviewee 10 call 
systemic risk “non-of-bankers-business risk.” What they are referring to is that the bulk of 
the work of how systemic risk should be managed should be done by the regulator by setting 
out a clear set of regulation and a process of monitoring and reporting during and post any 
systemic disruptions.  
4.3.5 Conclusion 
 
The data shows that bankers do not find that Basel II implementation has benefited their risk 
management function, practice, culture, and enterprise. I also found that there is a huge gap 
between the perceptions of the definition of risk management at banks compared to the CBB. 
In addition, there is evidence that bankers and the CBB are not on the same page in terms of 
risk management and the benefits of Basel II.  
 
The data provided evidence that the answer to the research question, “How has Basel II 
implementation, in the context of the CBB Rulebooks, helped banks with risk management 
function and practice?” is that Basel II implementation in the country did not help banks with 
their risk management function and practice. The reasons behind this are highlighted in the 
following summary of the findings.  First, there is an explanation relevant to the regulatory 
attitude of the CBB.  We learned from this section that the CBB does not find it necessary or 
beneficial to be transparent and converse with banks regarding its regulatory and supervisory 
objectives. The CBB perception of its rule in the country that it is the regulator and that it 
does not have to explain, justify or rationalize its initiatives or decisions. The bankers, on the 
other hand, perceives that to be a sign of transparency, social and economic coherence.  
The data revealed that the majority of the bankers do not attribute the improvement in the 
risk management functions at their banks to the implementation of Basel II or Basel III. 
They, instead, attributed that to their proactive measures to set their practices as per the 
practices o other financial institutions worldwide. In addition, the data showed us that 50% of 
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the banks do not see, in principle, any correlation between the implementation of Basel II and 
risk management. Second, there was a problem of the scope of the project outlined by the 
CBB. According to the CBB, their perception of Basel II implication in the country to focus 
only on the adequacy of the capital and the adherence of the bank to the minimum threshold.   
In terms of the two main categories of banks in the country, the data informed us that 
conventional bankers are more the least bankers who realized the contribution of Basel Ii 
implication to the advancement of risk management functions. Even when the advanced 
approaches of Basel II were, hypothetically, implemented by the CBB, they bankers in the 
conventional banks attributed that to be due to the advancement in the quantitative finance 
(i.e. credit modeling) and the Basel II in this particular field was a follower rather than the 
leader. Islamic banks, due to their relative recency in the banking sector in the country 
attributed some advantages of implementation of Basel II to risk management functions at 
their banks.  Third, there is an issue of understanding and knowledge of risk management at 
the CBB. Interviews taught us that there is no clear understanding of the concept of risk 
management amongst bankers in Bahrain. Some bankers perceive risk management as 
merely a department that has its own organization structure headed by a senior official, 
resourced with advanced I systems, documented policies and procedures, and the appointed 
of it ahead has to be approved by the CBB and the board of directors. Furthermore, the 
absence of this department in an absolute breach of the CBB requirements. 
 
One of the main reason that bankers do not see the Basel II helps them in risk management is 
the reluctance of implementing Pillar of Basel II and III. The CBB has not yet enforced the 
proper implementation of Pillar2. Hence, banks saw only the CAR as enforced and followed 
on by the CBB.  
The data revealed that there are banks, from both Islamic and conventional banks category, 
will only implement those that are directly asked by the CBB and would not invest in any 
Improvement of developments either in their risk management or in corporate governance 
framework unless imposed by the CBB. The organization culture as manifested by the board 
of directors and the management styles persuaded this attitude.  
The CBB does not contextualize risk management in its regulatory policies and supervision 
procedures as a culture, but instead, it promotes as a must-have department, which leads 
banks to believe o treat is as such, as ticking box exercise rather than a benefit. That attitude 
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of the CBB blurred the bank's vision of seeing the benefits of Basel ii in advancing their risk 
management frameworks. Bankers indicated that their periodic dialogues with the CBB are 
focused mainly on the capital adequacy figures and the overall organization that encompasses 
a risk management department. 
 
The CBB does not conduct due diligence or carry out a gap analysis between what it aim to 
launch and the existing conditions of the banks neither does it distinguish, while setting the 
scope of the implementation of the proposed  regulations, between banks in terms of 
considerable differences among them in sets size, capitalisation level, market share, 
complexities of assets compositions and quality of loans portfolio. The CBB uses a “ blanket 
approach; one size fits all regulations and implementation of risk management and Basel II. 
Banks are ahead of the CBB in discovering, adopting coping with the advancements in the 
risk management practices worldwide.  
 
The data shows that the CBB officials are not cognizant of the practical definition of risk 
management and do not share the same perception of the contribution of it to a department of 
a function within the bank. The concept of risk management culture is not well understood by 
the CBB officials neither is it taken into considerations. Furthermore, the CBB examiners 
and inspectors do not consider those in carrying out their duties.  
It is found that the CBB officials confuse the term compliance with risk management, which 
is another reason why they insist that Basel II implementation helps risk management. What 
Basel II is doing, according to their definition is that it helps improve the compliance 
framework.  The CBB officials do not understand the concept of risk appetite and have not 
shown clarity of the project of setting regulation and monitoring of risk appetite can be the 
approach. This is manifested in how 70% of the banks do not find the CBB asking about risk 
appetite at all in its communication with the banks.  Banks are either cannot define it 
succinctly or have it as a document instead of integrating it in their strategies or do not have 
it at all. 
 
In regarding the financial crisis, the data shows that banks in Bahrain suffered from the 
financial crisis of 2007 and that effect would not have been lowered or quelled if Basel II I, 
for implemented. Banks did not find Basel II implementation helpful in reducing the impact 
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of the crisis because what caused losses to banks was something that was not captured by the 
capital adequacy of the Basel II.  The quality of the loans in the loans portfolio, real estate 
plummeting prices, confidence in the market, shrinkage of liquidity in the market, lack of 
having proper geographical or product line concentrations, availability if risk appetite, proper 
monitoring of the banks by the board, lack of asking the good questions by the board were 
the drivers for the losses incurred. These were the real contributors of the suffering of the 
banks in the country because of the crisis of 2007, and none of them is addressed in the 
CBB’s work o Basel II implementation.  Bankers in Bahrain questioned the ability of Basel II 
or Basel 111 to detect, prevent or current financial crisis. The majority of the bankers refused 
and refuted the claimed relationship between Basel II and financial crisis and they refuse to 
call Basel II and Basel III an international best practice.   
 
With regard to the international competitiveness, the data informed us that even though Basel 
II might boost or enhance the international competitiveness of some banks that are 
internationally active, it does not help other banks who are locally focused in their business, 
such as the banks in Bahrain. This implies that there is no definite causal relationship 
between Basel II and the international competitiveness of banks.  
 
Lastly, some risk managers at banks in Bahrain could accurately define systemic risk, hence 
could not form an opinion about the relationship between Basel II and the reduction of the 
systemic risk. The data shows that the CBB has totally ignored the systemic risk and address 
its calamity neither in its regulatory policies nor in its supervisory conducts or periodic 
reporting and communications with the banks.  Bankers in Bahrain do not find that Basel II 
could help them prepare for or withstand systemic risk. I also found that the CBB does not 
consider that addressing systemic risk is a priority and plans to stick closely to monitoring 
the financial resilience of each bank on a micro level.  
 
4.4 The appropriateness of the techniques and methods of Basel II 
 
In this section, we discuss the results in relation to how appropriate Basel II requirements 
were to the banks in the country. I examine the appropriateness of Basel II requirements to 
the banks as another aspect of examining Basel II as a whole after discussing the acclaimed 
benefits of its adoption in the preceding section.   
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4.4.1 Operational risk  
 
In this subsection, we examine the appropriateness of the methods of Basel II imposed by the 
CBB to cater for operational risk.  
 
I start with the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) that is considered the most straightforward 
method for calculating the Operational Risk Weighted Assets (ORWA) out of the three 
approaches recommended in Basel II. According to this approach, the ORWA is calculated 
by taking the arithmetic average of the current and past two years of gross income. I asked 
the respondents in the survey “Does the Basic indicator Approach of calculating the 
operational risk-weighted assets reflect the essential operational risk your bank is exposed 
to?” Table 4.11 shows that 90% of the bankers found the capital requirement as calculated 
by the BIA is not reflective of the essential operational risk to which their banks were 
exposed. 77% of the bankers considered the AMA as the most reflective approach for 
assessing the operational risk loss events to which they are exposed. 
 
Response 
Response 
Percentage 
Yes, and our bank does not need to consider another approach 1% 
Yes, but our bank needs to show more robust capital allocation for 
operational risk in its ICAAP 7% 
Indifferent 3% 
No, and the CBB relies on the bank's ICAAP for the adequacy of capital 
for the bank's operational risk 10% 
No, and our bank should adopt advanced approaches for operational risk 80% 
Table 4.16 Assessment of BIA for ORWA calculation (All banks)  
I met with Interviewee 12, who considered himself an expert in operational risk management, 
having written papers and given lectures and presentations on the subject. Although he was 
welcoming during the arrangement of the interview date and time, he was very agitated right 
from the beginning of the interview. When we reached the discussion on operational risk, it 
became clear that he was agitated about the CBB: 
 
Interviewer: How would you describe the appropriateness of the BIA for operational risk in Bahraini 
banks? How did it or did it not help you? 
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Interviewee 12: I am telling you, this issue is way over the CBB’s head. The CBB does not know what 
it is doing; it just copies and pastes from Basel II papers without really knowing if those [the 
requirements] are convenient for the banks or not. 
Interviewer: Can you please limit your discussion to the operational risk, as we will discuss the 
supervision side of the CBB in more detail later? [We made this necessary interruption to gain 
remarks that are more useful in the limited remaining time, as the interviewer hinted that he had 
another important meeting to go to.] 
Interviewee 12: Apart from the operational risk, Basel II was not made for us; it was not designed to 
be implemented in all banks irrespective of their business models. Even the operational risk methods 
for calculation cannot be implemented in commercial or retail banks with the same scope as that of 
wholesale banks. For our bank, which has a very limited number of transactions since it is a private 
equity-based bank and limited numbers of staff compared to retail banks, which means it has fewer 
operational loss events, why would it need to keep a capital charge of the size suggested by the BIA? 
Therefore, we see that the calculations produced by the method bear no meaning to us and I assume 
that it bears nothing to the CBB except ticking the box that we have adhered to Basel II requirements 
and we are Basel II compliant.  
BIA is considered the most simple and straightforward method of the three approaches 
offered in Basel II to quantify the ORWA.  Table 4.9 shows that 88% of the banks in the 
study find that the capital requirement as calculated by the BIA does not reflect the essential 
operational risk to which their banks are exposed. I asked bankers in the survey, “Which 
method when implemented do you think would mostly reflect your banks; actual operational 
risk?” Table 4.10 shows that 77% of banks believe that AMA is the approach that best 
reflects the operational risk loss events to which they are exposed. This consensus is 
explained by the following observations on BIA. Capital requirements calculated according 
to the BIA could result in an underestimation of the ORWA as well as misalignment of the 
ORWA concept with the CAR. Exclusion of net losses, according to the BIA, means the 
average GI is divided by a lower number (i.e., the number of positive GI years only), which 
results in a higher CAR. The misalignment is that a bank generates a negative GI ends up 
with higher CAR than an identical bank, ceteris paribus. I enquired Interviewee 3 about his 
opinion regarding this:  
 
Interviewer: which factors do you think should be taken into considerations? Do you have a suggestion 
of the model to quantify operational risk?  
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Interviewee 3: the first factor that the CBB ponder on before thinking of charging in capital requirements 
for operational risk does a bank in question really how an operational risk 
Interviewer: and how would you know that for sure if you were on the regulator shoes? 
Interviewee 3: that is easy. If there are operational loss events recorded, reported, discussed with the 
board or the executive management then these reports must be available somewhere at the bank on a 
system dedicated either to this purpose or on the bank’s server. In all cases, the CBB has access to these 
reports. The CBB should then study these reports and assess how much capital is required to charge 
against the bank in light of this size and severity of the operational losses reported.  
If banks find that the BIA is not appropriate and irrelevant to the essential operational risk, 
they are exposed to, and they demand that the CBB has a capital requirement to address their 
essential operational risk then this stance begs some questions for the banks. First, if banks 
demand method other than the BIA, then they must have an operational risk management 
framework that produces valid and reliable reporting of all the operational losses faced by the 
bank. This is necessary because if work has to be done to avoid the given standardized methods 
requirements as given by Basel II (in this case the BIA), then there must be input data available 
to enable quantifications of the operational risk. To investigate whether or not banks have this 
framework in place we examined the annual reports of the banks for the past five years to see 
if they have disclosed anything in that regard. Moreover, to see if they disclosed, along with 
the requirements of BIA, information about a quantitative method used other than that the BIA, 
we found the following:  
Bank OR Policy& 
Procedures 
Loss events reporting Bank Database Since 
Bank 1 Approved by the 
board  
A process exists to report the lost 
events to the risk manager  
In place and loss, events 
are stored in in   
2008 
Bank 2  Approved by the 
board  
A process exists to report the lost 
events to the risk manager  
In place and loss, events 
are stored in in   
2010 
Bank 3 Approved by the 
board  
A process exists to report the lost 
events to the risk manager  
In place and loss, events 
are stored in in   
2008 
Bank 4 Approved by the 
board  
A process exists to report the lost 
events to the risk manager  
In place and loss, events 
are stored in in   
2011 
Bank 5 Approved by the 
board  
A process exists to report the lost 
events to the risk manager  
In place and loss, events 
are stored in in   
2010 
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Bank 6 Approved by the 
board  
A process exists to report the lost 
events to the risk manager  
In place and loss, events 
are stored in in   
2011 
Bank 7 Approved by the 
board  
A process exists to report the lost 
events to the risk manager  
In place and loss, events 
are stored in in   
2010 
Bank 8 Approved by the 
board  
A process exists to report the lost 
events to the risk manager  
In place and loss, events 
are stored in in   
2009 
Bank 9 Approved by the 
board  
A process exists to report the lost 
events to the risk manager  
In place and loss, events 
are stored in in   
2008 
Bank 
10 
Approved by the 
board  
A process exists to report the lost 
events to the risk manager  
In place and loss, events 
are stored in in   
2010 
Bank 
11 
Approved by the 
board  
A process exists to report the lost 
events to the risk manager  
In place and loss, events 
are stored in in   
2013 
Bank 
12 
Approved by the 
board  
A process exists to report the lost 
events to the risk manager  
In place and loss, events 
are stored in in   
2012 
Bank 
13 
Approved by the 
board  
A process exists to report the lost 
events to the risk manager  
In place and loss, events 
are stored in in   
2010 
Bank 
14 
Approved by the 
board  
A process exists to report the lost 
events to the risk manager  
In place and loss, events 
are stored in in   
2013 
Bank 
15 
Approved by the 
board  
A process exists to report the lost 
events to the risk manager  
In place and loss, events 
are stored in in   
2009 
Table 4.17 Status of Operational Risk at Bahraini Banks  
Table 4.17 shows that the majority (57%) of the interviewed banks have in place a framework 
for identifying, reporting and monitoring operational risk. This explains why bankers in the 
survey are against the BIA as a measurement tool for their operational risk. BIA does not 
distinguish between a bank with one operational loss event and a bank with hundred. This lack 
of differentiation makes bankers unconvinced of the outcome of the method.  
The CBB is cognizant of the shortcomings of the BIA but currently, has no option to rectify 
them. (Hamad, 2014).  According to Hamad, the only viable option available to the CBB is to 
impose an advanced approach, namely the AMA. There are several prerequisites the CBB 
and the banks need to satisfy in order to implement the AMA, such as the availability of a 
robust operational risk management system with validated quantitative measures, robust 
governance structure, etc. The AMA requires skills in quantitative finance from the banks’ 
side to calculate internally the capital requirements from their own operational risk events 
and from the CBB in order to validate whether the calculations carried out by these banks are 
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robust and reflective of the essential operational risks. Hamad opined that none of the banks 
has yet shown such capabilities, and the CBB is insufficiently resourced, from a human 
capital and systems perspective, to generate and validate such calculations.  
 
4.4.2 Credit Risk  
 
I here move from the operational risk requirements to the credit risk requirements which is 
the second component of the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR). The Standardized Approach 
(SA) is the only method for the calculation of the Credit Risk Weighted Assets (CRWA) that 
is accepted by the CBB. The SA is widely used owing to its simplicity and absence of 
prerequisites. According to SA, banks should classify their assets into counterparty 
classifications, and after classifying the exposures, predetermined fixed risk weights should 
be applied to each exposure. Risk weights are mapped to the rating of the counterparties as 
given by the external rating agencies. I have asked bankers in the survey “Does the 
Standardized Approach of Credit Risk Weighted Assets calculation reflect the essential credit 
risk in your bank's portfolios?”  
 
Assessment 
Response 
Percentage 
Yes, and our bank does not need to consider another approach or further 
calculation 7% 
Yes, but our bank needs to show more robust capital allocation for 
credit risk in its ICAAP 8% 
Indifferent 3% 
No, and the CBB relies on our ICAAP for the adequacy of capital for 
the bank's credit risk 7% 
No, and we think our bank should adopt advanced approaches for credit 
risk 76% 
Table 4.18 Assessment of SA for CRWA calculation (All banks) 
Table 4.18 illustrates that 75% of the banks in this study found that the SA did not reflect 
their bank’s essential credit risk in their credit portfolios. This stance is explained because the 
predetermined fixed rates in the SA apply to a bank’s clients, which are either commercial 
corporations or clients in the financial industry such as banks, insurance companies, funds, 
etc. Not all of these clients seek to be rated. The tendency to seek to rate depends on the 
environment in which the client operates. In an environment where conclusions about the 
creditworthiness of the borrowers and lenders are established based on personal interactions, 
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personal and professional networking, and trust, for instance, these counterparties would not 
need to seek the opinion of rating agencies on their creditworthiness. Interviewees have 
emphasized that their corporate clients fall in this category. Interviewer 4, for instance, 
explained as follows:  
 
Interviewer: how do you interpret the finding of our survey that the majority of the bankers find that 
SA not entirely reflective of the essential credit risk in their lending portfolios?  
 
Interviewer 4: In order to understand or interpret this finding you have to carefully look at two points: 
the geographical distribution of the credit portfolios of these banks and the credit rating capabilities at 
these banks. First, banks in Bahrain only lend to corporates in the local or regional market. By 
regional market, I mean the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries. Corporations in these 
countries are not rated. 
 
Interviewer: why?  
 
Interviewer 4: the question is why should it be rated? A corporation or even a bank seeks to be rated 
by credit rating agency if they see value in doing… for example, to solicit international foreign 
investments, international capital injection, deposits, etc. We as bankers in the country we do not 
expect these companies to be rated anyway for this reason.  
 
Interviewer: can we go back to your analysis, if they are not rated, what are the implications of the 
adoption of SA.  
 
Interviewer 4: the implications is that if they are not rated they would attract a risk weight of 100% 
even though they might be the best customer you ever want to deal with, they never default, always 
paying their installment on time, honest, transparent, etc. Therefore, we see it first hand; SA tells us a 
size of a risk that is very misaligned with what we see from the client by dealing with him.     
 
On the other hand, the bank’s internal assessment of such clients could be correct in some 
cases, yet they are still required to apply a 100% risk weight when calculating CAR as per 
the SA.  I have received unanimous responses from the interviewees in retail-banking 
categories are unrated.  I have augmented the unanimous response with an examination of the 
annual reports of these banks to explore the geographical distributions of their credit 
portfolios. The result of this examination is illustrated in the following Table 4.19:  
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Bank Bahrain GCC Middle East  
and North Africa 
North America  Europe East Asia 
Bank 1  94% 2% 4% - - - 
Bank 2 100% - - - - - 
Bank 3 93% 7% - - - - 
Bank 4 100% - - - - - 
Bank 5 100% - - - - - 
Bank 6 99% 1% - - - - 
Bank 7 100% - - - - - 
       
Bank 8 100% - - - - - 
Bank 9 100% - - - - - 
Bank 10 96% 1% 3% - - - 
     Table 4.19 Geographical distribution of Bahraini banks’ credit portfolios 
 
Table 4.19 informs us that the entire credit portfolio of banks are in a local or regional market 
where, as interviewers indicate the clients in this market are not rated.  
 
The summary of the above is that the CBB imposes the method given by Basel II that does 
not reflect the bank's credit risk and bankers say that their credit risk is different than the one 
captured by this method. Therefore, this leads us to raise the following questions: how does 
the CBB satisfy itself that the credit risk in the banks’ credit portfolios is acceptable on the 
individual and aggregate basis? What further analysis does the CBB conduct to augment the 
credit risk calculations in the SA?  
 
To that effect, the banks prefer to use advanced methods for CRWA that are called advanced 
approaches, namely the FIRB and AIRB. Table 4.20 informs us that 92% of respondents 
consider the FIRB and AIRB to be the best options to calculate the capital requirements for 
credit risk. There are, however, obstacles to the adoption of the advanced approaches from 
the CBB and the bank’s sites such as the regulator’s competency to deal with advanced 
mathematical models, as explained in more detail in interviewee 10’s response below.  
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Assessment Response percentage 
Alternative Standardized Approach 7% 
Foundation Internal Rating Approach (FIRB) 35% 
Advanced Internal Rating Approach (AIRB) 58% 
     Table 4.20 Assessment of the best method for CRWA calculation (all banks) 
Interviewee (10), although he was very circumspect so as not to disclose confidential 
information about his bank’s credit portfolio and initiatives for calculating the CRWA, he 
clearly outlined the issues with implementing the SA and advanced approaches for 
calculating the CRWA. Although other interviewees shared the same stance, we chose to cite 
this interview in particular because it offered the most comprehensive information in this 
respect. 
 
Interviewer: How would you assess the effectiveness of the SA in aligning the capital charge to the 
banks’ credit risk-weighted assets (CRWA)? Moreover, how successful is the SA in doing that at your 
bank? 
Interviewee10: To me, the SA is nothing but number crunching to satisfy the CBB. We just multiply 
figures with the risk weight. We do not agree on these weights and how they have been designed …, 
but we cannot object to that; we have to satisfy the CBB. 
Interviewer: Did you convey this to concern to the CBB? 
Interviewee10: Yes, of course, in many occasions and in the many letters we write to the CBB in 
response to its consultation paper. Whenever I find an opportunity, I speak up and say that this is not 
right. 
Interviewer: If the SA in nothing but number crunching, why not move to an advanced approach, such 
as the FIRB and AIRB? 
Interviewee10: It [doing so] needs a lot of investment in systems; we have no budget for that. In 
addition, even if we have that, the CBB will not approve it. 
Interviewer: Why not? 
Interviewee10: Because using advanced approaches requires the central bank to have the capability to 
make sure that we are doing the right job. 
Interviewer: How capable is the CBB of doing that currently, in your opinion?  
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Interviewee10: [Laughing] The CBB will not be ready for advanced approaches in fewer than 10 
years. … It needs data and people. 
Interviewer: Can you please elaborate on why you think the CBB is not capable of approving your 
application to use advanced approaches? I would appreciate it if you can please cite some real-life 
examples. 
Interviewee10: If you want to apply the advanced approaches to calculate the CRWA, you need to 
calculate the probabilities of default (PDs). Calculating PDs requires historical data from at least the 
past seven years about your bank’s credit portfolio problems. We do not have these data. Even if we 
did, the CBB would have to come and monitor us, to make sure itself that we are doing the right 
calculation and are not underestimating the capital charge for credit risk. Now, you tell me, how can 
the CBB do that if they do not have someone experienced in data analysis? Will they outsource the task 
to a consultancy or audit firm, like what they are doing now? It would be an embarrassing situation 
for them. 
Interviewer: OK, if we put the issue of the CBB’s capability aside, I still do not see why your bank’s 
management could not create a budget for systems that will enable you to correctly calculate your 
credit portfolios’ CRWA. Would you care to explain?  
Interviewee10: it is because of cost-benefit. We know that if we apply advanced approaches, our CAR 
might improve somehow, but in order to improve slightly, we would have hundreds of thousands of 
dollars to get that. So, why spend this money if the CBB is very much happy with the SA! Also, why 
should spend all this money and get into a hassle of staff training if the CBB itself will not understand 
what we are doing?  
The excerpt above reveals the impact of the CBB’s regulatory and supervisory approach on 
banks’ attitudes toward banking regulations and risk management. Because banks perceived 
that the CBB’s style in Basel II regulations and supervision is to be solely compliant to the 
accord regardless of how applicable or effective is it to them, banks tend to behave similarly; 
they tend to do things only to satisfy the CBB requirements. Anything that is beyond that, 
however, useful to them eventually, would be considered by banks as “unnecessary 
expenses.” For instance, even if banks deem IRB superior, in terms of producing lower 
CRWA, compared to the SA, and provides a framework for better credit risk management, as 
long as the CBB’s focus is only on SA, then banks would not be inclined to invest in the IRB 
systems. Another factor, as revealed in the excerpt above, is that banks would only invest in 
advanced systems for risk management and Basel II implementations if they were convinced 
that the CBB staff is competent to monitor and validate their work. I infer from the above 
findings that the credit risk of banks remain not accurately or meaningfully quantified for 
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capital adequacy and stakeholders of the banks, including the CBB as the regulator, are not 
being informed about this fact. I have examined the annual reports of the banks, and we have 
not seen evidence that indicates that the SA has been augmented with any other 
measurement. Therefore, for investors, debtors, creditors, as well as the shareholders 
themselves how much capital, actually supports the credit risk exposure of the bank is not 
and cannot be known from the banks’ from Basel II calculation. I also infer that the CBB’s 
implementation of the SA is only to satisfy Basel II with no regard given to the intrinsic 
credit risk in the system.  
 
4.4.3 Capital Adequacy Ratio 
 
After discussing operational and credit risk requirements in the CAR, we now discuss the 
concept of CAR. As we expounded in Chapter One and Two Basel II is a capital-based 
regulation, i.e., it uses capital size in relation to the riskiness assumed by a bank to determine 
its financial resilience. In the previous two subsections, we examined the components of the 
CAR. In this subsection, we aim to examine the concept of CAR as a whole because it is the 
crux of Basel II, as explained in Chapter One. There is a noticeable difference between the 
bankers from Islamic banks and those from conventional banks regarding the concept of the 
CAR as a sufficient indicator of a bank’s risks. Table 4.21 shows that approximately 88% of 
the respondents from conventional banks did not see a relationship between the CAR and the 
risks input into the CAR calculation. Only 65% of the respondents from Islamic banks shared 
the above opinion, while another 26% of the respondents from Islamic banks believe that the 
CAR was the right measure for their banks’ risks. 
 
Response 
Islamic 
Banks 
Conventional 
Banks 
Yes, CAR is a sufficient indicator of our bank's portfolios risks 8% 1% 
Yes, but needs to be enhanced with other indicator or proxy 26% 6% 
Indifferent 2% 4% 
No, we do not find CAR as we currently calculate a sufficient 
indicator of our bank's portfolios risks 42% 22% 
No, we do not find a relationship between our portfolios risk 
and the CAR we currently calculate 23% 66% 
Table 4.21 Assessment of CAR as sufficient indicator of risk (by bank type) 
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I asked interviewees about their experience with CAR, including how it is analyzed inside 
the bank and the impact it has on any process of decision making whether in the investment 
or lending side of activities. I cite three example of interviewee response as follows:  
 
Interviewee 20: in the area of our treasury and investment, we watch the impact of CAR on the project 
we are studying so that the CAR does not go below the minimum threshold that is it.  
 
Interviewee 16: as secretary of the board risk committee, I here only one comment from the members 
of the board “are w respecting the CBB ratios,” when I say yes then that is it. That is all that matters, 
meeting the requirements. As long as are above that, then no one uses that ratio no more.  
 
Interviewee 10: CAR is being looked at as regulatory think instead of what is supposed to be looked as 
guidance for cost of funds, liquidity decisions, etc.  
 
Interviewer: do you think the banks have contributed to this attitude?  
 
Interviewee 10: to me, both of them [banks and the CBB] are to blame for that. The CBB portrayed as 
ticking box exercise, and banks know that the CBB would go on hibernating mode as long as we are 
above the threshold.  
 
 
 
From the literature point of view, the above stances of the practitioners are consistent with 
the conclusion reached by some academic researchers such as Moosa (2010), Caruana and 
Narain (2008). Moosa (2010) asserted, “The experience of the financial institutions that 
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collapsed shows that what matters more than capital are liquidity and leverage” and Caruana 
and Narain (2008) stated that “the problem in the market goes beyond the ambit of capital 
adequacy framework.” It might be interpreted that banks are objecting CAR because they are 
having trouble meeting its minimum threshold. I examined the banks’ annual reports to 
determine the CAR of banks for the period ending December 2015, as illustrated in Figure 
4.1. Figure 4.1 informs us that banks do not have any problem adhering to the minimum 
threshold per se, as they are all above the minimum threshold of 8%. I infer from the above 
that they are not objecting CAR because they cannot meet its minimum threshold but because 
of practical implications. The practical implication of this considerably huge consent among 
bankers that the CAR does not mean anything to them is two folds. First, from the regulator’s 
perspective, the CBB does not have the valid basis for decision-making. This means that if 
the CBB relies on a measure that supposed to inform it about whether a bank has enough 
capital to absorb the expected losses, and that measure is deemed invalid, then on what basis 
the CBB takes its decisions in relation to that bank. These decisions refer to, for instance, the 
level of dividends and remunerations that are authorized to be distributed to the shareholders 
and the executive management, respectively, the approval for exemptions from large 
exposure limits, etc. Second, CAR leads banks to neglect disclosure to the stakeholder's other 
risks that are not included in the CAR such as liquidity and concentration risk. The CBB 
mandates reporting of CAR on a quarterly basis but never asks for reports on liquidity or 
concentration risk. I infer, therefore, that a list of risks facing banks are not regulated or 
supervised by the CBB as long as they are not within the realm of Basel II implementation 
project. This constitutes considerable vulnerabilities to the banking system. The negative 
repercussions of these vulnerabilities might not have been envisaged by the CBB yet, but 
when these vulnerabilities materialize, the onslaught on the system and the reputation of the 
market would be severely damaged. The literature on the financial crisis of 2007 taught us 
this lesson and led us to infer the above. Banks who suffered and shut down were compliant 
with Basel II, and their CARs were well above the minimum threshold. (Moosa, 2010). 
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4.4.4 Basel II, good or bad regulations 
 
I ended every interview with the heads of credit, risk, compliance, and finance with a close-
ended question: Do you think Basel II regulation and supervision in Bahrain are good or bad 
for the banks? The responses, which were succinct, are summarized in Table 4.22. 
Response Response Rate 
Basel II regulation and supervision are bad for the banks. 95% 
Basel II regulation is good, but the supervision is bad for the banks. 3% 
Indifferent 1% 
Basel II regulation and supervision are good for the banks. 1% 
Table 4.22 Assessment of Basel II regulation and supervision (all banks) 
I cite two example from interviews of banks for explanations, implications, and 
recommendations from interviewees with regard to CAR of Basel II.  
 
Interviewer: Do you think Basel II regulation and supervision in Bahrain are good or bad for the 
banks? 
Interviewee 10: Basel II is not only bad for banks but also bad for the CBB. It is particularly bad for 
the CBB because the CBB is not implementing Basel II in its entirety. The CBB is not yet implementing 
Pillar 2 in its right form. Therefore, we are half-Basel II compliant…  
Interviewer: I still did not understand how that could be bad.  
Interviewee 10:  let me simplify it for you. If there is a set of rules designed by people working in a 
banking environment that are very different from yours, for objectives and motivations that are not 
applicable to your banking environment. You implement this set of rules at face value, yet not all of it 
just part of it [he is referring to the implementation of Pillar 1 rather than Pillar 2 as we expounded in 
previous sections and chapters]. Add all that to the fact that the methods imposed are not relevant to 
the banks then you would definitely end up with a blurred vision of the true risks the banks you are 
regulating are exposed to. The numbers you get from the banks do not have a lot of meaning. If the set 
of regulations is bad, then the supervision would inevitably be bad.   
Interviewee 17 agrees that Basel II regulations are bad to the bank in Bahrain, but he ascribed 
that to the supervision more than the regulations per se.  
Interviewee 17: I am inclined to say that Basel II supervision in Bahrain is worse than the regulations. 
The regulations by themselves are guidance or recommendations for best practices. What makes 
regulations good or bad is how they are implemented, which are the supervision and inspection part of 
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the CBB. What we need to improve in the country is the way we choose which regulations to adopt but 
most importantly, how we implement them.  
Interviewer: How could that possibly be rectified?  
Interviewee 17: The CBB would need to change its approach to supervision. It should open up to think 
locally, in terms of regulations and supervision instead of always striving to implement things that 
impress the rating agencies or the IMF [International Monetary Fund] or the World Bank. It is time to 
separate policies from economics. Decisions of banking regulations should be based on the nature of 
the banks and their capabilities instead of dreams or wishes from some senior people at the CBB. It 
should work together with the banks instead of order banks. I guess you agree with me that there is a 
lot of difference in that.  
The practical implications of the above findings in which practitioners deem Basel II as a 
wrong kind of regulation are huge. Shareholders and board of directors of banks will wrongly 
get a perception that capital is covering the risks the management assumed, especially if the 
minimum requirements are achieved.  That perception makes them less vigilant to address 
risks beyond Base II such as leverage and liquidity. Eventually, that perception creates an 
environment of ticking boxes of compliance while the system is very much burdened with 
latent risks that are neither identified nor acknowledged.    
 
4.4.5 Conclusion  
The data showed us that 90% of the bankers found that the method imposed by the Basel II 
regulations and the CBB to quantify operational risk is just a ticking box exercises, not 
reflective of the essential operational risk faced by the bank. Furthermore, the bankers do not 
understand how the ORWA calculated by this method should be interpreted. The alternative, 
which they think more reflective and meaningful to their operational risk, is prohibitively not 
implementable. Bankers do not have the capacity or infrastructure to implement the CBB is 
qualified to neither implement nor design it as regulatory policy and the supervisory program 
in the first place. The inability of the bankers to make sense and use of the outcomes of the 
ORWA made them realize that Basel II, as shown in the data, is not designed for the banks in 
the region and they[ bankers] implied that the CBB should not just copy and passed the 
regulations as they are and implemented them. Bankers believe that if the CBB was qualified 
enough to handle the operational risk management, they have human capital, and the 
necessary infrastructure to handle well, it would have been able to augment the superficial 
result of the BIA with another method that could have given the CBB a clearer and 
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meaningful picture of the status of operational risk at the banks. The data informed us that 
there are banks, which shown readiness and ability to have a database of operational loss 
events that may qualify them to use alternative quantitative approach but the CBB has always 
blocked those attempts as not to deviate from the Basel II regulations. We learned that the 
CBB wants to stick to the Basel II regulations regardless of the impracticality in its own 
jurisdiction. The CBB’s inability to cope with the requirements of imposing advanced 
approaches is the only obstacle.  
 
With regard to the credit risk, the data showed identical result; the majority of the bankers 
found that the standardized approach for CRWA is not aligned to the intrinsic credit risk in 
the credit portfolios. Bankers consider the CRWA, especially to the corporate based 
commercial banking that their CRWA is exuberantly inflating their credit risk with no 
economic basis. They consider the 100% risk weight for local SMEs and corporate clients are 
not a risk-based measurement as always been claimed by the Basel II committee or the CBB.  
the SA is a cyclical approach and relies solely on the rating agencies of the corporate and 
fixed percentage for retail clients . well also learned that companies in this region do not seek 
rating and credit risk is better dealt with a good mixture of quantitative and qualitative 
measurement instead of relying solely on quantifying methods using non-risk-based 
approach.  
Bankers realized that the only method suitable is the internal rating approach, which a lot of 
banks have shown progress. The only obstacle to implementing this, as per the data is the 
inability of the CBB to supervise this method because it requires human capital competencies 
with certain skills in math statistics and business analytics. The CBB is not willing to make 
such an investment in attracting this human capital to enable it to listen to the banker's 
request. The CBB might be cognizant of the shortcomings, but they would rather accept the 
numbers that are not entirely meaningful than not to implement the Basel II or make that 
required investments.  
 
65% of the bankers do not see the cohesion and correlation between the capital adequacy 
ratios a percentage and their profitability, risks of loans portfolio, investment strategies, risk 
appetite, or business analysis. All the CAR represent to the bank's management, and the 
board of directors is that its regulatory “thing” with a minim number that we should always 
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operate above and that is. This attitude is shown in the boardrooms and communications with 
the elusive management. Discussion of capital adequacy takes only a few minutes by the 
board of directors as far as it's above the minimum threshold to the CBB. It is a concept that 
is only talked about 4 times a year, and that then shelved until new board meeting. The 
literature from studies outside the Bahraini market and the data in this study showed the 
banks have always been above CAR even shortly before they are announced to have trouble 
down the road. CAR is not a factor in formulating investment strategies risk appetite or board 
and management remuneration in the banking industry. Remunerations of the executive 
management are based on the profitability of the bank. if profitability is flourishing while the 
CAR is stagnated or constant, they none of the management or executive management would 
be penalized or held accountable for that matter.  
 
Examining Basel II as a full set of regulations, the data informed us there are two groups of 
bankers, those who think Basel 2 regulations are bad for both bankers and the CBB and those 
who think Basel II regulations are not bad per se but the CBB’s supervision is the inefficient 
part in the process. On the one hand, to those who think Basel II regulations are bad 
attributed this assessment to the fact that the Basel II regulations are not one-size-fits-all kind 
of regulations. It does not take the peculiar characteristics of the national banking system, 
types of the business model (Islamic or conventional), developed or developing countries, 
commercial, retail or wholesale banks. It is bad for the CBB as it puts the CBB in the 
embarrassing situation of not being able to both apply the advanced approaches of 
implementing it entirely without significant variations. On the other hand, there are bankers 
who think that Basel II regulations are not deficient per se but how they are implemented or 
monitored by the CBB is the knot in the thread.  
 
I learned from this section that the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) does not reflect the 
essential operational risk faced by banks and it is not a valid and reliable measure for it. I 
also found that banks in Bahrain have the framework of identifying, measuring, and reporting 
operational risk loss events, yet they cannot utilize this capability to determine the 
commensurate capital requirements for this risk as the CBB still imposes the BIA. With 
regard to the credit risk, we found that banks do not find the Standardized Approach (SA) an 
appropriate measure of the credit in their lending portfolio given in their portfolio 
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geographical concentrations and the one-size-fits-all approach in SA. As the crux of Basel II 
regulations, we learned that banks do not find the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) as a whole, 
relevant to their operating environment. Finally, banks consider the CBB’s Basel II 
regulations and supervision bad due to the lack of suitability and relevance of the regulations 
to their environments.  
4.5 The competence and the role of the CBB in Basel II implementation  
 
In this section, we discuss the results related to the competence and the role of the CBB in 
Basel II implementation. I aim in this section to shed light on how important is the role of the 
regulator is to the success or failure of Basel II regulations. I segregate the discussions of the 
findings into two categories: regulations and supervisions. I follow this breakdown because 
these two categories are the crux of the mandate of every bank regulator.   
 
4.5.1 Regulation  
 
In this subsection, we firstly define regulation then examine the regulatory approach adopted 
by the CBB. I define regulatory approach as the economic and methodological scope of the 
design and implementation of regulations and supervisions. Within the economic scope, there 
are either micro-prudential regulations or macro-prudential regulations and supervisions.  
Within the methodological scope, there is either rules-based regulation or principles-based 
regulation61. The economic and methodological scopes are not mutually exclusive. These 
approaches can be applied in parallel; a regulator might apply a micro-prudential rules-based 
regulation or macro-prudential rules-based regulation. 
A regulatory approach must be communicated well; the regulator and the regulated entities 
should be on the same page. If the regulator claims that he is applying a certain regulatory 
approach while the regulated perceives the regulation as something other than what is 
perceived by the regulator, then this indicates the following: 
• The regulator does not fully understand the regulatory approach,  
• The regulated does not know the difference between the approaches, and/or 
                                                 
61 BCBS applied the same definition in a number of its papers, such as “Regulatory Consistency Assessment 
Programme (RCAP) Assessment of Basel III regulations – Switzerland. June  2013  
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• There has been miscommunication while setting or designing the regulations and 
requirements, i.e., there has been no dialogue.  
 
This subsection discusses the bankers’ descriptions of the regulatory approach followed by 
their perceptions of the CBB and its effectiveness. I posed a question in the survey to gauge 
whether or not the bankers’ perspectives or understanding of the nature of regulation policy in 
the country were aligned with what was carried out in practice, that is, we wanted to see if the 
bankers and regulators were on the same page when it came to regulation. Gauging this 
phenomenon is very important because of communication between the regulator and regulated 
forms a milestone towards effectiveness in regulation design and efficiency in its 
implementation. It also reveals the effectiveness and openness of the regulator to sharing 
information about its regulation and supervision. There was a dichotomy in opinions amongst 
bankers with regard to this question. In this study, 75% of the bankers perceive the CBB 
regulatory approach as “rules-based,” but CBB officials and the CBB website are insistent that 
the CBB approach is not rules-based but instead risk- and principles-based regulation. (Table 
4.23). Approximately 40% of the interviewees attribute this magnificent variation between the 
CBB and bankers’ perceptions of the “lack of knowledge, and laziness in striking difference 
between the two, by the CBB officials” (Interviewee 7). Thus, the responses of the dominant 
majority of the surveyed bankers contradicted the CBB’s own description of its regulation 
approach as ‘focused and principles-based,' as stated on its website. In addition, Interviewee-
CBB 4, who is a senior CBB official, clearly stated the following:  
“We cannot let them [banks] work on a principles-based approach; they would be ruining everything 
we have built so far. If we operate on a principles-based approach, everyone will do as they wish and 
like. Bankers in Bahrain should be controlled tight; if we lose our grip on them, we would not be a 
reputable financial center anymore.” 
Response Response Percentage 
Principles-based approach 0.0% 
Rules-based approach 75.0% 
Principles and rules- based approach 25.0% 
Table 4.23 Bankers perspectives of the CBB regulatory approach   
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I asked Interviewee 23 about his description of the CBB regulatory approach and the 
practical explanation of the ramifications amongst bankers and the CBB in that respect.  
 
Interviewee 23: CBB follows a hard-core rule-based approach for sure. When I meet fellow bankers, 
we always say the same thing: the CBB sometimes act as a management of the bank more than a 
regulator.  
 
Interviewer: That is interesting. Would you care to throw more light on that?    
 
Interviewee 23: look at their recent requirements, and you would know what I mean. The CBB wants to 
know every person on the management how much they get in salaries, benefits, remunerations, etc. in 
the appointment; they even went so far to stipulate which specific certificates the head of finance, 
internal audit or risk manager should take.  For example, they ask every CEO [chief Executive 
Officer] to have a master degree. Why would you Mr. Regulator want the Master degree for a CEO? 
This is leadership position attained by experience and connections in the markets, not by a master 
degree.  
Interviewer: but what is wrong with putting the minimum standard for education and professional 
qualifications for important posts such as the CEO? 
 
Interviewee 23: I am not against the minimum standard; I am against going unnecessarily micro in 
stipulating the specific certificates. Would it not be more prudent and sensible to ask banks the 
following “every bank should hire to these posts a high caliber and experienced staff?  Do you call 
naming the certificates and the exact number of years as minimum experience principle or rules based!  
 
Twenty interviewees shared the same discontent with the approximate wording of 
interviewee 23 that the CBB regulatory approach is rules-based rather than principles-based.   
 
I should now seek to understand the reasons behind the variation in views between the CBB 
and the banks then we should understand the implications of this variation in relation to 
Basel II implementation. For this purpose, we cite the response of interviewee 24 and 
interviewee 10 as examples.   
 
Interviewer: how would you explain the variations between the CBB and the banks about the 
regulatory approach followed in the country?  
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Interviewee 24: I could think of two explanations. First, both parties do not know the difference 
between the rules-based or principles-based approach [laughing], and the second is there are obvious 
miscommunications between the two parties, i.e. these people do not talk well to each other.   
 
Interviewer: you as a risk manager for a long time in the country and with your bank, which 
explanation you seem mostly relevant?  
 
Interviewee 24: I am frankly inclined to accept the two. Let us start with the second one I mentioned to 
you. The banking environment here is different compared to, say, London. In London for instance, the 
banking environment there is like a community. Banking there is built on trust, dialogue. 
 
Interviewer: I apologize for interruption, but I really want to understand your point of trust 
 
Interviewee 24: By trust, I mean the regulator there, actually not only in the UK, in so many countries 
as well, does not deal with banks as rogue unless strictly monitored or negligent unless taught and 
supervised. On the contrary, the relationship is open and transparent. In such environment, the 
communication would inevitably be optimized in a sense that the regulator and the regulated entities 
are both on the same page in terms of the regulatory approach, the objectives, etc. the situation here is 
entirely different. Here, I do not sense from all these years of experience in the bank and the country 
that the CBB is dealing with us based on trust or even it strives to instill this culture in the system. The 
CBB I guess opted for the Police kind of mentality, which always assume that you are guilty unless we 
check, verify, and see if you are innocent and what we say go with no argument.  
 
Interviewer: would you be able to relate what you expounded to Basel II implementation in the country 
and what would you recommend to the CBB in this respect?  
 
Interviewee 24: Basel II, as well as all other recommendations issued by Basel Committee,  is full of 
rules as well as general guidance we may call them principles. Even though Basel II embeds many 
rules but each central bank can still apply national discretion to ameliorate these rules to fit the 
peculiarities of the banking system they are regulating. I would recommend that the CBB adopts Basel 
II or any other regulations, but with more emphasis on the spirit of the rules, I mean the principle, 
rather the mere rules-adherence kind of approach.   
 
Interviewee 10 approached the answer from a different angle, as follows:  
 
Interviewee 10: I explain the variation due to the marketing impact on the CBB… The CBB wants to 
market Bahrain as the financial hub not only in the region but also in the whole Middle East. There is 
a rating of the country; the IMF [International Monetary Fund] is also monitoring and issued a report 
on the country and its banking system. Therefore, it looks nicer to say that we regulate banks based on 
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principles-based rather than rules-based approach. It conveys to the rating agencies, IMF, etc. that 
there is maturity amongst the constituencies of the banking system. Both the regulator and the 
regulated as are competencies and transparent enough to understand each other objectives. 
Nevertheless, in reality, I truly believe that the CBB very much know that they are not doing it [the 
regulation] by principles-based because if they are why would we have all these concerns about them. 
I would also tend to say that from my interactions with both senior and junior CBB officials I do not 
believe they really know the difference.  
 
I examined the CBB’s Rulebooks to explore if it spells out its regulatory approach in its 
Modules, but we have not seen a mention to that effect. I only found a mention of it on the 
website, which says, “CBB requirements are risk-focused and principles-based, as well as 
tailored to different categories of the licensee and the variable nature of supervisory risks that 
they pose.”(CBB, 2016).    
 
Moving to the regulation design, meaning the parameters or options chosen by the regulator 
and then given to the banks and the methods for communicating the requirements of the 
standards in relation to Basel II regulation. Although the CBB adopts Basel II, this accord 
gives banking regulators like the CBB some discretion and allows them to choose the options 
that are more relevant to their objectives. In addition, even in areas where Basel II and III do 
not give the central bank discretion, these accords enable the central bank to modify the rules 
to fit its environment. As we expounded in Chapter Two, Pillar 1 is quite straightforward 
given the threshold. It does not require extensive work, unlike Pillar 2. Banks in Bahrain 
have confirmed to Pillar 1, the CAR calculation because it has been imposed by the CBB 
since 2007. In addition, both the banks and the CBB disclose the CAR level in their annual 
and economic reports, respectively. It is only Pillar 2 that we did not find disclosed in the 
banks’ annual reports or in the CBB’s literature. I reviewed the CBB Rulebook, for both 
Islamic banks and conventional banks, and we did not find a specific regulation outlined in it 
for Pillar 2. Although we discussed Pillar 2’s requirements in Chapter Two, we will briefly 
define it here in order to put the results in perspective. Pillar 2 encompasses the measurement 
of all risks other than credit, market, and operational risks, as they are already covered under 
Pillar 1. Further, Pillar 2 includes the banks’ measurement methodologies to ensure that the 
capital requirements calculated in Pillar 2 are reflective of and commensurate with the banks’ 
banking and trading books. All these measurements are detailed in a document called the 
‘ICAAP.' I wanted to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the CBB in addressing the 
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Pillar 2 requirements. I started with liquidity risk management  owing to its importance to all 
banks, and we asked banks whether or not they found the CBB’s design of its regulation and 
supervision of liquidity risk commensurate with the banks’ business models and reflective of 
their liquidity risks. Some 86% of the bankers found the CBB ineffective and adopting a one-
size-fits-all approach to managing liquidity risk in the banking system in the country. I also 
found that this view was stronger at conventional banks than Islamic banks; 97% of the 
respondents from conventional banks perceived that the CBB’s design of its liquidity risk 
management was not aligned with their banks’ business models, compared to only 71% of 
the respondents at Islamic banks. 
 
Response 
Response 
Percentage 
Yes, we find the CBB’s regulation and supervision of liquidity risk 
adequate and commensurate with our bank’s risk appetite and profile and 
thus, should be maintained. 4.2% 
Yes, but the CBB needs to improve its reporting requirements for liquidity 
risk to reflect a bank’s type of license and business model. 7.5% 
Indifferent 2.5% 
No, the CBB adopts a one-size-fits-all approach to liquidity regulation and 
supervision for all types of bank licenses. 28.3% 
No, the CBB does not currently have formulated regulation and supervision 
for liquidity risk relevant to our bank’s type of license. 57.5% 
Table 4.24 Assessment of the CBB’s design of liquidity risk regulation and supervision (All 
banks) 
Response 
Islamic 
banks  
Conventional 
banks 
Yes, we find the CBB’s regulation and supervision of liquidity 
risk adequate and commensurate with our bank’s risk appetite 
and profile and thus, should be maintained. 9.4% 0% 
Yes, but the CBB needs to improve its reporting requirements 
for liquidity risk to reflect a bank’s type of license and business 
model. 13.2% 3% 
Indifferent 5.7% 0% 
No, the CBB adopts a one-size-fits-all approach to liquidity 
regulation and supervision for all types of bank licenses. 26.4% 30% 
No, the CBB does not currently have formulated regulation and 
supervision for liquidity risk relevant to our bank’s type of 
license. 45.3% 67% 
  Table 4.25 Assessment of the CBB’s design of its liquidity risk regulation and supervision     
(by bank type) 
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I now discuss the respondents’ assessment of how successful the CBB was in outlining 
regulations and providing guidance for the ICAAP, the single most important document, for 
the reasons indicated above. I asked in the survey “has the CBB given your bank sufficient 
guidance and utilize ICAAP document.” As illustrated in Table 4.26, only 7% of the 
respondents thought that the CBB gave them guidance regarding compliance to the ICAAP, 
4% of whom believed that this guidance was not sufficient. The dominant majority found 
that the CBB failed to provide supervisory guidance for ICAAP compliance. I asked 
interviewees about their assessment of the CBB’s work on ICAAP. I cite findings from 
Interviewee (23) as an example because it was rather elaborate compared to other responses. 
Interviewee 23 described the reason behind this failure as follows:  
 
Interviewer: What is your assessment of the CBB’s work on ICAAP regulation and supervision? 
 
Interviewee 23: It was minimal. The CBB just sent a circular to all banks asking them to prepare for 
the ICAAP, and that was it. There was no guidance, no regulation, nothing else. 
Interviewer: What do you expect the CBB to provide you in this respect? 
 
Interviewee 23: I expect them to provide something similar to the module on capital adequacy, such as 
details of methods to be used and which method is preferred for each risk, for example, why a method 
is appropriate or not for concentration risk, liquidity risk, and so forth. A regulator who wishes its 
banks to satisfactorily implement the ICAAP should give them two things—clear directions and 
qualified people to follow up on the banks. The CBB did not give us clear directions; it did not give us 
anything on how to quantify risks and how to do stress testing, and they did not send qualified people, 
who, when they come to inspect us, can add value to our banks or say what is wrong or not in our 
ICAAP implementation. 
 
Interviewer: Why, in your opinion, did the CBB not do those? 
 
Interviewee 23: The reason is simple—they are not qualified to do the job. They are not competent to 
talk about the quantitative measurement of concentration risk and liquidity risk, technical details of 
stress testing, and economic capital. 
 
Interviewer: If the CBB is not competent, then why, in your opinion, is it imposing Pillar 2 of Basel II? 
Why not implement just Pillar 1? 
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Interviewee 23: The reason, again, is simple—the CBB does not want the country to be seen as that 
which only partially implemented Basel II. That does not sell well to the rating agencies and the IMF 
[International Monetary Fund]. It is politics, my friend. Just politics. 
 
Interviewer: How would that affect you then? I mean, when you do not receive guidance about how to 
get the ICAAP done? How do you satisfy the CBB then? 
 
Interviewee 23: Banks have two choices—either prepare the ICAAP internally, which, in banks that do 
not have people with quantitative and conceptual understanding, will be done haphazardly, or ask an 
audit or consultancy firm to do it for them. In both cases, the document is just prepared and sent to the 
CBB so that the banks can say that they satisfied the CBB requirement. The CBB does not use it [the 
document] or does not understand it, and we do not hear back from the CBB after we submit it. 
 
Interviewer: What about you? Do you utilize it [the document] internally at your bank? 
 
Interviewee 23: Frankly? No one knows or cares what is in it. 
Interviewer: what I get from your statement is that neither the CBB nor your bank cares about the 
whole exercise of ICAAP. Is that correct?  
 
Interviewee 23: absolutely.  
 
I examined the annual reports of the banks we interviewed to see if the ICAAP framework 
has been highlighted and if the banks disclose how they use or design / methodologies of 
their ICAAP. I found that every single bank of the 26 banks mentioned in their annual report 
that they have an ICAAP framework in place but none of these banks disclose or give an 
indication to the methodologies adopted to design the ICAAP framework. I have also noticed 
in the annual reports that the disclosure about ICAAP is generic in a sense that it focuses on 
just stating that they have the ICAAP then delve into the definitions of the underlying terms 
rather than focusing on their peculiar framework. Interviewee 25 explains the reasoning 
behind this as follows:  
 
Interviewee 24: it is a dichotomy; banks either develop their ICAAP internally or hire an external 
auditor and/or consultancy firms to do it for them. If they hire the consultant to do it, then they would 
not know how it has been done so it would be understandable if they do not disclose enough 
information about it in the annual report. If they developed internally, then it is considered as 
confidential because it should, in principle, enlists all the risks they are exposed along with their 
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quantifications. Again, it would be understandable not to disclose it that is unless the CBB specifically 
asks for such disclosure, which currently it does not.  
 
Response  
All 
banks  
Yes, the CBB gave us sufficient guidance to formulate our ICAAP. 2.5% 
Yes, the CBB gave us guidance, but it was neither sufficient nor precise and did 
not clarify the requirements. 4.2% 
Indifferent 6.7% 
No, the CBB required us to prepare an ICAAP without giving us any guidance 
for the preparation. 22.4% 
No, the CBB has not required our bank to prepare an ICAAP. 64.2% 
 Table 4.26 Assessment of the CBB’s design of its ICAAP regulation and supervision (all 
banks) 
In the ICAAP, after calculating the capital charge required for all risks other than those 
calculated for Pillar 1, a reassessment of those in Pillar 1 leads to an aggregate capital charge 
called economic capital. I asked interviewees about their definition of economic capital 
before and discussed with them the findings of the survey and their explanation and 
interpretation of the matter. I cite three examples of these responses below:  
Interviewee 22: A capital that could absorb all the loss to the extent that the bank can continue its 
operation without default or bankruptcy.  
Interviewee 3: a capital calculation that has a wider scope than the scope of the regulatory capital 
calculated in and for CAR… it is more accurate than the regulatory capital 
Interviewee 15: it is the bank’s internal assessment of every single material risk it is exposed to. It is 
internally measured by the bank without the imposition of any standard risk weights percentages. It is 
a capital that is calculated by the management that gives it an idea about the solvency of the bank and 
how sustainable is its growth rate.  
By these definitions, economic capital as in Basel II accord is the ultimate objective of 
quantifying, and not the regulatory capital in Pillar 1.  
I sought to gather data about the status of the CBB’s regulation and supervision of economic 
capital from the bankers’ experience and to find out whether or not they considered the CBB 
effective or helpful in this respect. Approximately 84% of the respondents, 96% of whom 
were respondents from conventional banks, did not consider the CBB to be effective in the 
regulation and supervision of economic capital. 
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 Response 
All 
banks  
Yes, we find the CBB’s regulation and supervision of the economic capital 
framework helpful and adequate for our needs. 0.8% 
Yes, but the CBB’s regulation and supervision of the economic capital framework 
are not sufficient for our needs. 9.2% 
Indifferent 6.7% 
No, we do not find the CBB’s regulation and supervision of the economic capital 
framework helpful. 
12.5
% 
No, the CBB does not currently have a regulation, guidance, or supervision 
program for the economic capital framework and practices. 
70.8
% 
Table 4.27 Assessment of the CBB’s design of its economic capital regulation and 
supervision (all banks) 
Response 
Islamic 
Banks  
Conventional 
banks  
Yes, we find the CBB’s regulation and supervision of the 
economic capital framework helpful and adequate for our 
needs. 
2% 0% 
Yes, but the CBB’s regulation and supervision of the 
economic capital framework are not sufficient for our needs. 
17% 3% 
Indifferent 13% 1% 
No, we do not find the CBB’s regulation and supervision of 
the economic capital framework helpful. 
17% 9% 
No, the CBB does not currently have a regulation, guidance, or 
supervision program for the economic capital framework and 
practices. 
51% 87% 
  Table 4.28 Assessment of the CBB’s design of its economic capital regulation and 
supervision (by bank type) 
Another essential part of Pillar 2 is the stress testing, which is a process of identifying 
plausible relevant worst-case scenarios against which a bank assesses the impact on its credit 
and investment portfolio’s profitability, liquidity, and so forth. The BCBS (2006, P255) 
specifically states that ‘rigorous, forward-looking stress testing that identifies possible events 
or changes in market conditions that could adversely impact the bank should be performed.' I 
asked the bankers in the survey if they considered the CBB’s design of its stress testing 
regulation helpful to their banks. Some 97% of the respondents from conventional banks did 
not consider the CBB’s regulation helpful, 87% of whom indicated that the CBB did not have 
any regulation on stress testing. Interestingly, 15% of the respondents from Islamic banks did 
not know whether the CBB’s design of its stress testing regulation was helpful or not, while 
another 15% of them found the CBB’s design of such regulation helpful. In contrast, 87% of 
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the respondents from conventional banks thought that the CBB did not have stress testing 
regulation in the first place and thus, were unable to assess whether it was helpful or not. 
 Response 
Islamic 
banks 
Conventional 
banks 
Yes, we find the CBB’s regulation and supervision of the 
stress-testing framework helpful and adequate for our needs. 4% 0% 
Yes, but the CBB’s regulation and supervision of the stress-
testing framework are not sufficient for our needs. 11% 1.5% 
Indifferent 15% 1.5% 
No, we do not find the CBB’s regulation and supervision of 
the stress-testing framework helpful. 17% 10.4% 
No, the CBB does not currently have a regulation, guidance, or 
supervision program for the stress-testing framework and 
practices. 53% 86.6% 
Table 4.29 Assessment of the CBB’s design of its stress testing regulation and supervision 
(by bank type) 
The implications of the above findings on stress testing and economic capital are that if the 
CBB does not a have a perception of the worst case scenarios facing banks it supervises it 
would be caught by surprise if one or more financial institution suddenly faces a financial 
problem. Caught in the midst of a crisis facing one or more banks could either make the CBB 
make inappropriate decisions or keep silent for not knowing how to react. The latter is what 
happened in the crisis of 2007. Interviewee 17 shared with us his experience during the crisis 
of 2007. He said:  
Interviewee 17: The CBB clearly told us that you are on your own. They called us for a meeting and 
told us that we are not going to bail out any bank and we are not going to force you to take any action. 
You manage it [the crisis] on your own. What we want from you is to report to us your liquidity status 
on a weekly basis.  
Interviewer: was a surprising stance to you as a bank?  
Interviewee 17: Not really, for we know that it is a kind of management-by-crisis in the domestic 
environment. The CBB did not see that crisis coming; that explains why it could not take a stance.  
Interviewer: Do you think a period stress testing is a helpful tool to order to see or forecast the crisis 
coming, as you described.  
Interviewee 17: Of course. Stress testing is a very much helpful tool for us [banks] and the regulator to 
plan for the worse.  
 
Finally, in relation to the survey questions in the section ‘regulatory tool’ about whether or 
not the bankers found the SA and BIA appropriate for their calculations of the CRWA and 
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ORWA, respectively, we sought the bankers’ opinions on the appropriate design of the 
calculations if they deemed the above approaches inappropriate. Approximately 93% of the 
bankers recommended opting for advanced approaches, such as the FIRB or AIRB. The 
respondents from conventional banks seemed more eager to adopt advanced approaches, with 
98% recommending such approaches, compared to only 87% of the respondents from Islamic 
banks recommending the same. 
Approach All banks 
Alternative standardized approach (SA) 7% 
Foundation internal rating approach (FIRB) 35% 
Advanced internal rating approach (AIRB) 58% 
Table 4.30 Preferred approach for calculating the CRWA (all banks) 
Approach Islamic banks Conventional banks 
Alternative standardized approach (SA) 13% 1.5% 
Foundation internal rating approach (FIRB) 21% 46.3% 
Advanced internal rating approach (AIRB) 66% 52.2% 
Table 4.31 Preferred approach for calculating the CRWA (by bank type) 
4.5.2 Supervision  
 
I defined supervision in Chapters One and Three as the activities undertaken by the regulator 
to ensure that the regulations are adhered to. These activities are mainly a) inspection visits 
by the banking regulator, b) reporting requirements, c) and off-site examination. For our 
purpose of examining the CBB’s supervision of Basel-based regulations, we raised questions 
in the survey about the processes for the CBB’s inspection visits, reporting requirements, and 
off-site examination. 
I start this subsection with the findings on whether or not the CBB takes into its consideration 
parameters such as business model, stage of bank’s growth, a bank’s risk appetite, etc. When 
it designs its supervisory program. A supervisory program encompasses three types of 
activities, namely the banking regulator’s inspection visits, reporting requirements, and off-
site examination.  I found, as shown in Table 4.32 that 86% of the respondents were not 
aware of the parameters used by the CBB to design its supervisory program for their banks, 
18% of whom believed that the CBB did not use any parameters but rather, adopted a one-
size-fits-all approach to supervision. None of the respondents from conventional banks 
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believed that the CBB followed a customized supervisory program, while 8% of the 
respondents from Islamic banks believe so. 
 
Responses 
All 
banks 
Yes, we find that the CBB’s supervisory program for our bank is designed based 
on these parameters. 3.3% 
Yes, we find that the CBB’s supervisory program for our bank is designed based 
on only a few of these parameters. 6.7% 
Indifferent 3.3% 
No, we find that the CBB uses a standard supervisory program for all banks that 
does not consider these parameters. 18.3% 
No, we are not aware of the parameters the CBB uses in designing the 
supervisory program for our bank. 68.3% 
   Table 4.32 Assessment of the CBB’s design of its supervisory program (all banks) 
 Assessment 
Islamic 
banks 
 Conventional 
banks 
Yes, we find that the CBB’s supervisory program for our 
bank is designed based on these parameters. 8% 0% 
Yes, we find that the CBB’s supervisory program for our 
bank is designed based on only a few of these parameters. 9% 4% 
Indifferent 6% 1% 
No, we find that the CBB uses a standard supervisory 
program for all banks that does not consider these parameters. 25% 13% 
No, we are not aware of the parameters the CBB uses in 
designing the supervisory program for our bank 53% 81% 
   Table 4.33 Assessment of the CBB’s design of its supervisory program (by bank type) 
The regulator’s staff carry out the supervisory program. Inspectors conduct on-site visits to 
examine the bank’s control and governance environments, risk management set-up, and 
compliance with all the rules. These responsibilities require that the regulator’s staff are up-
to-date with the regulation and sufficiently competent to ensure that the banks adhere to the 
regulations. I asked the bankers in the survey if they found the CBB staff competent to carry 
out the supervision tasks, particularly those related to Basel II. Table 4.34 shows that 
approximately 13% of the respondents found the CBB staff to have the limited competence 
to carry out such tasks, while 73% of the respondents found the CBB staff incompetent for 
such tasks. The results of the survey also show that the respondents from conventional banks 
had a more negative view of the CBB’s supervision staff than the respondents from Islamic 
banks. 
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Interviewee (17) explains the issue of the CBB’s competence in supervising the banks’ 
compliance with Basel II regulations. 
Interviewer: What is your assessment of the CBB staff’s competence—and by staff, I mean by staff at 
all levels, from junior staff to senior staff—in supervising adherence to Basel II regulations? 
Interviewee 17: There are a short answer and a long answer to this question. The short answer is that 
they—all of them—are not competent to do the job. 
Interviewer: Sorry to interrupt you, but can you please clarify what you mean by ‘job’ whether or not 
you are referring to both junior and senior staff by ‘they’? 
Interviewee 17: Yes, I mean all of them—they are not competent to do the job. They are not competent 
to supervise the implementation of Basel II or III because they do not have the skills, do not read, and 
do not have the experience. There is an issue of education with these people. Imagine, they send me 
junior staff from their inspection team who cannot distinguish between types of LCs [letters of credit] 
and argues with me that they have correctly done the calculations for the CAR [capital adequacy 
ratio]. My question to the CBB is, how can you send inspectors to check on my Basel compliance who 
did not fully study Basel requirements, who, if you take away their checklists, are totally lost, and who 
are unable to ask smart questions? You told me that you would not share this with the CBB, right? 
Interviewer: I confirmed to you that I would not disclose your name, title, bank, or nationality, but the 
content of what you share with me would be cited in my thesis. 
Interviewee 17: OK, no problem. That is fine, then. 
Response All banks 
Yes, we find the CBB’s inspection and examination staff competent to 
supervise our bank’s compliance. 1.7% 
Yes, but the CBB’s inspection and examination staff need to be up-to-date 
with the changes in the banking environment in order to give applicable and 
practical recommendations. 5% 
Indifferent 7.5% 
No, we find the CBB’s inspection and examination staff to have the limited 
competence to supervise our bank’s compliance. 12.5% 
No, we do not find the CBB’s inspection and examination staff competent to 
supervise our bank’s compliance. 73.3% 
Table 4.34 Assessment of the CBB staff’s competence in supervising banks’ Basel 
compliance (all banks). 
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Assessment 
Islamic 
banks 
Conventional 
banks 
Yes, we find the CBB’s inspection and examination staff 
competent to supervise our bank’s compliance. 3.8% 0% 
Yes, but the CBB’s inspection and examination staff need to be 
up-to-date with the changes in the banking environment in 
order to give applicable and practical recommendations. 9.4% 1.5% 
Indifferent 11.3% 4.5% 
No, we find the CBB’s inspection and examination staff to have 
the limited competence to supervise our bank’s compliance. 18.9% 7.5% 
No, we do not find the CBB’s inspection and examination staff 
competent to supervise our bank’s compliance. 56.6% 86.5% 
Table 4.35 Assessment of the CBB staff’s competence to supervise banks’ Basel compliance 
(all banks) 
 Assessment  All banks 
Annually, in the prudential meeting 28.3% 
Semi-annually, in the prudential meeting 2.5% 
Quarterly 2.5% 
During the inspection visits only 1.7% 
The CBB never asked us about a risk profile and appetite document 65% 
Table 436 Assessment of the frequency of the CBB’s supervision of banks’ risk profile and 
appetite (all banks) 
Assessment 
All 
banks 
Yes, we believe that the CBB relies on our ICAAP document in determining the 
supervision program for our bank. 2.5% 
Yes, but the CBB does not significantly rely on our ICAAP document in 
determining the supervision program for our bank. 4.2% 
Indifferent 6.7% 
No, we do not believe that the CBB uses our ICAAP document in determining the 
supervision program for our bank. 
16.6
% 
No, we do not believe that the CBB assesses our ICAAP document. 70% 
Table 4.37 Assessment of the CBB’s utilization of the ICAAP in determining the supervision 
program for banks 
The last aspect of supervision on which I focused in my data gathering is the reporting side. 
Reports are the administrative tools of control that the CBB has at its disposal to use on 
banks. It is their tool for gathering intelligence on banks’ financial performance. These 
reports are given very much attention by the CBB; the CBB rulebook is separated into parts, 
one for rules and regulations (named Part [A]) and one for the templates and specific 
requirements for filling in each cell of the templates within the reports. There are deadlines 
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for each report, and the CBB is obstinate about getting these reports by the deadlines.  The 
report that is most relevant to our discussion is the Prudential Regulation Report (PIR), 
which contains information about liquidity, income breakdown, CAR, etc.,  and is used as a 
supervision tool.  In this study, we wanted to gauge banker’s perceptions about the 
usefulness, helpfulness, and relevance of CBB reporting, in particular, Basel-related reports. I 
found that the reporting process of the CBB is viewed as useless, not helpful, and ineffective. 
60% of the respondents agreed that they do not receive any feedback from the CBB on these 
reports, and 24% believe that the feedback they received is useless and not helpful. Only 2% 
of the respondents found the CBB feedback and reports useful and helpful.  
In the interviews, the banker’s opinions and perceptions of the reporting process and how the 
CBB administers these reports were even harsher than the questionnaire results. The first 
point of concern in this context is the  fact that the CBB reports are designed by an external 
consultancy firm This fact is disgruntling to bankers; bankers interpreted this as a sign of 
inefficiency and lack of competence, and a lack of clarity of purpose and objectives. As a 
supervisory tool, reporting should connect with the objectives of the regulator; if the 
administrator of a tool is disconnected from the tool, then the regulated looks at the reporting 
process as a whole as a bureaucratic procedure (Hood, 1984; Moran 1986). The disconnect 
between the objectives of the reporting and its design is evident as in the following quote 
from Interviewee 5:  
The PIR is broken down into many sections ... the most relevant to banks is the CAR and large 
exposures sheets [each bank is supposed to list the largest 25 exposures with banks and nonbanks] ... 
the other sections are irrelevant.  They are out of our world. Because non-practitioners designed them.  
We communicated with the CBB that many of these sheets are not applicable, but the CBB still decided 
to go on with them.  Therefore, we have to fill them out for submission purposes.  
 
Ironically, instead of looking into the merit of the request by banks to make the reports more 
relevant for the banks’ business model, the CBB forced each bank to have the report 
reviewed by external auditors to ensure that the banks are not filling them out for submission 
purposes only.  
After the report is submitted, typically these reports ought to be acted upon so that banks 
would receive feedback from the CBB about large exposures, liquidity income distribution, 
and breakdown, the size of their regulatory capital, etc. However, the CBB only responds 
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when the CAR approaches the minimum threshold. 60% of the respondents asserted that they 
do not receive any feedback from the CBB, while 24% indicated that the feedback they 
received from the CBB is neither useful nor helpful. Lack of responsiveness from the CBB 
could be interpreted in several ways.  It is possible that the CBB treats these reports as a 
source of control; banks, from the point of view of the CBB, would have to be disciplined to 
adhere to deadlines even if the submitted reports end up shelved. I found that interviewees 
were inclined to ascribe this rigidness on the reports’ deadlines, yet bankers do not receive 
useful feedback to the lack of competence from the CBB side to analyze the reports, spot the 
problems or issues in them and take decisions to return to the bank with corrections actions. 
What moves us to adopt this interpretation is the rigidity and inflexibility that sometimes 
approaches irrationality by the CBB to the deadlines for submitting these reports. Financial 
figures are submitted prior to being audited merely to satisfy the CBB requirement that the 
report must absolutely be submitted on a specific day. I found that none of the bakers or the 
CBB official who agreed to meet with us could establish the reason behind these tight 
deadlines. 
I asked the bankers about the benefits of reporting to them and to the CBB itself. Any 
regulator that gathers periodic reports containing voluminous information must have a 
purpose, that is, there should be some uses of these reports. One major benefit of writing and 
submitting these reports is that they help the regulator determine whether the banks adhered 
to the regulations. If the regulator concludes that a bank violated the regulations, it usually 
works with the bank to ensure that it does not repeat the violation and provides guidance 
about compliance. I asked the bankers whether the feedback they have received from the 
CBB in their periodical reports were relevant to the objectives of Basel II regulations. 
Approximately 60%, as shown in Table 4.38, of the bankers stated that the CBB did not 
provide any sort of feedback on the periodical reports that they submitted to it, and 24% said 
that there was feedback but that it was neither useful nor helpful. 
Interviewee-7 described at length the CBB’s supervision of the reporting requirements: 
Interviewer: You are the head of finance at your bank. Your department is in charge of creating 
reports for the CBB, particularly those reports related to Basel regulations. Your department is also 
the one that directly receives the CBB’s feedback. How would you describe the CBB’s handling of the 
periodical reports submitted to it? 
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Interviewee 7: The way the CBB handles the reports is very inflexible, more like a box-ticking kind of 
thing. Yeah ... every banker I know here says so. The CBB is just piling up the reports; it makes our life 
miserable for submitting these reports on time, and once we submit them, nobody knows what happens 
to them. 
Interviewer: So, for the sake of keeping our discussion on track, please allow me to start with the 
design of the reports, then move on to the content of the reports, then the timing and deadlines, and 
finally, the effectiveness of the reporting requirements for Basel II implementation in the country. 
Interviewee 7: We submit many reports to the CBB, but the most important one is the PIR [prudential 
information returns; it is submitted on a quarterly basis and includes the detailed calculation of the 
bank’s CAR and the largest asset’s exposure, quality, and liquidity]. The report is not designed by the 
CBB; an external audit firm with whom the CBB has a very close and cordial business relationship 
prepares it. Moreover, this is the main problem that we face. ... The CBB staff come to us with many 
questions and claim that we have this and that mistake, but when we question the design of the PIR 
itself, we see that they are stuck, because they cannot makes sense of it. They just wish that we would 
fill out every single cell in the table. It does not matter whether it makes sense or not and whether it is 
applicable or not.  All that matters to the CBB is for us to complete the report and submit it on time. 
What is puzzling me, really, is why the CBB relies on an Excel-based report for Basel II designed by 
an external party. Don’t they have basic knowledge of Basel II to be able to design a report that 
includes everything they want so that they can make full use of the report? … Most of the time, I feel 
the CBB staff are just robots. ... They heard of something called ‘Basel’ internationally, announce that 
they are adopting it, ask audit firms to prepare the report template for them, and then, finally, send 
their staff to inspect banks’ compliance. … Regarding the content of the report, there is a good part, 
and there are unusual old tables. The good part is the calculation of the CAR sheets; all the rest, such 
as the liquidity risk sheet, does not benefit the CBB or us because it assumes that the bank handles its 
assets and liabilities in a static mode in every time bucket[the maturity of each item in the assets and 
liabilities side of the bank’s balance sheet] … The deadline for the report is the 20th of the month 
following the quarter end. First of all, why it is on the 20th day nobody knows. Does it give us time to 
get the audited figures for the quarter end and then plug them into the PIR? No, and the CBB does not 
care about that; they just want it on time on the 20th, and that is it. … How effective providing the PIR 
in the report that we submit to the CBB for Basel II implementation is not clear to me. As head of 
finance, I do not see any value; as long as we are above the minimum threshold, the CBB is happy. … 
We hear no comments, no discussions, nothing. Is it happy with this? I do not know, but if you ask me 
how useful these reports are to me or to the banking system as a whole in Bahrain, I cannot say. … 
Banks in Bahrain have basic banking activities; whether they implement Basel I or II, it does not 
matter a lot. The capital adequacy is not the problem; the problem is the governance, risk 
management, and internal control and asset quality issues. Nevertheless, unfortunately, all the CBB 
focuses on is capital adequacy. 
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 Response 
All 
banks 
Yes, we find the feedback from the CBB helpful to us in all areas of risk 
management and corporate governance. 2% 
Yes, we find the feedback from the CBB helpful to us but in limited areas of our 
risk management and corporate governance. 10% 
Indifferent 4% 
No, we do not find the feedback from the CBB helpful because it lacks precision 
and relevance. 24% 
No, we do not receive feedback from the CBB on our periodic reports. 60% 
 Table 4.38 Assessment of the CBB’s feedback on reports (all banks) 
The bankers’ assessment of the CBB supervision program, which includes the on-site 
inspection visits, reporting process, and off-site examination was that it was inefficient and 
not commensurate with their business model and needs. As the vital force to carry out the 
CBB supervision program, CBB staff in charge of inspection visits, reporting administration 
and off-site examinations are being assessed as incompetent, unqualified and inexperienced.  
 
4.5.3 Conclusion  
 
Bankers and the banks are not on the same ground. Bankers see CBB’s regulatory policy and 
supervision as rules-based while the CBB describe its approaches as principles-based. The 
interviews with the CBB officials revealed that the official stance contradicts with what the 
CBB markets its approach with. The CBB officials confirmed in our data that the country 
could not afford following the principles-based regulations because the government and the 
CBB officials do not trust the banking professional with the CBB. To the CBB officials, 
bankers are not trusted and unless they are directed by the minute detail of what they should 
and should not do they would ruin the banking system. As discussed in chapter three that the 
culture in the country of the governing bodies are not based on trust then verify kind of 
attitude and culture but instead, that every consist of every industry are guilty and prone to 
negatively impact the system they are operating in unless we intervene heavily from the 
beginning and set the stage well for them to perform according to meticulously drawn plan.  
The CBB micro-manage the banks by intervening in all material aspect of the banking 
industry, from the remunerations, the appointment of head senior  executives to the meeting 
attending fees, etc.  
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The variations between how the CBB describes itself to how the bankers see it indicates that 
there obvious miscommunications between the two. This, in turn, informed us that the 
banking industry is not like a community with shared values and protocols but merely like a 
police and rogue bankers. This gives us a picture of the institutionalism in the country, which 
is in in line with the political and economic environment of lack of transparency, trust, and 
believe in a rewarding governance structure at institutions. Even banks who blame the CBB 
or even the government of not being transparent and not trusting in their constituents they 
internally follow the same approach, knowingly or unknowingly. Akin to the relation of the 
CBB and the banks and how the CBB micromanage the banks while it should only run the 
task of a regulator, board of directors’ micromanage the bank on top of the management 
instead of being a monitoring body. The board, in many institutions, is caught up into who is 
hired or fired, promoted, the political affiliations of those who join the bank, even at junior 
levels, etc. The proper governance is that the management is on the front line and the board 
monitors and direct the movement. In Bahrain, and in banking particularly, the board is in the 
front, and the management is only representatives of the board due to the board engagement 
in other business.  
The bankers themselves do not see the board itself, as shown in the data, aware of the 
intricacies of the Basel II regulations and its implications neither are they seen as adequately 
aware of the risk management, corporate governance or risk appetite and strategy setting.  
In terms of formulating the appropriate regulatory policy, the CBB has not made progress 
toward intrinsically complying with the Basel II regulations as it only has a policy for capital 
adequacy as in Pillar 1 and Pillar 3 because it is linked to the IFRS 7 ( disclosure and 
transparency). The CBB has not formulated a policy for the most important pillar of the 
Basel II that is Pillar 2. The CBB did not develop a framework for dealing with the ICAAP 
submitted by the banks. The existing practice is that banks hired consultants to write for them 
an ICAAP document from scratch and then submitted to the CBB via the bank. The essence 
of the Basel II requirements is that it is the responsibility of the bank itself, and monitored by 
its board, to develop the ICAAP and outline its investment and credit strategies based on the 
routines in the ICAAP document. The CBB, as the bank regulator, is supposed to review 
every ICAAP document and before validating, it should ensure that the bank owns the 
document, i.e. the bank’s management, and its board are not cognizant of the content of the 
document and have a fair knowledge of how each risk has been parameterized and 
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quantified. Banks are aware that the current practice by the CBB is a ticking box exercise. 
Hence, it is not a major thing they should be worried about. Subsequently, it is fair to 
conclude, given this situation, that banks do not include the outcomes of the ICAAP 
document, as the majority of the bankers indicated so in the survey and the interview, into 
their credit and investment strategies or while they are outlining their risk appetite statement. 
Bankers attribute the silence of the CBB in making the expected progress in the area of 
ICAAP development to the competencies of the staff of the CBB to handle the quantitive part 
in particular of the ICAAP. The CBB officials themselves indicated that competent staff of 
could challenge and validate the calculations given by the banks based on the parameters and 
assumptions are chosen by the bank is a cumbersome task for its staff.  
In regard to the stress testing, the data shows that the CBB has not made noticeable progress 
in that area either. The CBB does not have hitherto regulatory requirements dedicated to 
stress testing. The CBB just obliged each bank to have a stress testing through a brief circular 
but left the whole exercise to the banks themselves to determine the scope and the depth of 
the stress testing. Stress testing is not being validated or challenged by the CBB, and the 
whole exercise is turned to be a formality. Long after the crisis of 2007 until now, many 
banks have submitted their semi-annual stress testing reports to the CBB and not once in any 
bank interviewed for this study has the CBB reverted with discussions, challenge, or 
calibration of the submitted results. That raise a question of the merits of such attitude by the 
CBB. Stress testing results could be if properly utilized, an important source for the CBB to 
anticipate idiosyncratic or systemic risks in the banking system.   
 
In regard to the supervision part, it has been identified that the supervision part of the CBB 
comprises of three tasks, period reporting. On-site inspection and off-site examination. The 
periodic reporting has been found to be non-value adding, routine, and ticking box exercise 
by both the CBB and the banks. These reports are of no use to the banks. They are merely 
reported to satisfy the CBB requirements. Once submitted, they are ditched on the bank's 
servers. The banks d not have evidence that the CBB utilize these reports in its 
communications with their respective banks. The only time they hear anything from the CBB 
concerning these reports is when they miss some “unfilled cell” or unfilled sheets. Otherwise, 
the reports are submitted and forgotten. Moreover, it has been found that the format and 
content of these reports are prepared as one-size-fits-all, i.e. they were not designed to cater 
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for the difference among banks in terms of their license of the business model. The CBB is so 
strict in receiving their reports as per the deadlines and very critical in highlighting a found 
mistakes or errors in the reports.  
Regarding the onsite inspection, the CBB does not carry out pre-visit due diligence to 
customize their visits to each bank. The CBB does not take into account prior to each visit 
the peculiar characteristics of each bank to design a customized inspection plan and strategy 
for each bank based on each bank’s risk appetite, credit and investment strategy, ICAAP, 
Stress testing, Basel II compliance or corporate governance. Instead, the CBB follows a 
predetermined inspection program that is applied to all the banks irrespective of the above 
characteristics. The bankers unanimously see inspection teams as not competent and unaware 
of the risk management, corporate governance, and Basel II requirements. 
 
In this section, we learned that the CBB and the banks are not on the same page in relation to 
the regulatory approach followed by the CBB. The CBB announces that it follows a 
principles-based approach while banks find that the CBB follows a strict rules-based 
approach of implementing Basel II. Concerning the supervision, we found that the majority 
of the banks do not find the CBB to be using any risk or governance-based parameters to 
design its supervision program. In other words, the CBB follows a one-size-fits-all 
supervision program that does not take the peculiar characteristics of the banks into 
consideration. Furthermore, the results showed us that banks do not find the CBB staff 
competent or qualified to administer Basel II regulations to meet the objectives of the CBB 
or the banks. Lastly, we examined the regulatory tools that the CBB adopts for Basel II 
implementation such as the stress testing, ICAAP (an essential Basel II requirements), and 
economic capital. I found that the CBB does not have, albeit expects banks to prepare for a 
stress testing and economic capital rules and regulations or guidance document. With regard 
to Basel II reporting, we learned that bankers consider Basel II reporting none value-adding 
and merely a ticking box exercise. Bankers discerned to the differences between the 
prudential set of reporting that is designed to assess, explore and rectify and that that set is 
designed for mere compliance with requests. In addition, we learned that neither banks nor 
the CBB take the ICAAP seriously. The ICAAP is utilized neither by banks in their daily 
operations nor by the CBB in designing their specific supervision program. Lastly, the data 
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informed us that the CBB had not addressed a commensurate set of regulations and 
supervision program of liquidity risk to the various business models of banks in the country. 
 
4.6 Banks’ Institutional Characteristics 
 
In this section, I explore banks institutional characteristics in relation to Basel II 
implementation at their banks. Doing so will help us understand the environment in which 
they operate and give context to their responses to whether they are for or against Basel II.  
The banking sector in Bahrain is a “cappuccino society.” The majority of the lower and 
middle management of the banks are Bahrainis. On top of this majority is a little bit of froth 
comprised of expatriates mostly from India, Pakistan, and the UK which makes the senior 
and executive management. On top of the froth is a little bit of Bahrainis or other Gulf 
countries national which makes the board of directors. The staff of the banking sector is not 
fairly well educated. Some of the senior executives have to be approved by the CBB prior to 
appointment. The CBB encourages banks, indirectly, to hire in the senior executive's position 
Europeans or Asian instead of Bahrainis. The CBB decision makers are of the opinion that 
Europeans and Asians bring along with the wealth of experience and skills that would benefit 
their institutions, as they will devise policies and procedures of a high standard. The 
evidence-informed us that all such banks contracted consultancy firms to prepare for them 
the risk management and corporate governance policies and procedures. The explanation of 
why the board of directors and the CBB favors expatriates over Bahrainis for senior 
executive management, albeit expatriates cost them more than Bahrainis, is that expatriates 
are entrusted to “go along” well with the implementation of the board's directives and 
strategies. The business of retail banks is focused on local markets. The menu of banking 
products is limited to consumer finance, mortgage loans, and trade finance. Wholesale banks 
are focused on syndications, private equity and wealth management. Similar to the cultural 
attributes of the all the institutions in the country, banks are managed with the same cultural 
mindset, banks are driven by the private interest of the board and the executive management 
rather than by the shareholders’. Hiring, promotion, and progress in this sector are not based 
on competencies, skills or educations but by the skin, political affiliations, and membership 
of the “ the club” mentality.” The criteria of to join this club can be summarized for the 
purpose of this study in two words ability “ go along” with what the board of directors and 
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executive management objectives and agenda. It is a heavily relationship-based sector. These 
relationships do not affect how institutions are managed but also affect the relationships 
between these institutions and the CBB. The closer the owner and the shareholders and 
members of the board are to the top official in the political and economic fabric of the 
country the more flexible is the CBB toward their supervisor of these institutions. When the 
CBB designs its regulatory or supervisory policy, it shops for what is available in the market 
Social responsibility among banker still not a popular topic in the country.   
For any regulations, policies or procedures to be implemented effectively at any entity, there 
is a need for the following to take place:  
• The governing body to supervise and monitor the implementation; in banks, this body 
is the board of directors,  
• A competent team to undertake the implementation; in banks, this team comprises of 
the executive management and senior management, namely: Chief Executive Officer, 
Chief Risk Officer, Chief Finance officer, Chief Internal Auditor, Chief Compliance 
Officer, and  
• An information system that enables processing and monitoring of the underlying 
outputs of the policies and procedures.   
In order for the governing body, i.e. the board of directors, to monitor the implementation of 
the regulations and policies, it should firstly be adequately aware of these regulations and 
policies.  
I, therefore, sought to explore the level of awareness of the board of directors at the banks in 
the sample of Basel II. I asked respondents in the survey whether their banks’ board of 
directors, after seven years of implementing Basel II, was adequately cognizant of the 
accord’s requirements and the implications of the implementations. Table 4.39 illustrates that 
approximately 46% of the bankers did not know whether their banks’ board of directors was 
knowledgeable of Basel II, and 10% asserted that their banks’ board of directors was not 
completely aware of Basel II requirements.  
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Response  
All 
banks 
Yes, the board of directors is fully aware of Basel II and all the relevant issues 
around its implementation. 12% 
Yes, the board of directors is adequately aware of Basel II and all the relevant 
issues around its implementation. 30% 
Indifferent 46% 
No, the board of directors is not adequately fully aware of Basel II and all the 
relevant issues around its implementation. 3% 
No, the board of directors is not aware of Basel II and all the relevant issues 
around its implementation. 10% 
 Table 4.39 Assessment of the board of directors’ knowledge of Basel II  
I examined the annual reports of the banks, and I found that these issues are never mentioned 
in them. The governance section of the annual reports addresses only the number of meetings 
attended by members of the board, the structure of each committee of the board, and a brief 
resume of each board member. The above findings are the perception of the bankers of the 
board of directors of their banks. Although the above findings give us an indication of the 
level of awareness of Basel II, they remain to be inconclusive because we should augment 
and compare the results with my direct meeting and interviews with the board of directors 
themselves. This, however, was not part of the scope of the data because of the intractable 
amount of time it would take to reach the members of the board of twenty-six banks included 
in the study, as most of the board's members are not Bahrain residents.  
 
Regarding the procedures that are in place to ensure adherence to Basel II, we asked the 
interviewees about how they managed the implementation of Basel II internally. All the 
banks either established a dedicated committee that was mandated to only monitor and 
ensure that the bank complies with the CBB’s Basel requirements or included this monitoring 
responsibility to the already existing Risk Management Committee.  
 
With regard to the information system, all banks in the interviews automated their process to 
complete the calculation in Pillar I of Basel II (the CAR). Banks acquired systems to perform 
the calculation, and the intervention of the banks’ staff are confined to the input of the 
required financial information. To validate this process, the internal auditors at each bank 
developed a checklist to ensure that the calculation and reporting process of Basel II are 
performed as required by the CBB. The staff is handling Basel II implementation, typically in 
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the Finance and Risk Management Departments are well trained and aware of the 
requirements.  
 
Conclusion 
 
I learned from this section that bankers’ assessment of the awareness of Basel II is 
dichotomous between not knowing whether the board is aware of Basel II and the assertion 
that it is adequately aware. I also learned that banks have in place appropriate information 
systems that enable them to sufficiently adhere to Basel II requirements. Banks in Bahrain 
has put significant investments in their institutions to comply with the CBB’s Basel II 
requirements. Committees were established to follow up on the implementation of the 
regulations, and IT systems were acquired to automate the calculations of the capital 
adequacy ratio.   
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 Chapter 5.  Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
This final and concluding chapter is divided into two parts. The first part starts with an 
overview of the dissertation then moves on to address the contribution of this research in 
terms of theory and methodology. After that, it draws conclusions from the data and the 
implications of these conclusions for banking regulation. The first part ends with the research 
design limitations and the potential scope of future research in this area of study. The second 
part of the chapter addresses recommendations, drawn from the data to the Central Bank of 
Bahrain (CBB).    
 
Part 1  
5.1 Overview of the dissertation  
 
In the opening chapter, we begin to understand the framework of banking regulations for the 
purpose of this study.  I attempt to answer five fundamental questions about banking 
regulations and the role of government in their design and implementation. After discussing 
these fundamental questions, we move to address the motivations for and the scope of the 
research followed by the research objectives we aim to achieve. After that, we highlight the 
contributions of the current research then moved on to address the research questions and 
hypothesis.  
 
Chapter Two reviews the literature on regulations and supervision in general with specific 
focus on Basel II.  
 
The theoretical framework and research methodology in the thesis are introduced in Chapter 
Three.  The purpose of this chapter is to describe a theoretical model for banking regulation 
in relation to the implementation of Basel II. This chapter also explains the methods of the 
research project and the chapter is divided into three parts. Part 1 describes the philosophical 
underpinnings of the research project. Part 2 describes the conceptual framework of Basel 
Accords regulations and supervision. Finally, part 3 describes the research method used in 
this project and explains the reasons for selecting ethnography as the research method. This 
is followed by a description of the data collection tools and analysis.  
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The Fourth Chapter illustrates the data found in the questionnaire and the interviews and 
shows the analysis of this data. A brief summary of the findings is addressed in section 5.3 
below. The discussions and the analysis are organized along the following themes; the 
questionnaire and the interviews were designed based on these themes:  
• Demographics and descriptive statistics 
• The role and impact of Base II; we raised questions in the interview soliciting views 
of the interviewees about whether or not base II and III are suitable for banks and for 
the whole banking system and asked them to justify their stance.  
• The appropriateness of the techniques and methods of Basel II (e.g. risk measures, 
ratios); this theme includes the interviewees’ responses to questions on the technical 
quantitative and qualitative requirements in Basel II and II, specifically, whether or 
not the requirements are reflective of and commensurate with a bank’s assets size and 
complexity. 
• The competence and the role of the CBB (regulations, supervision, inspection and 
reporting); this theme includes the interviewees’ descriptions of the regulatory 
environment in Bahrain. How, from the bankers’ perspective, are regulations 
designed and implemented? Are banking regulations fragmented or integrated within 
the whole economic system? What are the ‘rules of the game’? This theme includes 
the interviewees’ responses on how the CBB supervises Basel regulation. The 
supervision includes, specifically, inspection visits, off-site examination, and 
reporting requirements 
• The banks’ management practices and familiarities with Basel II concepts, 
requirements and implications; to appreciate the interviewees’ stances, complaints, 
and reservations about the regulation and supervision, we believe that it is necessary 
to understand the environment in which the interviewees work. What are the 
governance culture and attitude towards risk management and regulation in the 
interviewees’ work environment? What are the board’s and executive management’s 
attitudes towards regulation? This theme includes details provided by the 
interviewees that would help us interpret their responses to the other questions. 
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5.2 Contributions  
 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge regarding the implementation of Basel II in 
a developing country to two different types of banks, namely, conventional banks and 
Islamic banks, which feature different business models and sizes. This study should also 
contribute to the body of knowledge via a case study on how regulators in a country adopting 
Basel II could outline its regulation, create a supervision program and communicate its 
vision.  
 
This study is the first study on banking regulations on banks in Bahrain. It assessed the 
effectiveness of imposing Basel II regulations on Bahraini banks. It should give the CBB the 
perspectives of the banks in Bahrain about how Basel II regulations and supervision are 
being coped with and used. These perspectives may alter how the CBB plans its regulatory 
scheme and conducts its supervisory program. The findings of the study should result in the 
CBB re-visiting its scope of Basel II adoption. The study should also give the CBB a basis 
for future consideration to augment Basel II with other regulatory tools.  
 
Methodologically, this research is founded on the belief that if we are to understand how 
banks should be regulated and supervised, we must be able to view regulation and 
supervision from a socio-economic perspective. Furthermore, an interpretive position was 
adopted. If we subscribe to the socio-economical perspective of banking regulations and 
supervision, then insights into the social reality that prevails within the banks and regulator 
and various areas of risk and governance can be garnered by understanding the existing 
reality. Understanding this reality is achieved by understanding that banking regulations and 
supervision are not different from any social setting in which there are negotiations between 
its constituents on what meanings that they all ascribe to social reality. I view banking 
regulations as a social context influenced by culture, political and economic characteristics. 
A context that an interpretive qualitative approach was adopted in this research.  
 
5.3 Conceptual framework  
 
The data informed us that the existing conceptual framework that governs the banking 
system in the country is structured around private interest, administrative and cultural 
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theories. Aspects of new institutionalism and scope of cultures theories would need to be 
integrated into the framework in order to avoid all the pitfalls raised by the bankers as 
reported in the survey and interviews in this study. The part related to the public interest 
theory is that at the outset, the CBB’s driving motivations behind adopting Basel II and Basel 
III regulations are to make banks safer and banking system stable and resilient to protect the 
public interest.  Nevertheless, it was found that even though this is the announced motivation, 
the underlying interest that is saved is the private interest rather than the public interest. We 
saw the example that at the time banking licenses were generously given during 2006 and 
2007 in order to benefit the public by bringing more competition and the claim that that 
would reduce the cost of lending, enhance innovations and improve the customer's services 
by banks. Later on, it was found that the ultimate objective was the regional competition 
among some countries in the region to win the position of who is the “financial center and 
hub” for banks. When the crisis hit the banking system in several of these banks and faced a 
cutthroat competition in a small market like Bahrain with a low appetite for different banking 
products, those banks were encouraged to merge by the CBB again for the interest of the 
public to create “strong banks.” The overall regulatory and supervisory policy of the CBB are 
interpreted in light of the data in the study is that the CBB uses Basel II is an administrative 
tool. The CBB’s philosophy of dealing with banks as a government agency inherited control 
upon the consistent that obliged to honor their obligations to it by complying with the 
imposed rules and regulations. As in the administrative theory of regulations, a regulator 
approaching the task of regulation from the administrative perspective need some tools 
through which the constituents are controlled, covered or even punished. Ministry of 
commerce would control the merchants through price ceiling, for instance, the CBB used 
Basel II and Basel III as the administrative tool. Moreover, as per the administrative theory 
that each tool is chosen by the regulator to address a specific problem. The CBB seemed to 
want to address the stability and resilience of the banking system as the spepcifi problem it 
fights to resolve; the data showed us that the tool was not successful in addressing the 
problem. The tool did not work because of malpractices in administering the tool, the scope 
of implementing the tool and the lack of augmenting the tool with another tool that could 
potentially rectify the shortcomings of the tool (i.e. Basel II). The CBB has also adopted the 
second important part of the administrative theory, the periodic reporting mechanisms that 
the regulated entities should honor. The data showed us that these reports were administered 
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in ways construed by bankers as non-valued exercises, impractical, cumbersome and 
irrelevant with minimum or no regard to the underlying nature and characteristics of those 
obliged to adhere. From the cultural theory, we can see from the data the CBB administration 
of banking in general and Basel II implementation, in particular, is identical to the way the 
government regulates every economic phenomenon. A problem identified by the higher 
officials and a tool is devised based on the decisions of these officials to address this 
problem, narrowly from private political and economic interest, and proceed with 
implementation portraying this implementation as a public-interest practice. When the 
implementation turned out to be malfunctioning with considerable shortcoming, the tool is 
either enhanced, augmented, replaced or radically changed by the decisions of the same 
officials and re-introduced to the marketplace for implementation under the same “noble 
motivation,” public interest. In carrying out this implementation, the cultural values govern 
the conduct. These cultural values are: not giving trust to the constituents, monitor closely, 
micro manage in disguise, policies changed only if opposed by political or economic 
influential parties, and the end justifies the means (the end is the competition for the financial 
hub and center justified by adopting the means or tools). Furthermore, the cultural attribute of 
the banking system, in the country is that a regulatory body has to be staffed with those who 
share the common political, economic and social doctrine of the officials in charge; the 
competency is not a priority. From this angle, we can properly understand the data that 
showed how bankers responded to the questions regarding the skills and competencies of the 
CBB staff who inspect and examine their banks. 
 
5.4 Answers to the research questions  
 
In this section, I state the research questions outlined in section 1.8 and provide the answers 
to these questions based on the evidence the data provided in Chapter 4. Each question is 
showed in italics followed by the findings and discussions.  
 
How has Basel II implementation, in the context of the CBB Rulebooks, helped banks with 
risk management function and practice? Do banks see the existing regulatory program as 
effective in advancing their risk management practices? 
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I examined whether Basel II regulations help banks improve risk management. I started with 
the issue of the definition of risk management to make sure that the CBB, Basel II, and 
bankers have the same approach to the definition of risk management to streamline the 
discussions. I found that Basel II regulations and the CBB’s definition of risk management 
differ significantly. Basel II regulations focus on a generic set of principles of how the bank’s 
board of directors and executive management should handle the risk at the bank while the 
CBB focuses mostly on credit risk. I found that bankers, on the other hand, define risk 
management in an organizational and technical sense. Organizationally, risk management to 
bankers refers to the presence of well-resourced department entrusted to identify, measure, 
and monitor all the material risks a bank is exposed to. I also found that the CBB applies a 
static definition of risk management; a definition that does not take into consideration the 
rapid changes in the banking sectors concerning the methods of quantifications and internal 
control environment.  
 
The CBB relies on the influence of Basel II implementation in the country to directly or 
indirectly motivate banks to improve their risk management practices. The data revealed to 
us that the CBB does not address risk management at banks outside the context of Basel II 
regulations. I found that the influence expected of Basel II regulations to advance the risk 
management practices not appreciated by the practitioners. I learned from the data that risk 
management at banks is dynamic and proactive. Practitioners do not wait for the regulator to 
motivate them to improve and install the risk management practices that are appropriate for 
their needs. Instead, they develop or adopt tools and methodologies that are commensurate 
with their business models and the environments.  
 
How effective is the CBB in implementing Basel II in its banking system with the design of its 
regulation policy and supervisory program? 
 
The CBB implementation of Basel II regulations was found to be simplistic and superfluous 
because it focused only on the Pillar I requirements of Basel II regulations and ignored Pillar 
2, which addresses, albeit in generic principles form, risk management practices and culture. 
Due to that fact, banks manage risk management at their institutions by adhering to the 
requirement in the CBB’s rulebook that every bank has to have a dedicated independent risk 
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manager, but they go on their own way to determine the scope, the methodologies, and 
integration of risk management in their environments.   
 
I found that the CBB designs its banks inspection program with a mere focus on compliance 
to the CBB’s rulebooks instead of a comprehensive program that encompasses risk 
management, compliance, governance, etc. The implication of this unilateral focus was on 
banks’ incentives and attitude toward risk management at their banks and toward the CBB.  
 
 
Is the current CBB implementation of Basel II the optimal regulation for the Bahraini 
banking system? 
 
What we get from the survey results and the above example of interviews is that even though 
Basel II might boost or enhance the international competitiveness of some banks that are 
internationally active, it does not help other banks who are locally focused in their business. 
This implies that there is no definitive causal relationship between Basel II and the 
international competitiveness of banks.  
 
With regard to the appropriateness of Basel II’s methods to the banks in Bahrain, we learned 
that the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) does not reflect the essential operational risk faced 
by banks and it is not a valid and reliable measure for it. I also found that banks in Bahrain 
have the framework of identifying, measuring and reporting operational risk loss events yet 
they cannot utilize this capability to determine the commensurate capital requirements for 
this risk as the CBB still imposes the BIA. With regard to the credit risk, we found that banks 
do not find the Standardized Approach (SA) an appropriate measure of the credit in their 
lending portfolio given geographical concentrations and the one-size-fits-all approach in SA.  
With regard to the role and competence of the CBB to implement Basel II, we found that the 
CBB and the banks are not on the same page in relation to the regulatory approach followed 
by the CBB. The CBB announces that it follows a principles-based approach, while banks 
find that the CBB follows a strict rules-based approach for implementing Basel II. 
Concerning the supervision, we found that the majority of the banks do not view the CBB is 
using any risk or governance-based parameters to design its supervision program. In another 
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word, the CBB follows a one-size-fits-all supervision program that does not take the peculiar 
characteristics of the banks into consideration. Furthermore, the results showed us that banks 
do not find the CBB staff competence or qualified to administer Basel II regulations to meet 
the objectives of the CBB or the banks. Lastly, and in relation to the regulatory tool, we 
examined the regulatory tools that the CBB adopts for Basel II implementation such as the 
stress testing, ICAAP (essential Basel II requirements) and economic capital. I found that the 
CBB does not have, albeit expects banks to prepare and, a stress testing and economic capital 
rules and regulations or guidance document. With regard to Basel II reporting, we learned 
that bankers consider Basel II’s reporting none value-added and merely a box-ticking 
exercise. Bankers discerned the differences between the prudential set of reporting that is 
designed to assess, explore, and rectify and the set that is designed for mere compliance with 
requests. In addition, we learned that neither the banks nor the CBB take the ICAAP 
seriously. The ICAAP is utilized neither by banks in their daily operations nor by the CBB in 
designing the specific supervision program. Lastly, the data informed us that the CBB had 
not addressed a commensurate set of regulations and supervision program of liquidity risk to 
the various business models of banks in the country. 
 
Do banks prefer to be supervised by principles-based approach than by rules-based 
approach? 
 
There was a dichotomy in opinions amongst bankers with regard to this question. In this study, 
75% of the bankers perceive the CBB regulatory approach as “rules-based,” but CBB officials 
and the CBB website are insistent that the CBB approach is not rules-based but instead risk- 
and principles-based regulation. Approximately 40% of the interviewees attribute this 
magnificent variation between the CBB and bankers’ perceptions of the “lack of knowledge, 
and laziness in striking difference between the two, by the CBB officials.” Thus, the responses 
of the dominant majority of the surveyed bankers contradicted the CBB’s own description of 
its regulation approach as ‘focused and principles-based,' as stated on its website. In addition, 
Interviewee-CBB 4, who is a senior CBB official, clearly stated the following:  
Bankers and the banks are not on the same ground. Bankers see CBB’s regulatory policy and 
supervision as rules-based while the CBB describe its approaches as principles-based. The 
interviews with the CBB officials revealed that the official stance contradicts with what the 
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CBB markets its approach with. The CBB officials confirmed in our data that the country 
could not afford following the principles-based regulations because the government and the 
CBB officials do not trust the banking professional with the CBB. To the CBB officials, 
bankers are not trusted and unless they are directed by the minute detail of what they should 
and should not do they would ruin the banking system. As highlighted in chapter three that 
the culture in the country of the governing bodies are not based on “trust then verify” kind of 
attitude and culture, instead, that every consistuent of every industry are guilty and prone to 
negatively impact the system they are operating in unless we intervene heavily from the 
beginning and set the stage for them to perform.  
The CBB micro-manage the banks by intervening in all material aspect of the banking 
industry, from the remunerations, the appointment of head senior  
executives to the meeting attending fees, etc.  
The variations between how the CBB describes itself to how the bankers see it indicates that 
there obvious miscommunications between the two. This, in turn, informed us that the banking 
industry is not like a community with shared values and protocols but merely like a police and 
rogue bankers. This gives us a picture of the institutionalism in the country, which is in line 
with the political and economic environment of lack of transparency, trust, and believe in a 
rewarding governance structure at institutions. Even banks who blame the CBB or even the 
government of not being transparent and not trusting in their constituents they internally follow 
the same approach, knowingly or unknowingly. 
Do banks see the current supervisory program effective in addressing all the risks they are 
exposed to? 
 
The supervisory activities are mainly a) inspection visits by the banking regulator, b) 
reporting requirements, c) and off-site examination. Only 13% of the respondents found the 
CBB staff to have the limited competence to carry out the inspection tasks fir Basel II and 
non-Basel II assignments while 73% of the respondents found the CBB staff incompetent for 
such tasks. The results of the survey also show that the respondents from conventional banks 
had a more negative view of the CBB’s supervision staff than the respondents from Islamic 
banks. Reports are the administrative tools of control that the CBB has at its disposal to use 
on banks. It is their tool for gathering intelligence on banks’ financial performance. I found 
that the reporting process of the CBB is viewed as useless, not helpful, and ineffective. 60% 
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of the respondents agreed that they do not receive any feedback from the CBB on these 
reports, and 24% believe that the feedback they received is useless and not helpful. Only 2% 
of the respondents found the CBB feedback and reports useful and helpful. An external 
consultancy firm designs the CBB reports. This fact is disgruntling to bankers; bankers 
interpreted this as a sign of inefficiency and lack of competence, and a lack of clarity of 
purpose and objectives. As a supervisory tool, reporting should connect with the objectives 
of the regulator; if the administrator of a tool is disconnected from the tool, then the regulated 
looks at the reporting process as a whole as a bureaucratic procedure. The CBB only 
responds when the CAR approaches the minimum threshold. 60% of the respondents asserted 
that they do not receive any feedback from the CBB, while 24% indicated that the feedback 
they received from the CBB is neither useful nor helpful. 
 
Do banks see the existing supervisory program as effective in aligning the regulation to their 
risk profile and appetite? 
 
The data shows that the concepts of risk appetite and risk culture do not seem to be 
adequately contextualized by these officials. The implications of this misconception of risk 
appetite from the regulators are that if the regulators are not certain about the concept of the 
risk appetite or they do not define it as it is defined in the industry’s literature there would be 
miscommunications between the regulators and the bankers on the subject. This 
miscommunication is manifested by the fact that the CBB cannot assess what the banks 
produce in terms of risk management policies in order to determine if these banks are 
operating according to their limits. In addition, in Basel II accord there are stipulations that 
refer to having “an appropriate risk appetite of the institutions” about the type of approach 
used to quantify the capital requirements. Because of this misconception, the CBB believes 
that it is already giving banks the guidance and the requirements needed to build an 
appropriate risk appetite framework as stated in the above two quotations while 65% of the 
bankers said that the CBB has never asked them about their risk profile, appetite or strategy. 
That is in spite of the fact that 55% of the respondents affirmed that they have an updated 
risk profile, appetite, and strategy 
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The data show an evidence of the gap that the regulators assert that they have the necessary 
checks and balances to monitor risk appetite at banks while 65% of the banks indicate that 
the regulators have never asked them about their risk appetite, profile, and strategy. The 
annual reports of all the banks in the sample showed no reference to the risk appetite and 
profile and how they are integrated into their strategy setting and risk management.  
 
Do banks see Basel II implementation and its capital adequacy requirements as reflective of 
their essential risks and performance? 
 
As the crux of Basel II regulations, we learned that banks do not find the Capital Adequacy 
Ratio (CAR), as a whole, relevant to their operating environment. Banks consider the CBB’s 
Basel II regulations and supervision bad due to the lack of suitability and relevance of the 
regulations to their environments.  
5.5 Conventional Versus Islamic Banks  
 
Conventional banks are more than Islamic bank in not finding benefits of Basel II 
implementation. This could be explained by the fact that conventional banks were established 
more than the Islamic banks in terms of processes and operations. Conventional banks are 
more mature, and they gradually built the risk management set up through the experience of 
the staff, lesson learned from the current practice as well as the Basel I.  
Islamic bank business model with no interest and lending are backed by assets in addition to 
not transacting in the hedging instruments immunize them from exposure to some risks, but 
they will not immunize them from market or liquidity risk because they are part of the 
system. For example, if the international interest rate level were rising, Islamic banks would 
inevitably raise eventually their interest rate on the lending portfolio because the borrowing 
has become an expense for them.  
There is a noticeable difference between the bankers from Islamic banks and those from 
conventional banks regarding the concept of the CAR as a sufficient indicator of a bank’s 
risks. Approximately 88% of the respondents from conventional banks did not see a 
relationship between the CAR and the risks input into the CAR calculation. Only 65% of the 
respondents from Islamic banks shared the above opinion, while another 26% of the 
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respondents from Islamic banks believe that the CAR was the right measure for their banks’ 
risks. 
9.4% of the Islamic bankers find the CBB’s regulation and supervision of liquidity risk 
adequate and commensurate with our bank’s risk appetite and profile and thus, should be 
maintained while 0% of the conventional banks share the view. Furthermore, 45.3% of the 
Islamic banks do not find the CBB to currently have formulated regulation and supervision 
for liquidity risk relevant to banks’ type of license.  
 
In regard to the CBB’s regulatory and supervisory framework for economic capital, 13% of 
Islamic banks are unaware of the economic capital and its implications while only 1% of the 
conventional banks are shown to be unaware.  
 
In regard to the stress testing, 15% of the Islamic banks are unaware of the stress testing 
requirements of the CBB is sufficient for their needs while only 1.5% of the conventional 
banks are unaware of that. 
Islamic banks are less inclined to move to advanced approaches for credit market, and 
operational risk weighted assets than conventional banks. 21% of the Islamic banks would 
prefer the e adoption of the Foundation Internal Rating Approach while 46.3% of the 
conventional banks prefer this method. In addition, 13% of the Islamic banks prefer to 
continue under the standardize approach for credit risk while only 1.5% of the conventional 
banks prefer this approach.  
 
86.5 % of the conventional banks do not find the CBB’s inspection and examination staff 
competent to supervise our bank’s compliance while only 56% of the Islamic banks find that 
this is the case.  
 
None of the conventional banks find the CBB uses any parameters (such as ICAAP, Risk 
Appetite, and CAR) to determine the design of its regulatory and supervisor program while 
8% of the Islamic banks found the opposite. 81% of the conventional banks are confirmed 
not be aware of any parameters adopted by the CBB for the supervisory program while only 
53% of the Islamic banks reported not be aware.  
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In sum, the data gave us evidence that there are notables differences between the maturity of 
the conventional bank's risk management functions and awareness compared to Islamic 
banks. Moreover, the data also gave us evidence that the conventional banks are more 
competent, updated and experienced than Islamic banks. The financial crisis hit both types of 
the banks by varying degrees, but both of them suffered directly or indirectly the 
consequences. The model for non-interest and non-derivative or structured-finance business 
model saved Islamic banks from toxic assets investments but hit them indirectly in terms of 
the level of benchmark interest rate access to liquidity, etc. We have also learned that during 
liquidity shortage Islamic banks would suffer the most compared to the conventional banks 
because the secondary markets for sharia liquidity products are not as mature as the 
conventional banks. The constraints on the Islamic bank's permissible products and industry 
make them disadvantaged compared to the conventional banks in terms of utilization of their 
liquidity in either financing or investment ventures.  
 
5.6 Research limitations  
 
The reason for adopting and developing a qualitative ethnographic approach was lead 
primarily by pragmatic criteria. Achieving access to the bank's financial information, other 
than that disclosed in the annual report, is difficult enough for researchers, but when a 
proposed study aims to study the impact of regulations on banks risk management ( e.g., how 
they manage their risk, how the regulator operates), it becomes even tougher. Banks are 
particularly sensitive about disclosing any information; they construe that as jeopardy to their 
local competitiveness, their reputation, and their relationship with the regulator.   
 
The bank and the regulator desire to withhold information and consider even the opinion of 
their staff as confidential were problematic. To solicit staff opinion and experience through 
interviews and the questionnaire required secondary data in some areas. The only 
information available in the public domain is the banks’ annual reports. Information related 
to the various risk management frameworks are cursory addressed. With regard to the 
ICAAP, for instance, either what is mentioned is generic definitions and an indication of “we 
have put in place an ICAAP” or “we are embarking on ICAAP.”  Another example is an 
operational risk. Banks do not disclose how many fraud cases occurred during an accounting 
year or how much loss they incurred from a system disruption. Disclosure of such 
203 
 
information might tarnish their image and retard investors and depositors from dealing with 
them.       
 
5.7 Area of future research  
 
The Research and the Methodology section addressed that the disclosure of financial 
information was an obstacle. An area of future research would be to quantify the financial 
impact of Basel II implementation on the banks by studying the financial performance (e.g., 
profitability, liquidity, and solvency) of the banks before and after the implementation. 
Another potential area of research is to quantify statistically the operational and credit risk 
faced by each bank vis-à-vis the capital and then compare the results to the CAR calculated 
by Basel II. This exercise will inform us how much of risk coverage can be explained by 
Basel II.   
 
Part 2  
5.8 Recommendations  
 
In light of the findings of the research, we come in this section to bring out the 
recommendations to the CBB. I categorize the recommendations into two main sub-
categories, regulatory policy, and supervisory program.  
 
5.6.1 Regulatory Policy 
 
The first step that the CBB should take is to examine the scope of implementation of Basel II 
regulations. A practical way to perform that is to scrutinize the existing pool of banks in the 
country. There are financial institutions that carry the license of a bank while their business 
models are identical to those of investment companies62. The implications of this 
misalignment between the license and the business model are that many articles of Basel II 
regulations would be either underestimated, overestimated or not applicable to such banks. 
This, in turn, would result in a missing link in the chain, as the CBB does not have a 
                                                 
62 The design and scope of Basel II regulations are only for banks. The regulations are not applicable to any 
other financial or non-financial institutions. 
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supporting regulatory tool in place that could potentially be used to augment Basel II in such 
cases. From the aspect of accountability, the CBB would be asked to justify to the authority 
that supervises its conduct, in cases of crisis, why it failed to design a commensurate 
regulatory and supervisory program for these institutions. The CBB should clearly outline 
measurable criteria to distinguish investment companies from banks (in both forms, whole, 
and retail). Once the criteria have been outlined a decision should be made to change the 
license of those institutions which failed to meet the criteria of banks. By the end of this 
exercise, the CBB would have ensured that Basel II regulations are only implemented at 
institutions where all the articles of the regulations are applicable.  
 
After refining the scope of Basel II regulations, and before proceeding to the implementation 
of the regulations, the CBB should address the competence and expertise of its staff to handle 
the supervision program efficiently and effectively. It has been argued by Baldwin et al. 
(2012) that a set of regulations is assessed to be “good” when it is carried out by a high level 
of expertise by the regulator. I learned from the data in this study that there is a gap of 
knowledge and skills between the CBB’s staff and the bankers. This disadvantage of 
competence led to poor communication and absence of dialogue between the bankers and the 
CBB that eventually caused bankers’ to look at Basel II regulations as merely a “ticking 
boxes” exercises. The danger in such attitude that the CBB should be concerned about is that 
bankers could, and in some instances did, attempt to circumvent some of the regulations in 
ways that are arduous to be discovered or challenged. In an unmatched level of expertise, it is 
possible that the CBB will take decisions about the regulatory and supervisory programs 
based on understanding and analysis of information that is not reflective of the reality. The 
CBB might find itself in a situation that where what it assessed as low risk or immaterial 
issues have turned out, in reality, to be jeopardizing the banking system. So, the CBB should 
raise the bar of its staff in terms of ability to take expert judgment, education, skills, and 
knowledge, to be equal to that of the bankers, if not above.   
 
A clear macro-prudential policy would then need to be defined about which approach the 
CBB finds most appropriate to adopt, rules-based or principles-based approach regulatory 
approach. The CBB should be transparent about the policy and duly communicate it to the 
bankers. In addition, the CBB should be transparent with bankers about its objectives and 
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initiatives. The decision to choose from the above two approaches should take into 
considerations the organizational and operational characteristics of both the CBB the banks. 
The policy should also include the CBB’s directions and objectives of implementing Basel II 
regulations. Typically, the policy should include whether the CBB intends to implement the 
articles of Basel II regulations in a one-size-fits-all approach (i.e. irrespective of the size of 
the bank’s operations or its type of license) or it intends to implement the regulations based 
on a matrix of variables. The data in this study supports us to recommend that the one-size-
fits-all regulatory policy with regard to Basel II regulations should be avoided. The CBB 
should consider the idiosyncratic risks, financial performance, organizational structure, 
governance, and business model for each bank. Subsequently, banks should be categorized 
based on a pre-defined matrix that is designed based on the above variables and features.  For 
each category, there is a peculiar regulatory policy and supervision program. Criteria for 
mapping of banks into this matrix should be disclosed and dialogued with banks. The scope 
of implementation of Basel II regulations, specifically the minimum capital thresholds and 
approach for calculation of CAR, should be scored as per the matrix.   
 
The data in this study informed us that the CBB should instill a culture of dialogue and trust 
with the banks rather than the culture of imposition and mistrust.  Banks should be regarded 
as partners to build and maintain resilient banking system. Their feedbacks on the regulatory 
policy and supervision program should be solicited and attended to. The CBB should take the 
first step toward that objective by altering its view of banking regulations and supervisions 
that are currently focused on the administrative side of the regulation. The current focus of 
the CBB, as far as Basel II regulations are concerned, is limiting the scope of regulation to 
the control, control of capital, control of the government, and control of compliance. There 
are many facets of regulations than the capital, and Basel II is only a tool for banking 
regulations. For a regulator, the focus should not be confined to which tool we use and 
whether the tool we adopt is dubbed as “international best practice.” In spite of the 
importance of applying the best practices in the industry but a focus should also be widened 
to include other tools to augment Basel II. These other tools should accommodate the 
peculiar cultural, social and economic attributes of the players in the banking system. The 
driving factor that would help the CBB move to that direction is the change of its attitude 
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from a regulator that envisages itself as a government arm mandated to police the banking 
system to a regular that work with the banks to build robust banking system.   
 
The data advised us that Basel II is not an adequate regulation in Bahrain. The CBB should 
consider augmenting Basel II implementation with other regulatory tools should be deployed 
on a case-by-case basis. There should be a clear policy at the CBB that outlines the tools, 
scope of their implementation and the criteria that guide which and when each tool is 
implemented.  
 
5.6.2 Supervision program  
 
The above recommendations were for macro-prudential regulations and supervision. Moving 
to micro-prudential regulations and supervision, we recommend that the CBB should design 
and develop a comprehensive regulations and supervision program for Pillar 2 of Basel II. 
The CBB should clearly demarcate the minimum requirements for the composition of 
ICAAP by banks. With the absence of clear requirements in this respect, banks resorted to 
external auditors or consulting firms to develop the ICAAP document on their behalf. These 
documents are then sent to the CBB. This is a ticking box exercise. Basel II regulations 
require that the ICAAP document is developed internally by each bank and it is the 
responsibility of the bank’s management and board of directors to make all the needed 
assessments to determine the size of capital required to absorb all the material risks. This 
behavior of CBB toward the implementation of Pillar 2 of Basel II is in sheer breach of Basel 
II regulations. Thus, we recommend that the CBB requires every bank to develop their own 
ICAAP and the exercise of preparing the ICAAP should not be outsourced. The CBB should 
utilize the ICAAP in the design of its supervision and inspection program and monitor how 
banks develop and utilize ICAAP in their risk management conduct. 
 
With regard to the risk management at banks, the CBB should not rely on the implementation 
of Basel II to instill risk management practices at a bank or prevent exposure to the financial 
crisis. The CBB should adopt tools such as stress testing for each bank and aggregate stress 
testing of the whole system in order to enable them to foresee and prepare for financial 
crises. There should be a design for comprehensive regulatory and supervisory 
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methodologies for stress testing and economic capital. These regulations should cover the 
desired scenarios to be tested, the frequency of testing and the mechanics of dealing with the 
results at the banks and the CBB level.  
  
The CBB should opt for an advanced approach of Basel II. If the CBB cannot obtain the 
needed resources to implement advanced approaches it should augment the currently applied 
methods with another method to reflect the essential risks faced by the bank; 
 
The CBB’s periodic reporting should be enhanced to create value to the CBB, to uncover the 
essential underlying risk of banks’ operations, and value to the banks as a monitoring tool for 
the board and executive management. The prudential reports should be designed consistently 
with the banks’ business models, and the CBB’s staff should be very well aware of the 
intricacies of these reports to be able to effectively monitor banks’ adherence. The data 
informed us that the CBB outsources the entire design of its Basel II prudential reporting to a 
consultancy firm. Since the CBB’s inspectors and examiners are not aware of the rationale 
and objectives of the design of this reporting, their reaction towards the banks’ feedback on 
the reporting is perceived to be unproductive. I, therefore, recommend that the CBB instill a 
culture of transparency and dialogue with the banks about their scope of supervision, 
inspections programs, and supervisory objectives.  
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Appendix (A) 
Questionnaire’s questions 
1. Do you think that Basel II implementation, in the context of the CBB Rulebooks helps to 
improve your bank risk management’s function and practices? 
• Yes, we find strong positive correlation between Basel II implementation and risk 
management practices at our bank 
• Yes, but the improvement in risk management is not as per our expectations 
• Indifferent 
• No, we find no differences in risk management practices after or before Basel II 
implementation 
• No, we find no correlation between Basel II implementation and our bank's risk 
management practices 
2. Has your bank been impacted by the financial crisis erupted in 2007? 
• Yes, our bank was hugely impacted by the crisis 
• Yes, our bank was considerably impacted by the crisis 
• Indifferent 
• Yes, our bank was insignificantly impacted by the crisis 
• No, our bank was not impacted by the crisis at all 
3. Do you believe Basel II implementation at your bank, along with the CBB guidance, 
helped your bank survive the crisis of 2007? 
• Yes, but our bank was also impacted by risks not addressed in the CBB Basel II 
implementation 
• Indifferent 
• No, because banks were impacted by risks other than those calculated in Basel II 
Capital Adequacy Ratio(CAR) 
• No, because banks in Bahrain were not impacted by this crisis 
4. In your view, could Basel II implementation in Bahrain reduce the systemic risk? 
• Yes, and the CBB has shared with the banks the relationship between Basel II 
implementation and systemic risk 
• Yes, but the CBB did not share with the banks how could Basel II implementation 
reduce systemic risk 
• Indifferent 
• No, but the CBB has shared with the banks the relationship between Basel II 
implementation and systemic risk 
• No, I do not see a relationship between Basel II implementation and systemic risk 
5. In your view, could Basel II implementation enhance the reputation of your bank? 
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• Yes, Basel II implementation significantly enhanced our bank's reputation 
• Yes, but the positive impact is not significant 
• Indifferent 
• No, Basel II implementation has not enhanced our bank's reputation 
• No, we do not find a relationship between Basel II implementation and our bank's 
reputation 
6. Has Basel II implementation at your bank enhanced its international competitiveness? 
• Yes, we noticed strong positive correlation between the implementation and our 
international competitiveness 
• Yes, but the positive impact was not significant 
• Indifferent 
• No, Basel II implementation did not enhance our bank international competitiveness 
• No, we do not believe there is a relationship between Basel II implementation and 
international competitiveness 
7. If Basel II was not imposed by the CBB until now, would you have applied the same tools 
of risk management such as VaR, Economic capital, Stress testing, that you are/ will be 
applying? 
• No, if Basel II was not imposed by the CBB we would not have applied the risk 
management tools we are currently applying 
• No, but we might eventually apply to be at par with the international best practices 
• Indifferent 
• Yes, but not in the same level of scale and sophistication 
• Yes, we would have implemented all the risk management international practices and 
standards even if Basel II was not imposed by the CBB 
8. Does the Standardized Approach of Credit Risk Weight Calculation reflect the essential 
credit risk in your bank's portfolios? 
• Yes, and our bank does not need to consider another approach or further calculation 
• Yes, but our bank needs to show more robust capital allocation for credit risk in its 
ICAAP 
• Indifferent 
• No, and the CBB relies on our ICAAP for the adequacy of capital for the bank's credit 
risk 
• No, and we think our bank should adopt advanced approaches for credit risk 
• Other (please specify) 
9. Which methods when implemented do you think would mostly reflect your bank actual 
credit risk? 
• Alternative Standardized Approach 
• Foundation Internal Rating Approach (FIRB) 
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• Advanced Internal Rating Approach (AIRB) 
10. Does the Basic Indicator Approach of calculating the operational risk-weighted assets 
reflect the essential operational risk your bank is exposed to? 
• Yes, and our bank does not need to consider another approach 
• Yes, but our bank needs to show more robust capital allocation for operational risk in 
its ICAAP 
• Indifferent 
• No, and the CBB relies on the bank's ICAAP for the adequacy of capital for the 
bank's operational risk 
• No, and our bank should adopt advanced approaches for operational risk 
• Other (please specify) 
11. Which methods when implemented do you think would mostly reflect your bank actual 
operational risk? 
• Standardized approach 
• Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) 
• Bayesian methods 
12. Do the CBB Rulebooks, inspection visits and prudential meetings help to improve your 
bank economic capital framework and practices? 
• Yes, we find the CBB regulation and supervision for economic capital framework 
helpful and adequate to our needs 
• Yes, but the CBB regulation and supervision for economic capital framework are not 
up to our needs 
• Indifferent 
• No, we do not find the CBB regulation and supervision for economic capital 
framework helpful 
• No, the CBB does not currently have a regulation, guidance or supervision program 
for economic capital framework and practices 
13. Does the CBB Rulebooks, inspection visits and prudential meeting help to 
design/improve your bank stress testing framework and practices? 
• Yes, we find the CBB regulation and supervision for stress testing framework helpful 
and adequate to our needs 
• Yes, but the CBB regulation and supervision for stress testing framework are not up 
to our needs 
• Indifferent 
• No, we do not find the CBB regulation and supervision for stress testing framework 
helpful 
• No, the CBB does not currently have a regulation, guidance or supervision program 
for stress testing framework and practices 
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14. Do the CBB Rulebooks, inspection visits and prudential meeting help to design/ improve 
your bank risk profile and risk appetite framework? 
• Yes, we find the CBB regulation and supervision for risk appetite framework helpful 
and adequate for our needs 
• Yes, but the CBB regulation and supervision for risk appetite framework are not up to 
our needs 
• Indifferent 
• No, we do not find the CBB regulation and supervision for risk appetite framework 
helpful 
• No, the CBB does not currently have a regulation, guidance or supervision program 
for risk appetite framework and practices 
15. Do the feedbacks from CBB on the periodic reportings from your bank (e.g. PIRI, etc.) 
help you identify weaknesses and areas for improvements in your risk management, capital 
allocation, corporate governance and strategic risk management? 
• Yes, we find the feedbacks from the CBB helpful to us in all these areas 
• Yes, we find the feedbacks from the CBB helpful but for limited areas and aspects of 
our risk management and corporate governance 
• Indifferent 
• No, we do not find feedbacks from the CBB helpful because they lack precision and 
relevance 
• No, we do not receive feedbacks from the CBB on our periodic reportings. 
16. In your view, is the Capital Adequacy Ratio, as calculated based on Basel II, a sufficient 
indicator of your bank capitalization level toward your portfolio risks? 
• Yes, CAR is a sufficient indicator of our bank's portfolios risks 
• Yes, but needs to be enhanced with other indicator or proxy 
• Indifferent 
• No, we do not find CAR as we currently calculate a sufficient indicator of our bank's 
portfolios risks 
• No, we do not find a relationship between our portfolios risk and the CAR we 
currently calculate 
• Other (please specify) 
17. Do you prefer to be supervised by the central bank based on principles-based supervision 
or rules-based supervision? 
• Principles-based supervision 
• Rules-based supervision 
• Principles and Rules-based supervision 
18. Do you find the current supervision of CBB on the liquidity risk on your bank is adequate 
and commensurate with your risk profile and appetite? 
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• Yes, we find the CBB regulation & supervision of liquidity risk adequate and 
commensurate to our bank risk appetite and profile and should be maintained. 
• Yes, but the CBB needs to improve its reporting requirements for liquidity risk to 
reflect the types of license and business model for a bank 
• Indifferent 
• No, the CBB adopts a standard one-size-fits-all liquidity regulation & supervision for 
all types of banks licenses 
• No, the CBB does not currently have a formulated regulation and supervision for 
liquidity risk relevant to our bank license 
19. Do you find the CBB regulation and supervision effective in implementing the pillar 2 of 
Basel II? 
• Yes, we find the CBB regulation and supervision for Pillar 2 effective and 
commensurate with banks business model 
• Yes, but only on the regulation side; the CBB needs to improve its supervision side of 
the Pillar 2 implementation 
• Indifferent 
• No, we do not find the CBB effective because its regulation and supervision for pillar 
2 are not commensurate with banks business model 
• No, the CBB does not have a formulated regulation & supervision for Pillar 2 
20. Do you have risk profile and appetite updated and approved by the board and adequately 
linked to the capital planning and risk management? 
• Yes, and it is adequately integrated with our strategic planning and capital allocation 
• Yes, but it is not adequately integrated into our strategic planning and capital 
allocation 
• Indifferent 
• No, we do not have an updated risk appetite and profile 
• No, we have not yet developed a risk appetite and risk profile for our bank 
21. How frequently, and in which way, does the CBB ask for the risk profile& appetite and 
strategy of your bank? 
• Annually, in the prudential meeting 
• Semi-annually, in the prudential meeting 
• Quarterly 
• During the Inspection visits only 
• The CBB never asked us about a risk profile and appetite document 
22. Did the CBB indicate to your bank which methods to use to measure the concentration 
risk, liquidity risk, strategic risk, leverage risk and stress testing? 
Yes, the CBB has given us adequate instructions, guidance, regulations and supervision on 
how to quantify these risks 
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• Yes, the CBB has given us instructions, guidance, regulations and supervision on how 
to quantify these risks but we have not implemented them 
• Indifferent 
• No, the CBB has not given us any instructions, guidance, regulations or supervision 
on how to quantify these risks because the CBB did not assess how important these 
risks are to the banking system 
• No, the CBB has not given us any instructions, guidance, regulations or supervision 
on how to quantify these risks because it does not have the competence or the 
methodology to do so 
23. Do you believe the board of directors of your bank is fully aware of Basel II implications 
on your bank's risk management, capital planning, and risk appetite and risk profile? 
• Yes, the board of directors is fully aware of Basel II and all the relevant issues around 
its implementation 
• Yes, the board of directors is adequately aware of Basel II and all the relevant issues 
around its implementation 
• Indifferent 
• No, the board of directors is not adequately fully aware of Basel II and all the relevant 
issues around its implementation 
• No, the board of directors is not aware of Basel II and all the relevant issues around 
its implementation 
24. Has the CBB given your bank sufficient guidance to design and utilize ICAAP 
document? 
• Yes, the CBB gave to us a sufficient guidance to formulate our ICAAP 
• Yes, the CBB gave to us a guidance but was not sufficient and lacked precision and 
clear requirements 
• Indifferent 
• No, the CBB required us to prepare an ICAAP without giving any guidance for the 
preparation 
• No, the CBB has not required preparation of an ICAAP for our bank 
25. Do you believe that the CBB relies on your ICAAP document to direct its supervision 
program toward your bank? 
• Yes, we believe the CBB relies on our ICAAP document in its decision about the 
supervision program for our bank 
• Yes, but the CBB reliance on the ICAAP document is not significant in its decision 
about the supervision program for our bank 
• Indifferent 
• No, we do not believe that the CBB uses our ICAAP document in its decision about 
the supervision program for our bank 
• No, we do not believe the CBB examines or assesses our ICAAP document 
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26. Do you find the CBB designs and plans its supervisory program on your bank based on 
the parameters of your bank: business model, risk profile, risk appetite, stage of growth, 
strategy, board and executive management expertise, etc.? 
• Yes, we find the CBB supervisory program for our bank designed based on these 
parameters 
• Yes, we find the CBB supervisory program for our bank designed based on only a 
few of these parameters 
• Indifferent 
• No, we find the CBB uses a standard supervisory program for all the banks 
irrespective of these parameters 
• No, we are not aware of the parameters the CBB uses in its decision about the 
supervisory program for our bank 
27. Do you believe that the CBB staff of inspection and off-site supervision possess the 
required skills, competence and knowledge of risk management, capital management & 
planning, and business risk? 
• Yes, we find the CBB staff competent and possess the required skills to supervise our 
bank 
• Yes, but the CBB inspection and examination staff needs to be up-to-date with the 
changes in banking environments to give applicable and practical recommendations 
• Indifferent 
• No, we find the CBB inspection and examination staff with limited competence or 
required skills to supervise our bank 
• No, we do not find the CBB inspection and examination staff competent or possess 
the required skills to supervise our bank 
• Other (please specify) 
28. What is your title or current post? 
• Head of Risk 
• Head of internal Audit 
• Head of Financial Control 
• General Manager/ CEO 
• Head of Compliance 
29. How long have you been with the bank? 
• 1-3 year 
• 3-5 years 
• 5-10 years 
• 10-15 years 
• More than15 years 
• Other (please specify) 
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30. What is your academic Background? 
• Undergraduate 
• Baccalaureate 
• Master/ MBA 
• PhD 
• Other (please specify) 
31. What is your professional qualification? 
• CPA 
• CFA 
• ACCA 
• FRM/PRM 
• CMA/CIMA 
• CIA 
• CA 
• PMP 
• CAIA 
32. What is the type of your bank’s license? 
• Islamic Retail Bank 
• Islamic wholesale bank 
• Conventional retail bank 
• Conventional wholesale bank 
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